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ABSTRACT
The Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance,signed by the Flandin-Laval 
government in May 1935, was never complemented by the conclusion of a 
military accord, as the Russians hoped. This study comprises an 
analysis of the value of the Pact in these circumstances, and an 
examination of why and how the French Popular Front Government allowed 
the Pact with the USSR to deteriorate beyond repair. Thus the numerous 
adverse pressures on the Government are evaluated: fear of alienating 
France’s allies, particularly Great Britain, as well as the desire not 
to antagonise Germany further; and fear of domestic opposition, both 
in parliament and from the military leaders.
This study suggests that the single most important factor linking these 
considerations was dislike of communism; the attitudes of France’s 
allies towards the Soviet Pact were predominantly coloured by fear of 
bolshevism; the conservative tendencies of the General Staff clouded 
its judgement of Soviet military usefulness; the Popular Front 
Government itself was primarily concerned with the activities of the 
French Communist Party; while, ironically, its own association with the 
communists made any Popular Front attempt to extend the Pact subject 
to vociferous domestic opposition. In effect, the Franco-Soviet Pact 
was unlikely ever to be reinforced as long as fear of communism 
remained stronger than fear of German fascism.
Thus it may be said that the failure to consolidate the Pact represents 
the broader French unwillingness to recognise the true nature of 
Hitlerism, and so to defy British reticence and take an effective lead 
in the struggle against fascism. In this way, an analysis of Popular
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Front policy towards the Soviet Pact can be seen as an integral part of 
an understanding of the whole of French foreign policy during the later 
1930's.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION : THE NATURE AND LEGALITY OF THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT
Paul Reynaud describes the Franco-Soviet Pact in his memoirs as 
"l’instrument diplomatique le plus confus et le plus inefficace que 
la diplomatie française ait jamais mis au monde" (1). Pierre-Etienne 
Flandin, the French Premier when the Pact was signed, disputes this 
interpretation, insisting that the Pact was even clearer and more 
precise in its obligations than the French undertaking to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia signed in October 1925 (2). In fact the two are 
describing entirely different facets of the Pact. It was precise in 
its scrupulous wording, designed to ensure that it did not counter 
France’s obligations under either Locarno or the League of Nations 
Covenant, and as such it was entirely legal. Where the Pact was 
confused, as Reynaud claimed, was that while under article 2 it was 
stipulated that in the event of either party being the victim of an 
unprovoked aggression by a European state then "1’URSS et réciproquement 
la France se prêteront immédiatement aide et assistance", there was 
nowhere any definition of what form the envisaged mutual aid and 
assistance should take. It was this point which was in fact the most 
crucial, since it dealt with the actual nature and value of the Pact, 
but it was the first, that is the question of its technical legality, 
which initially caused the most controversy.
In spite of the rapprochement which had produced a non-aggression pact 
in 1932, the Franco-Soviet Pact was not initially conceived as a 
bilateral agreement : Louis Barthou, who was responsible for much of 
the groundwork for the Pact, had originally envisaged it as an integral
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part of an ’Eastern Locarno’, a non-agression treaty of consultation 
and mutual assistance between thossEastern European states actually 
interested in such an agreement for regional reasons, which was to be 
guaranteed by a complementary pact between France, Russia and if 
possible, Germany (3). Only once German and Polish opposition to such 
a scheme became apparent did the idea of a purely bilateral Franco- 
Soviet agreement emerge, ’comme dernière ressource’’ (4), though the 
hope that such an arrangement could still become part of an Eastern 
Pact persisted in French governing circles. This French reluctance 
to conclude any agreement which might resemble a formal alliance meant 
in practice that negotiations with the Russians were extremely complex, 
often foundering on the French insistence that a direct reference be 
included that the Pact must not operate contrary to the provisions of 
Locarno or the League of Nations Covenant, stipulations which the 
Soviets saw as unnecessary. In addition, Barthou’s successor at the 
Quai, Pierre Laval, was far from enthusiastic about such an agreement, 
although with persistent encouragement from the Ambassador in Moscow, 
Charles Alphand, who constantly urged that ’’1 ’accord avec Moscou est 
le seul moyen de rétablir l ’égalité de fait sinon de droit, détruite 
par le réarmement de l ’Allemagne" (5), the tortuous negotiations were 
allowed to proceed : finally, on May 2nd 1935, seven months after the 
assassination of its primary architect, Louis Barthou, a Franco-Soviet 
Pact of mutual assistance was concluded in Paris.
Just three weeks after the signature of the Pact, on May 25th the 
German government circulated a memorandum to the other Locarno powers 
in which it challenged the legality of the new Pact,or rather, of the 
Protocol which accompanied it. Two fundamental objections were raised: 
the first, that Germany was being encircled by unfriendly powers : the
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second that by attacking Germany, whatever the circumstances, France 
would be violating Locarno (6 ). One month later, the official French 
reply to the memorandum was handed to the German charge d ’affaires in 
Paris (7). On the charge of encirclement the French case was weakest
(8 ). Although it had originally been inspired by fear of Germany, the 
French argued that the Pact itself specified only ’’un Etat européen’’, 
and pointed out that it had initially been conceived as part of an 
’’eastern Locarno’’ between the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, Poland 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, to be guaranteed by France. Moreover, it 
was still open to those powers which wished to join it (9 ). In fact, 
though, this accord was to have been complemented by an assistance 
treaty between France, the Soviet Union and Germany, and paragraph 4 
of the Protocol stipulated that the Franco-Soviet undertakings would 
operate only "dans les limites envisagées dans l ’accord tripartite 
antérieurement projeté" : thus, the Protocol did effectively single 
out Germany as the object of Franco-Soviet mutual action, and the French 
insistence that Germany herself could still resolve this problem by 
agreeing to extend the Pact into a tripartite accord was merely 
disregarded by the Germans.
The French were on stronger ground when denying the charge of violating 
Locarno and the League Covenant. The text of the Pact and Protocol 
repeatedly referred to the wish of the contracting parties to ensure 
the ’precise application’ of the terms of the Covenant, making specific 
reference to articles 15,16 and 17. Moreover, article 11 of the 
Protocol specified that no action taken as a result of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact could contradict any obligation previously undertaken by either 
France or Russia towards a third party, or expose either to the 
possibility of international sanctions. This last point had little
importance for Russia, but referred directly to the provisions of 
Locarno, in effect making any French action under the Pact dependent 
on the acquiescence of Great Britain and Italy, the Locarno guarantors. 
The French memorandum even maintained that if "une obligation découlant 
du traité franco-soviétique apparaissait comme étant en contradiction 
avec une obligation découlant pour la France du traité de Locarno, le 
traité de Locarno devrait prévaloir". Finally, the French sought to 
dispel any further argument by pointing out that the terms of the 
Protocol (article 1) ensured that the application of the envisaged 
"aid and assistance" would not be automatic since it would be made 
dependent on referral of the dispute to the League Council.
It was in fact this clause which raised the most criticism, since it 
included the proposal that France and Russia should act together to 
obtain the Council’s recommendations regarding article 16 of the 
Covenant as soon as possible, but added that "si néanmoins le Conseil, 
pour une raison quelconque, n ’énonce aucune recommendation ou s ’il 
n ’arrive pas à un vote unanime, l ’obligation d ’assistance n ’en recevra 
pas moins application". German opposition to this provision, expressed 
through various international channels, was two-fold. Firstly it was 
argued that since France and the USSR were both members of the Council, 
they could always ensure that there was no unanimity in the vote and 
would therefore, under article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant, regain 
their freedom of action (10). In fact, that same article specified that 
the vote would not be open to the "representatives of the parties in 
dispute", although of course it was likely that either France or Russia 
would not at that stage be officially involved in the dispute in question
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The second objection was more fundamental. Under article II of 
Locarno, Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, mutually agreed 
not to attack each other except : when exercising the right of 
legitimate defence; when acting in pursuance of article 16 of the 
League Covenant; or when acting as a result of a decision taken by 
the Council in pursuance of article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant, 
provided that the action was directed against the state which was the 
first to attack. In aiding Russia in the event of an unprovoked 
German attack, France claimed that she would not be violating Locarno 
because she would be acting in accordance with article ii of that 
treaty, that is in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant. Dr.Gaus, 
the Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 
argued however that this obligation in the Pact (to aid the attacked 
party even if no unanimous recommendation were made by the Council 
under article 16), was inconsistent with article 16 itself, maintaining 
that military action of any kind could only be taken under article 16 
in pursuance of a recommendation by the Council (11). In fact, Dr.Gaus 
was here really taking issue with the League Covenant rather than the 
Franco-Soviet Pact, for while article 16 did provide for joint military 
action against a flagrant aggressor by the League members, it neverthe­
less nowhere precluded the kind of bilateral assistance envisaged by 
the Franco-Soviet Pact. Moreover, the Pact merely constituted an 
extension of the open-ended provision contained in article 15, paragraph 
7, which declared that in the event of the Council not reaching a 
unanimous decision, then the League members would regain their right 
to act "as they judged necessary for the maintenance of right and 
justice".
In spite of German attempts to cast doubt on the legality of the Pact
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the French position was supported by the other Locarno powers. In 
April 1935, Sir John Simon had expressed British fears that the Franco- 
Soviet agreement might oblige France to attack Germany in circumstances 
which would bring into operation the British guarantee to Germany 
under Locarno (12), but after repeated reassurances from Laval and 
Léger that the Pact was entirely compatible with both Locarno and the 
League Covenant (13), the British government declared that the Pact 
was entirely legal. Thus in July, led by Great Britain, the other 
Locarno powers, Belgium and Italy, replied to the German memorandum 
that they were in complete agreement with the views expressed in the 
French government note of June 25th, and on consideration of the 
German objections, were satisfied that there was nothing in the Franco- 
Soviet treaty which either conflicted with Locarno or modified its 
operation in any way (14). The three powers also agreed to confirm, 
in accordance with the request made in the German memorandum, that 
the provisions of Locarno could not legally be modified or redefined 
by the fact that a treaty had been concluded by one of the signatories.
Although the legality of the Pact was no longer really in question, the 
French continued to minimise its implications in order to justify its 
existence. Thus during the Chamber debate on ratification supporters 
of the Pact sought to counter the arguments of those such as Fernand 
Laurent and Jean Montigny who insisted that the Pact constituted a 
dangerous military alliance, by stressing the Pact’s restrictions.
Henri Torrès, for example, the socialist ’rapporteur’ of the Pact in 
the Chamber, was so anxious to ensure its acceptability to the right- 
wing opposition that he listed all its limitations while saying 
virtually nothing of its potential value. For instance, according to 
the Pact the aggressor state must be European (which excluded the
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possibility of French involvement on Russia’s behalf against Japan); 
the aggression must be against the victim’s own territory (which meant 
that France would not be obliged to act in the event of a German attack 
on the Baltic states, even though Russia would regard this as a threat 
to her own security); and finally, of course, the assistance would 
not be of an immediate or automatic nature. Moreover, Torres argued 
that in fact the Pact ’’comporte une assistance qui n ’a pas un caractère 
aussi diligent que l ’assistance prévue par les accords de Locarno’’, under 
which French obligations to Poland and Czechoslovakia were of a more 
vigorous and automatic nature than those now linking France to Moscow
(15).
Similarly Flandin, who was Premier when the Pact was signed and Foreign 
Minister when it was ratified, did everything possible during the 
Chamber debate to make it appear harmless (16). In fact, French 
officials seem to have been unsure about what exactly French obligations 
under the Pact comprised. Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Chamber in November 1936, for example, Torrès sought to show that while 
the only available public definition of ’’assistance’’ was that of Cannes, 
which envisaged ’’une totalité des forces publiques militaires,terrestres 
et aériennes’’, France would nevertheless retain sovereignty of action 
devolving from article 16 of the Covenant, and so could not be held to 
its obligation to assist unless it had decided itself that it must do 
so (17) Indeed, as late as December 1938, jurists at the Quai d ’Orsay 
were still attempting to ascertain the nature of French obligations under 
the Pact (18).
While the French anxiously sought to prove that the Pact was entirely 
legal, however, it was becoming painfully clear that Germany was
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anxious to maintain that France had destroyed Locarno merely so that 
she could turn this apparently new situation to her own advantage.
This was demonstrated by the German refusal to countenance any French 
attempts at conciliation. For example, in June Léger, the General 
Secretary of the Quai d ’Orsay, indicated that the French government 
might be prepared to give an official undertaking to the effect that 
in the event of France being enabled to act on Russia’s behalf in 
pursuance of article 15, paragraph. 7 , the French government would 
still not take any military action against Germany without first 
consulting and obtaining the agreement of Great Britain and Italy : 
the Berlin government merely replied that such an attack by France on 
Germany was contrary to the provisions of Locarno, and the fact that 
Britain and Italy concurred made no difference to the legal position
(19). The French also proposed that the Pact be submitted to an 
arbitration tribunal such as the Hague Court of Justice, but received 
no reply from Germany. Similarly, by February 1936 the German press 
had begun to argue that while the letter of Locarno might have been 
respected, its spirit had been violated in that the Pact would bring 
dangers to Germany which Locarno had aimed to remove, as well as 
creating the possibility of French intervention in parts of Europe for 
which Locarno had made no provision (20).
That Germany simply chose to regard the Pact as rendering Locarno 
obsolete for her own purposes was appreciated by the French government, 
which noted in January 1936 that ’’on ne peut se défendre de l ’impression 
qu’il cherche là un prétexte pour se débarrasser des engagements pris 
à Locarno, qui le gênent considérablement dans sa réorganisation 
militaire actuelle’’ (21) Such fears were justified. On the 7th March 
as German troops marched into the Rhineland, the German government
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issued a memorandum to the other Locarno powers in which it declared 
that France had infringed the Rhine Pact by signing a military alliance 
with the Soviet Union directed exclusively against Germany. Thus, "the 
Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to 
exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no longer
bound by this dissolved treaty and (has)today restored the full and
unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarised zone of the 
Rhineland" (22) While opponents of the Pact saw Hitler’s action as a 
justification of their criticisms, the real lesson of the Rhineland coup 
was in fact exactly the opposite. Hitler clearly believed, or was at 
least prepared to gamble, that the Pact did not constitute a real threat 
to Germany, and as such he was able to use the Pact’s existence as a 
pretext, while having no fear of the consequences. In other words, in 
spite of his own assertion to the contrary. Hitler did not believe that 
the Franco-Soviet Pact comprised a military alliance.
In this assumption, as French supporters of the Pact had pointed out 
throughout. Hitler was quite correct. Indeed Pierre Laval, who had 
signed the Pact, had never intended that it should become a military 
alliance. Ironically it was the Protocol, on which the Germans chose 
to base their criticisms of the pact, which had the effect of depriving 
the Pact of its value, since by including the recommendations that any 
dispute be first referred to the League Council, the automatic operation 
of the Pact’s obligations was excluded. In the words of one Russian 
historian, this would give Germany, launching a sudden attack, time 
enough to conquer the country before the act of an aggression had been 
formally established (23). Moreover, the restriction implied by the 
Protocol was entirely intentional. The Soviet Ambassador to Paris at 
the time recollects that "les collaborateurs diplomatiques de Laval..... 
s ’efforcaient, par tous les moyens, de donner au futur pacte franco-
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soviétique un caractère purement formel" (24), while Laval himself 
openly admitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber that 
"j’ai toujours considéré que dans le pacte franco-soviétique il ne 
devait pas y avoir d ’automatisme" (25). Similarly he told a meeting 
of the French High Command in November that although the Parliament 
would probably ratify the Pact, there was no cause for alarm since 
"j’en ai extrait le plus dangereux" (26).
It is significant that critics of the Pact were virtually unanimous 
in their praise of Laval. The Polish ’Czas’ newspaper, for example, 
congratulated him on limiting the engagement of assistance by the 
addition of the Protocol, which it saw as a "veritable chef d ’oeuvre 
diplomatique" (27), while the ’Journal de Genève) an avowed opponent 
of Franco-Soviet rapprochement, praised Laval’s prudence in resisting 
the pressure for a more binding alliance (28). Similarly, the right- 
wing Spanish newspaper ’El Debate’ rejoiced that "le pacte du 2 mai 
est bien loin d ’être une alliance" (2). Furthermore, Laval’s own 
dislike of the Soviets and marked preference for a Franco-German 
rapprochement was well-known. He was said to have remarked among 
friends that "protéger et secourir le regime bolchéviste ne valait pas 
les os d ’un seul paysan d ’Auvergne" (30), while ’Humanité’ claimed that 
he told press representatives that "ce que je voudrais en vérité,c’est 
m ’entendre avec Hitler, plutôt qu’empêcher la guerre en signant avec 
Litvinov" (31). In fact, as early as June 1934, Laval had declared 
himself at a Cabinet meeting "categorically in favour of an agreement 
with Germany and hostile to a rapprochement with Russia, which would 
bring us the Internationale and the Red flag" (32).
Laval was presumably irritated that he had to sign an agreement with
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Russia at all but, recognising that he would have to respond to 
considerable pressure from Cabinet colleagues, particularly after the 
re-establishment of military service in Germany in March 1935, seems 
to have decided that his best course of action would be to conclude the 
Pact, while weakening it as much as possible. Thus, having insisted 
on the inclusion of the Protocol, Laval then proceeded to delay the 
ratification of the Pact for as long as possible, insisting on its 
being broughtibefore Parliament. In fact, as one official of the Quai 
pointed out, the government would have been acting perfectly within 
its powers and in accordance with several precedents had it proceeded 
with ratification without first obtaining parliamentary approval (33), 
but Laval continued to insist that ratification could only take place 
after a general vote of confidence by the Chamber in the government's 
foreign policy (34). His ploy deceived no-one, of course. The British 
Ambassador to Germany remarked, for instance, that "M. Laval is 
wriggling like a devil in holy water and keeps postponing from day to 
day on one pretext or another the ratification of the Pact" (35), 
while Ambassador Potemkin recollects that "il devenait plus en plus 
evident que Laval accordait à ce document l'importance d'un simple 
chiffon de papier qu’il ne pourrait utiliser qu’au cours de ses 
négociations avec l ’Allemagne, pour se donner plus de prix" (36).
Indeed, on July 2?th, Laval told the German Ambassador to Paris that 
if Germany would only agree to sign an obligation not to attack the 
Soviet Union, then France would "hand her paper back to Russia" (37).
The Soviets were not only critical of Laval’s refusal to submit the 
Pact for ratification, but also of his evasion of their repeated 
requests for military talks. In the words of Paul Reynaud, the Russians, 
unlike many Frenchmen, had read ’Mein Kampf’, and "en avaient tiré
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la conclusion qu’il fallait faire avec la France quelque chose de plus 
sérieux que le pacte vidé de son contenu que leur avait fait signer 
Laval’’ (38). It was, after all, only reasonable that if potential 
Soviet assistance in the event of a German attack on France, or, by 
virtue of the complementary Soviet-Czech assistance pact, on 
Czechoslovakia, were seriously envisaged,then . detailed military 
discussions should be undertaken. Moreover, since Russia had no common 
frontier with Germany, then any Soviet aid would necessarily have to 
cross Poland or Roumania who, as allies of France, could have been 
involved in such discussions. Thus the Soviet government was naturally 
encouraged by Laval’s assurance to Stalin during his visit to Moscow 
that he was ready to open Staff talks (39)* And yet. General Gamelin 
recollects that, having returned from Moscow, Laval ’’qui me savait des 
relations suivies avec l ’attaché militaire des Soviets, m ’avait 
demandé, sinon spécifiquement de ’freiner’, tout au moins de ne pas 
travailler sur le plan des grades élevés de l ’Armée’’ (40) Laval had 
no regard for the Red Army and, in the words of his Minister of War, 
Jean Fabry, ’’ayant évité, dans les articles du pacte,de lier la 
France par un texte trop rigide, le Président de Conseil n ’avait aucun 
gout pour l ’automatisme brutal d ’une convention militaire,!’. In fact 
Fabry, a vociferous anti-communist, shared this opinion fully, and 
throughout 1935 he resisted Potemkin’s requests for military 
collaboration which, he believed, ’’laissait trop de chances à la 
guerre’’ (41).
Clearly, as long as the Laval government remained in office, no 
consolidation of the Franco-Soviet Pact could be expected. This was 
fully recognised by Litvinov who ’’a le sentiment que M. Laval a signé 
ce pacte à contre-coeur, qu’il ne lui attribue" pas la même valeur que
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Moscou et qu’il ne tient pas du tout a le renforcer’’ (42) Moreover, 
in his policy of rapprochement with Germany and his conduct during the 
Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Laval had shown himself to be totally dis­
interested in the Soviet policy of collective security and collaboration 
with the western democracies. In contrast, 1935 had witnessed the 
development of the Rassemblement Populaire, a coalition of Radicals, 
Socialists and Communists who included the organisation of French 
foreign policy along the lines of the Franco-Soviet Pact in their 
political programme, and as early as October 1935 Litvinov had enquired 
of Mme. Tabouis of ’L ’Oeuvre’ about the possibility of a Popular Front 
government taking office and of Harriot, recognised as one of the 
architects of Franco-Soviet rapprochement, becoming Foreign Minister (43) 
Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland had demonstrated that the Franco- 
Soviet Pact gave France all the disadvantages of a military alliance, and 
none of the security : the victory of a Popular Front coalition in May 
1936 provided a fresh opportunity to rectify the situation, and to endow 
the Pact with the substance denied it by Laval.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 2
CONFLICTING ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET PACT WITHIN THE FIRST
POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT
The accession to power of a Popular Front coalition government in 
France in June 1936 was naturally welcomed in Russia, where Laval's 
overtly pro-German attitude, and in particular his blatant disregard 
of the Franco-Soviet Pact, had been viewed with considerable suspicion. 
The Rassemblement Populaire, on the other hand, was committed, by 
virtue of its programme published in January 1936, to a policy of 
international collaboration and collective security within the framework 
of the League of Nations, and to the negotiation of an arms limitation 
agreement with a view to achieving a general, simultaneous and 
controlled reduction of armaments in Europe. It was also pledged to 
extend, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, a system of pacts 
open to everyone, along the lines of the Franco-Soviet Pact (1).
On the 23rd of June, these aims were reaffirmed when the new government 
presented its declaration on foreign policy to the Chamber and the 
Senate. The government recognised that the aim of its policy must be 
to "ranimer chez tous les peuples de bonne volonté la confiance, si 
rudement ébranlée, dans le système collectif", and so it proposed to 
negotiate a system of regional pacts in Central and Eastern Europe 
and to seek a settlement in western Europe which would end the crisis 
begun by March 7th. In this policy the government felt sure of the 
assistance of Italy, England and the U.S.A., as well as of "nos amis 
de l ’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques auxquels nous unit 
un pacte d ’assistance ouvert à tous, que nous a dicté notre commun 
souci de la paix". In addition the new government would continue the
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struggle for an entente with Germany, since it was recognised that 
"la propagande ou la lutte pour ou contre tel ou tel système politique 
ou social, ne doivent pas être des prétextes de guerre" (2 ).
The lack of any specific commitment towards the extension of the Pact 
with Soviet Russia was natural enough in a government elected with 
communist support and anxious to allay conservative fears. The 
government’s immediate concern was to prove that, as the Popular Front 
Leader reassured Gamelin on June 10th, a socialist-led government did 
not mean that France’s security would be endangered, since the 
Socialists fully understood the gravity of the European situation and 
had no intention of weakening France’s national defences (3). 
Similarly, it was stressed that the Popular Front government would not 
organise its foreign policy on the basis of ideologies. In a radio 
broadcast on September 17th, Blum emphasised that "les causes de 
guerre qui pèsent sur le monde sont déjà assez lourdes pour qu’elle 
(la France) ne pense pas a les aggraver encore par le dessein d ’une 
croissade doctrinale" and that "il n ’y a pas un seul contact, pas 
un seul entretien, pas un seul ordre de discussion auxquel elle se 
refuse" (4). Thus the government would be fully prepared to undertake 
negotiations with both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy if it were in 
the interests of peace to do so. On the other hand, inherent fears 
of communism-socialism which had already caused the massive flight of 
gold from France after the victory of the Rassemblement Populaire 
meant that any open commitment towards the negotiation of a military 
alliance with Communist Russia would have been singularly ill-timed.
In fact, the government itself did not have a very clearly defined 
attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Popular Front comprised a
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coalition of Socialists Radicals and Communists who had allied in order 
to combat the threat of fascism, both within France and abroad, but who, 
understandably enough, had fundamentally conflicting views on many 
other issues, including foreign policy. Indeed, although the cohesion 
of the Popular Front was maintained in practical terms, at least 
during the lifetime of the first Blum government, this inherent 
divergence of views was to prove extremely critical in influencing the 
government’s attitude to foreign affairs in general, and the Pact with 
Russia in particular. Even within the individual parties there were 
considerable differences of opinion. The new Premier’s own inter­
nationalist policy had evolved only with difficulty since the advent 
of Hitler. During the 1920’s Blum’s attitudes had been firmly based 
on several fundamental tenets evolved from the thinking of his mentor 
and predecessor Jean Jaurès : he was acutely critical of Versailles, 
which merely represented the victors’ attempts to assert their own 
dominance ; he argued that the level of reparations should be adjusted 
to match the real capabilities of Germany to pay; all conflicts must 
give way to obligatory arbitration; and, above all, France must seek 
a disarmament settlement. Blum's attitude was seen perhaps at its 
clearest in his violent denunciation of the Poincarist occupation of 
the Ruhr in 1923, which he regarded as a resurrection of militarism 
and a dangerous provocation of the German nationalists (5). The 
accession of the overtly militarist and nationalist Hitler to power in 
Germany and the subsequent announcement of the German rearmament 
programme, naturally called into question the validity of Blum’s views, 
and in particular his insistence on disarmament. In a speech at 
Soissons in November 1936 Blum seemed at last to resolve this conflict 
by clarifying the socialist attitude to war. Blum asserted that in a 
world where socialism had established its law of equality and justice.
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"non seulement la guerre ne serait plus possible, mais qu’elle ne 
serait même plus concevable", but in the meantime, national defence 
did have an important place in society. To justify this position, 
particularly against those on his left who believed that war provided 
an opportunity for the revolutionary seizure of power, Blum cited 
Jaurès who, in the years preceding 1914 had argued, "Guerre jamais, 
sauf quand la guerre est imposée. Guerre jamais, sauf quand il s ’agit 
de défendre le sol national. Guerre jamais, sauf quand il s ’agit de 
défendre ce qui équivaj^ au sol national, c ’est a dire l ’existence et 
l ’intégrité d ’autres sols, dont l ’existence et l ’intégrité sont liées 
étroitement au notre". In this way, Blum sought to justify his 
government’s decision to undertake a rearmament programme, although 
he continued to insist that "plus l ’Europe arme, plus nous armons nous- 
memes, plus nous avons le devoir de ne pas laisser l ’idée du 
désarmement, l ’espoir due désarmement s ’éteindre" (6 ).
The fundamental dichotomy in Blum’s outlook was sharply reflected in 
his attitude towards the Soviet Pact. As early as October 1922 he had 
warned that the reopening of diplomatic relations with Russia should 
not lead to the re-establishment of the pre-war Franco-Russian alliance, 
directed against Germany, and as late as 1931 he had classed the Soviet 
Union in the same category as Fascist Italy (7). In July 1934 he 
stated unequivocally the party’s attitude towards Franco-Soviet 
rapprochement when he warned in the ’Populaire’ that, "MM.Doumergue et 
Barthou tendent manifestement a imprimer au rapprochement franco- 
soviétique le caractère de l ’alliance franco-russe d ’avant-guerre.
Le parti socialiste doit déclarer, franchement et clairement, qu’il 
combattra sur ce terrain comme sur tous les autres, le gouvernment du 
Bloc National" (8 ). By May 1935, however, largely as a result of the
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réintroduction of military service in Germany, announced on March 16th, 
Blum’s position had changed to one of cautious support for the Pact, 
although he still insisted that ’’le role de la France est d ’éviter que 
les pactes particuliers...prennent le caractère des vieilles alliances 
armées’’ (9 ), and by 1936 his position had evolved sufficiently for him 
to vote for the ratification of the Pact. On the first morning of the 
debate, Blum explained in ’Le Populaire’ that the socialists would vote 
for ratification, but would take particular care to emphasise why this 
pact differed from the former armed alliances which socialism had always 
condemned, and would show what consequences they hoped the Pact would 
have for the cause of peace (10). The following day he welcomed an 
alliance with ’’un Etat proletarian’’ which provided a solid barrier to 
war (11).
It is difficult to follow the evolution of Blum’s thought with similar 
clarity after he became Premier, since for the duration of his term of 
office he gave up writing his daily column for the parly newspaper,
’Le Populaire’. What remains clear is that by May 1936 Blum had come 
to accept the Pact with Russian as a necessity and had even become to 
appreciate, as he himself claimed before the postwar investigative 
committee, that it would be necessary to endow the Pact with military 
significance (12). And yet, as in the rest of his international policy, 
the doubts persisted. Genevieve Tabouis, the influential journalist 
on the Radical organ, ’L ’Oeuvre’, recalls that Blum was in favour of 
the Russian Pact but ’’when -1 .... clamoured constantly for the enforcement
of the vital pact .1 came up against Leon Blum, not against the
President of the Council with a very realistic and nationalist viewpoint, 
but against the intellectual socialist who wrote in the ’Populaire’:
’’this Franco-Soviet Pact creates a bad atmosphere in France’’ - and who
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thus continued to provide powerful ammunition against the Pact!” (13). 
Thus it was with considerable difficulty that Blum overcame his own 
instincts and agreed to the initiation of the French rearmament 
programme and, in November 1936, to military talks with the Soviet 
Union.
Blum’s views were not shared even by some within his own party. For 
Paul Faure, for example, the very popular and influential General 
Secretary of the party between 1920 and 1940, pacifism remained the 
dominant consideration, even after the advent of Hitler. For many 
years his views had closely resembled Blum’s, sharing a passionate 
belief in disarmament and a fierce hatred of war. But Faure was 
violently hostile to the communists, opposing any idea of unity of 
action, and was convinced that the Soviet Union was trying to provoke 
a European War : as a result, he was consistently hostile to France’s 
pact with Russia. Faure saw Russia’s attempt at rapprochement with 
France as a final and desperate bid for an ally against Hitler, and 
shortly before the signature of the Pact he warned pointedly that,
”a National security which is obliged to count upon uncertain alliances 
and cooperation with a foreign power whose cooperation is precarious 
and doubtful, is a false security” (14). Although his official reaction 
to the Pact was reserved (15), fellow members of the SFIO have since 
confirmed that he was totally hostile to any reliance on the Franco- 
Soviet Pact, and it has even been asserted that Faure and his supporters 
were anti-bolshevik ”to such an extent that they detested Stalin more 
than Hitler” (16). Although by 1936 Faure’s differences with Blum had 
not become openly apparent, the seeds of Faure’s later support for 
appeasement and advocacy of collaboration with the German occupiers in 
1940 were already present, in the form of a fundamental suspicion and
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fear of Soviet motives which was merely exacerbated by the Soviet role 
in the Spanish Civil War (17). These views contrasted sharply with 
those of Jean Zyromski, the leader of the "Bataille Socialiste" tendency. 
In 1933 Zyromski had led a strong opposition to the proposal made by 
Adler at the Paris Conference of the Socialist International that all 
united front manoeuvres from Moscow should be opposed (18), and he had 
remained a firm supporter of a policy of united action with the French 
Communist Party throughout. At the same time he opposed Blum’s definition 
of the "exercise" rather than the "conquest" of power, proposing at the 
Party Conference of May-June 1936 that the aim of the SFIO in government 
should be "attaquer la racine, le principe meme de la structure de 
régime capitaliste" (19). Similarly, Marceau Pivert, the leader of 
the "Gauche Révolutionnaire", motioned that "cet exercise du pouvoir 
ne vaudrait rien, il n ’aurait aucun intérêt pour le partie socialiste 
s ’il ne constituait pas un element de la marche directe a la conquête 
du pouvoir" (20)
In foreign affairs, however, and particularly with respect to the 
Soviet Union, Zyromski and Pivert failed to agree either with the 
Socialist leader or with each other. Zyromski, who felt a certain 
personal affinity towards the Soviet Union as the father of socialism, 
abandoned his former policy of revolutionary defeatism once he believed 
that Germany’s aim was to attack the USSR. For Zyromski this 
realisation posed the same problem as it did for the French Communist 
party, for, in the words of the SFIO historian Nathanial Greene,
Zyromski’s dilemma immediately became "how to conciliate his faith in 
mass ~ action and predilection for movement with the need to employ 
the ’bourgeois’ Republic . in defence of the USSR" (21), Just as the 
problem was similar, so was the response, as Zyromski became a most
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vigorous supporter of Franco-Soviet military rapprachement. Pivert’s 
reaction was somewhat different. In an inflammatory brochure entitled 
"Revolution d ’abord!", Pivert suggested that Zyromski had betrayed his 
socialist principles in accepting the international war policy of the 
bourgeoisie, arguing that the only way to prevent an imperialist war 
was to proT.cke a revolution. Thus he continued to advocate a policy of 
revolutionary defeatism, persistently condemning the "fievre des 
alliances", and in particular, the Franco-Soviet Pact (22).
The serious internal divisons within the SFIO, which were already 
apparent when the Blum government took office, were only exacerbated 
by Blum’s yearlong "exercise of power". Jean Zyromski, for example, 
joined with the Communist Party in denouncing the government’s policy 
of non-intervention in Spain, while Marceau Pivert proved to be more 
extreme than the Communists themselves in his encouragement of the 
strikes in June 1936 with his slogan, "Tout est possible". A 
particularly clear example of the Party’s divisions was the mixed 
reaction to Blum’s decision to relinquish power after an adverse vote 
in the Senate in June 1937. At the 34th National Congress in Marseille, 
from the 10th to the 13th July, three motions were proposed : the first, 
signed by Leon Blum and Paul Faure, suggested that the Congress affirm 
its pride in the work accomplished by the first Popular Front 
government; a ’Bracke-Zyromski’ or ’Bataille Socialiste’ motion 
argued that "la capacité d ’action des masses a été negligee"; and a 
motion by Marceau Pivert regretted that "the government constituted in 
June 1936 has abandoned the struggle in face of the opposition of the 
Senate...and withdraws the party delegation of the Socialist Ministers 
from the Chautemps cabinet". Although the Blum motion received 2,946 
(54.7%) votes and with eighteen representatives a majority on the
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Commission administrative permanent, the Zyromski tendency received 
1,545 votes (28.7%) and nine representatives on the C.A.P. and the 
Pivertistes 894 votes (16.6%) and six representatives (23). Thus 
while Blum sought to reconcile his socialist ideals with the exercise 
of power in an unstable international situation, he was fully aware 
that serious divisions of opinion relating to his conduct as Premier 
were developing within his own party.
The second major component of the Popular Front government, the Radical- 
Socialist party, was similarly divided in its views on the Soviet 
alliance. It was the left-wing of the party, the so-called ’Young 
Turks’ such as Pierre Cot, Jacques Kayser and Jean Zay, who were 
initially the strongest advocates of a united front policy, and 
supporters of the Soviet Pact. The most notable exception to this 
group was Edouard Harriot who, had been largely responsible for the 
initial Franco-Soviet rapprochement in 1932. In his tireless advocacy 
of a Soviet alliance Harriot was motivated purely by the realistic 
belief that ’’un accord avec l ’Union soviétique est notre meilleure, 
notre plus forte garantie’’ (24). As leader of the party’s right-wing 
Harriot certainly felt no personal affinity for communism, and he was 
the most reluctant of the Radical Socialists to accept the formation of 
a united front, but he remained convinced that domestic political 
considerations should play no part in the formulation of international 
policy. Although even Harriot was attacked by extremists as being 
pro-bolshevik, French communist leaders evidently recognised that a 
Radical Socialist might find it easier to make an alliance with Soviet 
Russia acceptable to the influential middle-classes than would a 
Socialist whose political convictions might seem dangerously close to 
communism. Moreover, Harriot, of all French politicians in the period
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was the most outspoken supporter of rapprochement, and was considerably 
more committed to the policy than socialists such as Blum. For this 
reason the realistic communist leader, Thorez, began to cultivate the 
good opinion of Harriot. For example, during a debate in the Chamber 
in May 1935 Thorez made the rather astonishing statement that the 
Communist Party "would be ready to bring you our support, President 
Harriot, if you or any other head of your party wished to lead a 
Radical government - since the Radical group is the most important of 
the left-wing groups in this Chamber which would really apply the 
policies of the Radical Party" (26). Similarly, Soviet officials 
several times indicated that they hoped that Harriot would become 
Foreign Minister in a new Popular Front government (27).
Harriot in fact became President of the Chamber and while his position 
within the party remained strong, his direct influence on the Blum 
government was inevitably reduced. However, his party was well- 
represented in the Cabinet, taking thirteen out of thirty-six 
ministerial portfolios, and in particular monopolising the Defence 
and Foreign Ministries: Yvon Delbos became Foreign Minister, Daladier 
the head of the newly-created National Defence Ministry, as well as 
Vice-President of the Council, Pierre Cot the Minister for Air, and 
Gasnier-Duparc the Minister for the Marine. Delbos was something of 
an unknown quantity in comparison to Harriot, but he was known to be 
a confirmed anti-fascist and in November 1935 had violently attacked 
Laval’s Italian policy in the Chamber. He had, moreover, been much 
impressed during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1932, and had returned 
believing that Franco-Soviet detente was necessary. Daladier, known 
primarily as the "fusilleur" of February 6th, was still seen as 
representing the left of the party against his arch-rival Harriot,
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although he was to move increasingly towards social conservatism and 
the political centre during the next two years: his attitude towards 
the Soviet alliance was as yet unknown. Pierre Cot, on the other 
hand, had already distinguished himself as a firm advocate of the 
policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union when, as Air Minister 
in a previous government he had headed a parliamentary Aeronautical 
mission to the USSR returning full of praise for* the Red Airforce and 
declaring that "to every honest man it was apparent that the developing 
Soviet power was the only force that could be compared to the growing 
might of Hitler" (28). He was also, like Zyromski and many other left- 
wing intellectuals, scientists and politicians, a member of the 
Association des Amis de l ’Union soviétique, continuing to be a committee 
member long after evidence of the harsh realities of Soviet life had 
disillusioned famous adherents such as André Gide (29).
Cot’s enthusiasm for the Soviet Union was certainly not shared by all 
his fellow Radicals, many of whom remained uneasy in the association 
with the Communist party. In particular, the influential Radical group 
in the Senate, led by Joseph Caillaux, rapidly took fright at the wave 
of popular unrest which followed the victory of the Rassemblement.
On the 24th June Pierre Dominque, a friend of Caillaux’s, wrote an 
article in ’La République’ under the title, "Les radicaux n ’ont pas 
voulu cela", in which he denounced "anti-French communist agitation".
The theme was echoed by Emile Roche, who published an article on June 
26th entitled, "Contre la dictature communiste!" and another on July 
2nd which proclaimed, "Rassemblement populaire? Oui. Dictature 
communiste? Non".(30). This press campaign naturally gathered 
momentum once the events in Spain became known in late July, and Georges 
Dupeux, in his study of Blum’s parliamentary majority, has linked this
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campaign directly to the Senate’s disinclination to examine the Office 
du blé project, although he admits we cannot be certain whether there 
was an agreement between the Radical group in theSenate and ’La 
République’, or if the newspaper campaign had the effect of bolstering 
the confidence of the Senators (31).
The lack of harmony between the Popular Front partners seemed to reach 
crisis proportions during the Radical party’s National Congress at 
Biarritz in October, during which several party members violently 
attacked the communists and some even the government (32). The majority 
of Radicals were, after all, socially conservative, and the popular 
unrest combined with the Communist party’s virulent attacks on the 
government’s non-intervention policy, was causing many of them to 
doubt the wisdom of collaboration with what they saw as Moscow- 
controlled French communists. However, crisis within the Popular Front 
was averted on this occasion by a firm directive from Blum who, just a 
few days before the Congress opened, had made clear his own attitude 
towards divisions within the Popular Front in a speech at Orléans.
If one of the groups adhering to the Popular Front were to withdraw 
its confidence, or if the common action which was indispensable among 
all the elements comprising the coalition could not be maintained then, 
said Blum, this would comprise a totally new situation, one which would 
in turn require a new majority. Since no other majority was possible 
within the present Chamber, ’’l ’unique issue serait...la dissolution et 
le recours au pays souverain" (33). Probably as a result of this 
threat Radical speakers contented themselves with verbal attacks on the 
communists and then Congress reaffirmed the party’s fidelity to the 
government.
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Blum renewed this threat during the Chamber debate on the government’s 
foreign policy in December, when it seemed possible that the communist 
deputies who had refused to accept ministerial posts but had pledged 
support might vote against the government. If the Communist party 
today wished to detach itself from the government’s majority 
voluntarily then, warned Blum, the situation and consequences would be 
the same as he had outlined before Biarritz: the Popular Front would 
lose its raison d ’etre and Blum would be forced to go to the country 
(34). In fact, the communist contingent, having bitterly attacked 
the government’s Spanish policy, merely abstained in the vote of 
confidence. Thus, despite antagonisms within the Popular Front,Blum 
was able to continue in office with an unchanged majority until he was 
brought down by the Senate in June 1937. But while he managed to 
retain this support in the Chamber, the fundamental conflicts between 
the various parties of the coalition, indeed within the SFIO itself, 
meant that Blum’s freedom of action in both domestic and international 
affairs was necessarily restricted. In fact, it was in the sphere of 
the government’s relations with the Soviet Union that the political 
structure of the government’s majority, that is, its association with 
the French Communish party, played the most crucial role, for it was 
here that the government’s domestic and foreign problems were seen to 
merge into one.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 3
COMMUNISM AND FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS
The Popular Front’s relations with the USSR were largely determined by 
the issue of communism. For some, the fact that the Soviet Union was 
a communist state was irrelevant : as Harriot, a right-wing Radical, 
pointed out, "Le tsar, jadis, tout despote qu’il était, a consenti a 
s ’allier avec une République. Notre bourgeoisie, notre presse,seront- 
elles moins intelligentes? " (1). But for most Frenchmen, including 
some in the Popular Front Government, communism and the Soviet govern­
ment were indistinguishable, and as such French attitudes towards the 
Soviet Pact were often based on an analysis of the activities of the 
French Communist Party, rather than on an objective examination of the 
value of the Soviet ally. Thus it becomes necessary to examine the 
somewhat obscure evolution of the new Soviet foreign policy of collab­
oration with the western democracies, and the extent to which that 
policy determined the initial communist participation in the 
Rassemblement populaire and the subsequent role of the French Communist 
Party in French political life, in order to assess the validity of 
such assumptions.
1) Soviet, Comintern & French Communist Party policy
In September 1934, after fourteen years of public hostility, the Soviet 
Union joined the League of Nations : henceforth its representative on 
the League Council, the Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, became the 
most ardent champion of collective security, stressing at every avail­
able moment that the Soviet Union "has never tried and will never by 
any methods, let alone forcible ones, try to thrust its ideology on
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other states" (2). At the same time, the Soviet government continued 
to pressurise the French Republic for the logical conclusion of the 
process of rapprochement initiated in 1932, that is, for the negotiation 
of some form of political and military alliance. And yet in June 1930 
Stalin had referred to France as "the most aggressive and militarist 
of all the agressive and militarist countries of the world" (3),while 
the Communist International, widely regarded as an organ of the Soviet 
government, had repeatedly attacked Versailles as the "traité d ’esclavage 
et de rapine" (4), and criticised the League of Nations as an instrument 
of war (5). It is perhaps scarcely surprising, therefore, that the 
credibility of the new Soviet foreign policy was immediately questioned.
The motivation behind the new policy is clear enough : Stalin was 
concerned not to undertake an ideological crusade against fascism, as 
communists claimed, but to secure the defence of the Soviet Union 
against possible German expansionism. The advent to power of Hitler in 
Germany had effectively ended the period of close political and military 
collaboration which had persisted throughout the 1920’s under the terms 
of Rapallo (6 ), and which had been so beneficial to the USSR, while 
Hitler’s anti-bolshevik tirades left no doubt about his aggressive 
intentions : thus at the Congress of Soviets in January 1935 Molotov 
drew attention to the statement in ’Mein Kampf’ that "when we speak of 
new lands in Europe today, we can only think of Russia and her border 
states" (7). Stalin was, above all, a realist, and as soon as he 
detected a threat to Soviet national security, was prepared to change 
his tactics to the extent of disavowing all former Soviet policy, in 
order to gain allies among the western democracies. At the same time 
the massive programme of industrialisation envisaged in the Five Year 
Plans was now directed specifically towards the needs of defence and
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the increased mechanisation of the Red Army (8 ), while the defence 
budget was increased from 1.3 milliard roubles in 1931 to 8.2 in 1935, 
and 14.6 in 1936 (9).
There is thus no reason to doubt that in the policy of collaboration 
with the democracies the Soviets were entirely'sincere, since this 
constituted a fundamental question of Soviet national security, but at 
the same time the new policy completely contradicted the position of 
foreign communist parties with regard to their own governments. The 
Comintern had remained undeterred from its conviction that the task 
of all communists was "to accelerate the collapse of social democracy" 
even in the face of the growing menace of fascism in Europe, notably 
in Germany where the Communist party was told to support the NSDAP 
rather than the "social fascists", the SPD. Shortly before the 
Reichstag fire in February 1933 the SPD leader, Stampfer, was told by 
a secretary at the Soviet Embassy that Moscow believed that a period 
of fascist rule was an unavoidable transitional phase of development, 
while Pravda declared in November 1932 that greater fascist terror 
would intensify the class struggle and accelerate the growth of the 
KPD (10). Even after Hitler's accession to power, and the subsequent 
suppression of the KPD, the Comintern continued to advocate hostility 
to the social-democratic parties, and on May 6th 1933 Isvestia wrote, 
with reference to the prolongation of the 1926 Soviet-German treaty, 
that "the Soviet Union has nothing to change or to revise in its 
policy towards Germany" (11). Such a position was clearly untenable 
in view of the newly-evolved Soviet policy, and since the Soviet 
government and the Comintern were widely regarded as "Siamese twins" ,(12! 
it was seen as Moscow’s responsibility to ensure that the subversive 
activities of foreign communist parties should cease, as proof of the
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sincerity of the new policy.
It was not in fact until August 1935 that the new tactics were 
officially announced, although they were adopted by the ECCI in the 
autumn of 1934. This delay seems to have been largely due to differ­
ences of opinion on the Executive Committee itself, where delegates 
supporting the new policy, notably Manouilski and Dimitrov, had con­
siderable difficulty in overcoming the resistance of militants such 
as Bela Kun and Lovoski (13) For years the Comintern had opposed any 
unity of action with the "social fascist" leaders, on the grounds 
that any common action must be undertaken by the workers united under 
communist leadership : now, at the first Comintern Congress held for 
seven years, in July and August 1935, it was officially announced that 
the new policy of foreign communist parties should be to work towards 
a United Front from above, to include the peasantry, the urban petty 
bourgeoisie, and ’advanced’ sections of the intelligentsia, united in 
their antipathy towards fascism. If an anti-fascist government were 
formed, then the Communists, "while remaining the irreconcilable foes, 
of every bourgeois government, and supporters of a Soviet government, 
will nevertheless, in face of the growing fascist danger, be prepared 
to support such a government". The aims of the United Front were care­
fully worded in order to avoid any revolutionary implications and 
were in fact very similar to those adopted in the French Popular Front 
programme. For example, the People’s Fronts were to try and bring 
about trade union unity, to enlist the support of the peasant and 
petty bourgeois masses,and to secure the disbanding of any fascist 
leagues or organisations (14).
In this way Moscow attempted to resolve the essential conflict between
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national Soviet policy and that propounded by the Communist Inter­
national.. It would, however, have been more immediately successful 
had the Soviet government merely banned the Comintern from Russian 
soil altogether as many foreign governments wished, particularly 
since Georgi Dimitrov, when announcing the new tactics at the Congress, 
had added that the United Front was "the surest road to the overthrow 
of fascism and the capitalist system" (15). In effect, it seems that 
the policy of world revolution had been temporarily shelved in response 
to the suspected threat to Soviet security, but net abandoned : main­
tenance of the Comintern by the Soviet government, in spite of the very 
evident disadvantages, could mean little else. The French Ambassador 
to the USSR, Robert Coulondre, believed that, in fact, Stalin would 
never officially renounce the Comintern for two basic reasons. On the 
one hand, Stalin saw the Comintern as an instrument of national defence
(16) : although the German Communist party had been officially dissolved 
by Hitler in 1933, it was naturally in the interests of Germany’s 
enemies to encourage anti-governmental agitation wherever possible and 
indeed, in February 1937 the French consul in Munich reported an 
increased number of pursuits of communists in Bavaria and the anxiety 
caused to the authorities by the activities of the party, "le seul 
organise en Allemagne" (17).
Secondly, Coulondre argued that the Comintern represented a fundamental 
and insoluable conflict within Soviet p o l i c y . Indeed, when in mid-1936 
the sincerity of the newly-evolved policy was suddenly put to the test, 
its inherent anomaly immediately became apparent : Britain and France 
favoured non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, while Germany and 
Italy, though officially supporting that policy, blatantly intervened 
on behalf of the rebels. Thus the Soviet government found it necessary
-  40 -
to decide whether to aid the legitimate Republican government which, 
as effective leaders of world communism, they were morally obliged to 
do, or whether to abandon Spain to the fascists in an attempt to main­
tain links with the western democracies. In this way the Spanish 
Civil War created a profound crisis in the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy, and more than anything else promoted the suspicion that the 
USSR had not abandoned its aim to promote world revolution, and so 
could not be trusted as an ally.
The initial reaction to the Spanish crisis in Moscow was a joint meeting 
of the Secretariats of the Comintern and Profintern organisations, 
which immediately decided that aid should be sent to the Republican 
government (18). For Stalin the issue was not so simple, since while 
he realised that if he refused to intervene he could be accused of be­
traying the international proletariat, he also knew that if he openly 
intervened he would alienate the pacifist democracies (19). On this 
occasion, as in 1935 with the publication of the Popular Front tactics, 
Stalin seems to have decided that the revolutionary policy of the 
Comintern must be subordinated to the needs of national Russian policy, 
and on August 23rd the Soviet government issued its reply to the Franco- 
British initiative of the 8th calling for a non-intervention pact : 
although one of the shortest, the Soviet response was categorical,fully 
approving the non-intervention declaration, and was followed on August 
28th by the introduction of a law in Russia forbidding the exportation 
of any kind of munitions, war material or armaments to Spain. Moreover, 
it does seem that the non-intervention agreement was applied quite 
strictly by the Soviets (20), undoubtedly in an attempt to co-ordinate 
its policy with that of France. In September, for example, Litvinov 
said that Russia had adhered to the pact "parce que la France craignait
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que sans ce pacte, la guerre n ’éclate" (21 ).
By September, however, the Soviet government was finding it increasingly 
difficult to adhere to the agreement. The Soviet press had always been 
lukewarm about non-intervention, and was quick to report German and 
Italian violations of the agreement, until finally, in October, the 
Soviets began openly to criticise the inertia of the London Non-Inter­
vention Committee which, it said, spent most of its time considering 
matters of procedure, rather than co-ordinating non-intervention measures, 
Furthermore, it was claimed that there was now considerable evidence 
that Germany, Portugal and Italy had never adhered to to the agreement,in 
spite of which, the London Committee continued to vacillate. On October 
5th, for example, Pravda complained that "Les ’Junker’ allemands et les 
’Caproni’ italiens exécutent leurs vols de nuit sur Madrid, semant la 
destruction et la mort. Et pendant ce temps-là le memorandum du 
gouvernement légal de l ’Espagne, qui démasque l ’aide systématique 
accordée par les fascistes aux rebelles, est mis sous le boisseau..."
( 22). The Soviet government had always maintained that it would continue 
to adhere to the non-intervention agreement as long as the other parties 
did the same : on October 7th a statement was issued complaining about 
the consistent violations of the non-intervention agreement, and warring 
that if they were not immediately stopped, "the Soviet Government will 
consider itself free from the obligations arising out of the Agreement"
(23). On the 15th of October, Soviet aid began to arrive in Spain.
The single most important reason for this decision by the Soviet 
government was undoubtedly the violent reactions which its policy had 
provoked among foreign communist parties. In particular, Stalin feared
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that he might lose control over the communist masses, and Comintern
leaders were quick to inform him that Trotsky was naming him the
"liquidator and traitor of the Spanish revolution, abettor of Hitler 
and Mussolini" (24). In other words, Stalin need to maintain the 
Comintern in order "de sauver la face révolutionnaire", that is, as a
channel into which excess revolutionary fervour, both abroad and within
the CPSU itself, might be diverted (25). It is also possible that the 
Soviet decision to aid Republican Spain was occasioned by its fear 
that France would inevitably be weakened if she were surrounded by 
three fascist powers. Certainly Lord Chilston in Moscow thought that 
"the Soviet government's concern for the welfare of France - or rather, 
for the continued functioning of France as a container of Germany - 
was nowhere more unmistakably shown than in their reactions to the 
Spanish Civil War", believing that any pleasure which might have been 
felt at the possibility of communism being established in Spain was 
offset by the threat to France's international position which the 
Spanish conflict inevitably entailed (26).
Such interpretations gain credibility when it is considered that Soviet 
policy in practice was designed to prevent rather than promote revolu­
tion in Spain. George Orwell who, as a member of the P.O.U.M. 
militia in the early months of the war, had witnessed the application 
of such a policy, believed that the Soviet government’s main consid­
eration in this was the alliance with France, writing in late 1937 
that "In Spain the Communist "line" was undoubtedly influenced by the 
fact that France, Russia’s ally, would strongly object to a revolutionary 
neighbour and would raise heaven and earth to prevent the liberation 
of Spanish Morocco. The ’Daily Mail’, with its tales of red revolution 
financed by Moscow, was even more wildly wrong than usual. In reality
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it was the Communists above all others who prevented revolution in 
Spain" (27). Certainly, having found it necessary to intervene in 
Spain at all, there is no reason to suppose that the Soviets wanted 
to antagonise the western democracies further, which would certainly 
have been the result of revolution in Spain, and so if this were indeed 
the Soviets’ motive, then Russian policy in Spain can be seen as a 
further attempt to maintain the newly-formed foreign policy. On the 
other hand, Moscow was possibly primarily concerned to prevent the 
Anarchists from gaining control of any revolution in Spain, or perhaps 
intervened actually to prevent the Republican forces from winning the 
war, in the hope that a prolonged conflict might divert Hitler’s 
attention away from Eastern Europe.
It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyse Soviet motivation 
in the Spanish Civil War, but it is at least clear that it was not 
primarily Stanlin’s aim to provoke revolution in Spain, as was general^r 
assumed. Similarly, there were several indications that the Soviet 
government was concerned that France should be a strong ally, rather 
than one weakened by internal dissension and civil war : the death of 
Barthou, hardly a man of the Left, but a firm exponent of Franco-Soviet 
rapprochement, was deeply mourned in Moscow (28), and Litvinov surprised 
Coulondre by lamenting that France no longer had a statesman of the 
same stature as a Clemenceau or a Poincare (29). Litvinov also wanted 
to know the possibility of Herriot becoming the Popular Front Foreign 
Minister (30), and he subsequently said that he wished that Blum were 
more conservative. Coulondre believed that "ce qu’a voulu montrer 
M.Litvinov en parlant de ’bons patriotes’ c ’est qu ’il plaçait, dans 
ses rapports avec l ’Occident, les considérations de raison d ’Etat 
au-dessus des considérations idéologiques" (31). As a result, there
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was little enthusiasm in the Soviet press concerning the accession to 
power of the Popular Front and no particular emphasis was laid on the 
communists* part in the victory; a member of the British Embassy staff 
in Moscow even detected embarassment on the part of the government at 
the extent of the communist success (32).
From the point of view of the French government and public, however, 
the real sincerity of the new Soviet tactics would naturally be judged 
solely on the basis of the activities of the French Communist party. 
Before 1935 the PCF had followed the Comintern line faithfully,constartly 
calling for the defence of the USSR, not against German fascism, but 
against French imperialism. Moreover, Thorez and other communist 
leaders argued not only for the liberation of the colonies from the 
French imperialist yoke, but also for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, 
which they claimed had been subjugated to French domination by 
Versailles (33). At the same time the French communists resisted all 
suggestions from the Socialist leaders for unity of action against 
fascism, advocating instead a United Front from below, that is between 
communist and social-democratic workers united under solely communist 
leadership. One reason given for the expulsion from the party in May 
1934 of Jacques Doriot, for example, the only leading communist who had 
advocated a United Front from above, was that he had wanted to liquidate 
the party by fusing it with social democracy, which was "totally foreign 
to the spirit of communism" (34). Then, only two months later, the 
French Communist Party officially renounced its opposition to social- 
democracy by signing a pact of joint action with the SFIO : the Party 
now concentrated its efforts on gaining Radical support, and even 
extended a hand of friendship to the Catholics. This abrupt reversal 
in policy gave party leaders no qualms : having consistently attacked
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"social-fascism" for the past six years, Thorez now conveniently 
remembered that in 1875, Marx had said that it was absurd to treat the 
middle classes as forming a single reactionary bloc with the capitalist 
classes, and himself now declared that "the Communist Party refuses to 
treat all capitalist parties as a reactionary mass" (35).
Naturally enough, this reversal in tactics was widely seen in France 
as proof that the French Communist Party was controlled by Moscow : the 
historian Georges Lefranc writes for example that the new PCF tactics 
were dictated by "telegrams from Moscow" and telephone calls from the 
Soviet Embassy (36). On the other hand, communist historians such as 
Georges Cogniot, a representative of the party on the Comintern’s 
Executive Committee between 1936 and 1937, have sought to show that 
the relationship between the Comintern and foreign communist parties 
was one of mutual consultation. Thus Cogniot emphasises that the 
individual parties were able to exercise greater autonomy after the 
Seventh Congress, where it was decided that henceforth the ECCI would 
concentrate on the elaboration of fundamental tactics, while avoiding 
direct intervention in the internal organisational affairs of individ­
ual parties. Indeed, in 1937 Dimitrov wrote that "les partis doivent 
de plus en plus voler de leurs propres ailes et être capables de 
définir par eux-mêmes, a n ’importe quel moment, leur politique et leur 
tactique, ainsi que la direction opérationnelle" (37) Thus, says 
Cognior, "il y avait, dans l ’Internationale communiste, un perpétuel 
échange d ’idées entre le centre et la périphérie, une aide mutuelle, 
une double impulsion intellectuelle et politique d ’en haut et d ’en bas" 
(38).
In the same way, Cogniot and other communist historians have claimed
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that far from acting in mere response to Soviet orders, the French 
Party was itself largely responsible for the adoption of the new 
tactics by the Comintern. Thus it is suggested that the Comintern 
fully appreciated the dangers of fascism in Germany, but that the 
United Front tactics formulated by Lenin ten years earlier were 
attacked by sectarians such as Barbé and Celor : it was they who were 
responsible for the term "social fascist", it is said. Cogniot 
continues that once this group had been eliminated in 1931 Thorez was 
able to reintroduce the United Front policy, doing so with the full 
support of the Comintern (40), who eventually agreed to adopt the 
tactics as official policy. That the French party had close links with 
the Comintern can hardly be denied : Thorez and Cachin, the editor of
y
1 ’Humanité, had since 1931 been members of the Executive Committee, 
and they were joined in 1935 by Jacques Duclos and André Marty, who 
also became a member of the Secretariat. This group visited Moscow 
frequently and often spoke at plenary sessions of the ECCI. In return 
a permanent representative Eugene Fried, known as Clement, was sent to 
Paris not, party members have since claimed, merely as a bureaucratic 
robot of Moscow, as critics said, but to supply information and advice, 
and contribute to the elaboration and application of party policy (41).
On the other hand, it does seem that although continuing to expound in 
public the Comintern policy of hostility to social democracy until the 
tactics were abandoned in favour of a United Front, the French party 
had itself long-since formulated such a policy as a response to what 
was soon as the growing threat of fascism in France. In December 1932, 
for example, Thorez wrote to Paul Faure expressing approval of a 
proposal for a joint SFIO-PCF bureau to organise meetings, and was 
reprimanded for doing so by Fried (42). Even Cogniot admits that the
-  47 -
Comintern sent the Italian communist, Togliatti ("Ercoli"), to Paris 
in October 1934 to express criticism of the party’s initiative in 
favour of a Popular Front, although he adds that Thorez refused to 
withdraw, feeling the observations were unjustified (43). Moreover, 
several times since 1932 the French party had proposed unity of action 
to the Socialists (although usually in terms which would have meant 
the virtual absorption of the SFIO into the PCF), and had played a 
significant role in the anti-fascist Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. Thus, 
whether or not the new tactics were ultimately imposed by the Comintern, 
it is evident that the French party fully approved them, and was there­
fore more inclined to apply the new policy sincerely.
But in spite of the constant assertions that the PCF was not controlled 
by the Comintern ,and that the Comintern was totally independent of 
Moscow, it remains true that throughout this period the activities of 
the French party mirrored almost exactly the aims of Soviet foreign 
policy. In fact, Thorez, who had emerged as leader in 1931 as an 
orthodox Stalinist, was always ultimately prepared to accept Moscow’s 
decision. One such example was the party’s reaction to the communique 
issued at the end of Laval’s visit to Moscow in May 1935 in which 
"Comrade Stalin expressed complete understanding and approval of the 
national defence policy pursued by France, with the object of main­
taining its armed forces at a level consistent with its security 
requirements" (44). It is probable that in obtaining this declaration, 
which represented a complete reversal of the long-established communist 
policy of opposition to military credits, Laval was trying to weaken 
the position of the strong communist contingent of Aubervilliers, where 
he hoped to be re-elected as mayor later that month. But after a 
brief stunned silence, the party simply produced a poster saying.
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"Staline a raison", which explained that "Pour faire face au danger 
menaçant, l ’Union soviétique, dont l ’intérêt permanent est la paix, 
a raison d ’agir de concert avec les puissances qui ont un intérêt 
momentané à maintenir la paix" (45). Thus it is reasonable to assume 
that the attitude of the French Communist Party to the French govern­
ment, and in particular to the Popular Front government, could be 
expected to reflect accurately the attitude of the Soviet Union to its 
ally, the French Republic.
Although refusing to accept ministerial posts in the Popular Front 
government, the French communists were prepared to offer the "bourgeois" 
government full support, often to the extent of restraining left-wing 
enthusiasm in the interest of maintaining order. The most startling 
example of this was the Communists’ reaction to the widespread strikes 
following the victory of the Popular Front in May, which were widely 
assumed to be communist-inspired. In reply to the enthusiastic claim 
by the left-wing socialist, Marceau Pivert, that "Tout est possible" 
(46), Marcel Gitton retorted in L ’Humanité "Mais non, messieurs.’
II n ’est nullement question de chambardement ni d ’anarchie" (47 ), 
which was confirmed by Thorez’s statement to a meeting of militant 
communists on June 11th that "II faut savoir terminer une grève".
In a long article in the "Communist International" at the end of 1936, 
Thorez explained that "the party realised that a more rapid advance 
on the part of the working class risked its estrangement from the 
middle classes who were disturbed and made uneasy by the strikes" (48) 
Indeed, in domestic policy the communists were often more restrained 
than the socialists. For example, the communists opposed the inclusion 
of nationalisation in the Popular Front programme : Thorez explained 
that the working class must first win power as a result of a
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victorious revolution and the establishment of a French Soviet 
Republic in order to apply this measure, although he was no doubt 
primarily aware of the need not to antagonise the Radicals.
Similarly the communists made little objection when Blum devalued the 
franc in September 1936 and voted the Premier special powers to deal 
with the financial crisis in June 1937, even though the projects 
envisaged would primarily affect the poor.
Perhaps the clearest example of the lengths to which the Soviets were 
prepared to go in their support of the French alliance, as well as of 
the obedience of the PCF to Moscow, was shown by the Party’s attitude 
towards the French government’s Spanish policy. In their campaign 
on behalf of the Spanish Republic, the French communists were 
initially acting in advance of the Soviet government, which was at 
first prepared to support the non-intervention initiative. On August 
25th, for example, Thorez made an impassioned plea at the Buffalo 
stadium for aid to Spain, arguing that since fascism was already in­
stalled over the Rhine, and to the south-east across the Alps, the 
struggle against Franco ’’ne s ’agit pas de lutte entre démocratie et 
fascisme, il s ’agit de la menace de Hitler contre la France et contre 
la paix’’ (491 That this call to action was incompatible with official 
Soviet policy was clearly recognised by Blum, who in a speech de&nding 
the non-intervention policy to the SFIO in September argued, "Do not 
let us forget that the international convention of non-intervention 
in Spain bears the signature of Soviet Russia. Yet one political 
group which adhered to this contract by the Popular Front parties 
appears to be criticising our actions. Does it wish to repudiate the 
contract?"(50).
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The ultimate test of the party’s loyalty came in December when, 
during a foreign affairs debate in the Chamber, Thorez felt obliged 
to declare that "le parti communiste n ’a pas approuve et n ’approuvera 
jamais l ’initiative néfaste du Gouvernement qui a organisé le blocus 
de la république espagnole" (51). In addition Thorez pointed out 
that his party had given the government consistent support in order 
to ensure the realisation of the Popular Front programme, and had 
even voted for the devaluation of the franc, but that the party now 
believed that "la politique extérieure du Gouvernement s ’ecarte du 
programme du Front populaire". Having delivered this, his first 
public attack on the Blum government, Thorez concluded that "C’est 
seulement par souci de l ’unité du Front populaire, de la cohesion des 
masses populaires qui attendent beaucoup de nous tous, que nous ne 
voterons pas contre le gouvernement" : in the ensuing vote, the 
communist contingent merely abstained (52).
Thus it seems that in spite of communists’ claims to the contrary, 
French Communist Party policy was determined largely by the interests 
of Moscow’s foreign policy, and that as long as the Soviet government 
continued to have some hope in the possible consolidation of the 
alliance with France, then the French Communists would continue to 
support the Popular Front government. As a result, they continued to 
support the government under Blum’s successor, the more conservative 
Radical, Camille Chautemps, making little criticism of his very 
orthodox financial measures or even of the new government’s restric­
tions on the 40 hour week, which had been one of the major domestic 
successes of the Blum government. This moderate policy, which 
persisted throughout the summer of 1937, has been attributed to a 
desire to do well in the cantonal elections to be held in October :
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indeed,as soon as those elections were over the communists launched 
a violent attack on the government’s Spanish policy (53), and by 
December the party’s relationship with the increasingly conservative 
Chautemps government had deteriorated dramatically, with the Communists 
openlysupporting a strike at the Goodrich tyre plant, which Chautemps 
publicly held responsible for a sudden financial crisis in early 
January. Then, on the 13th, a communist deputy named Ramette,calling
in the Chamber for "un veritable gouvernement du front populaire, à
/
l ’image du front populaire", provoked the fall of the first Chautemps 
government(54).
It was widely believed in political circles that the communist role in 
this debate was dictated by Moscow, where the government was anxious 
to be rid of Chautemps and Delbos as a result of their failure to 
consolidate the Pact (55). Indeed, the communist campaign against 
Delbos began only after he had refused an invitation from Litvinov in 
November to include Moscow on his tour of France’s central and east 
European allies : the Soviet government took the snub badly, and in 
particular Delbos’ stop in Berlin on his way to Warsaw, where he was 
met by the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath (56). Soviet anxiety 
was exacerbated by Halifax’s visit to Germany as well as by the trip 
made by Chautemps and Delbos to London in November, where it was 
rumoured that Chautemps had suggested that a reinforcement of the 
Franco-British entente would enable him to adandon the Franco-Soviet 
Pact (57). On January 19th Gabriel Peri complained in L ’Humanité 
that the essential moves of French policy had been subordinated to 
the consent of London, and had never taken into account the opinion 
of Moscow. He added that it was obvious that, in order to save the 
peace, "le ministre qui a sur les bras le déplorable bilan de M.Yvon
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Delbos ne doit pas se reprendre sa place au Quai d ’Orsay (58).
Clearly Moscow was losing patience over France’s lack of interest in
the Soviet Pact : on January 16th, for example, Andrei Zhdanov 
delivered a blistering attack on France at a meeting of the Supreme 
Soviet, asking ’’if the Pact exists or not" (59). Nor did the Soviets
entertain high expectations from a return to power of Leon Blum (60):
indeed, when Blum was called upon in March to constitute a new govern­
ment after the fall of the second Chautemps cabinet, the communists 
were noticeably unenthusiastic, and althouglym?st have’been aware that 
the Blum government was now sendirg large supplies of military equip­
ment to Spain, l ’Humanité even launched a new campaign against the 
government’s official Spanish policy. In contrast, the communists 
were initially prepared to support a completely new government under 
Daladier, even though he brough the pro-German Georges Bonnet to the 
Quai, making little protest against Daladier’s financial decree laws, 
which raised taxes by 8% and further weakened the 40-hour week law.
In fact, however, the communists’ moderation lasted little more than 
a few weeks, after which they resumed the attack on the Popular Front 
government, which was now clearly so far from representing their 
interests in either domestic or foreign policy. As one party,historian, 
Jacques Fauvet, has said, "le parti communiste veut maintenir une 
fiction pour sauver une realite. La fiction, c ’est le front populaire; 
la réalité, c ’est la politique étrangère" 61 ).
Thus, when it finally became apparent to the Soviet government in 
September 1938 that the policy of rapprochement with France was 
definitely worthless in practical terms, the French Communist Party 
abandoned the Popular Front Government. In the Chamber, the whole
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communist contingent, joined by only two other deputies, voted against 
a majority of 535 in refusing to approve the Munich agreement, while 
with five other deputies the communists refused to grant the special 
financial and economic powers requested by Daladier. The final test 
of the Party's devotion to Moscow came in September 1939 : once the 
Soviet government had abandoned the French alliance and signed a Pact 
with Nazi Germany, the Comintern announced the ending of the Popular 
Front tactics and the réintroduction of revolutionary defeatism.
The French Communist Party obeyed. But that the French communists had 
continued to support the increasingly conservative and, in their 
opinion, reactionary. Popular Front governments until September 1938, 
approving policies which directly contradicted the bases of communist 
ideology, demonstrates clearly not only the undoubted subservience 
of French communists to Moscow, but more significantly the importance 
which the Soviet government attached to the preservation of the French 
alliance. To this extent, then, it seems probable that the existence 
of a Franco-Soviet alliance might have actually reduced, rather than 
increased, the potential communist threat to French domestic stability. 
In fact, the public loyalty of the French Communist Party to the 
Popular Front government did little to convince non-communists that 
the Party really had abandoned its long-avowed aim to subvert the 
political and social system of France.
* * * * *
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2. French attitudes to communism and the Soviet Pact 
In June 1936 Thorez explained that after considerable deliberation 
his party had decided not to accept ministerial posts in the new Blum 
government, even though it had participated fully in the development 
of the Front populaire, since it was thought that "les communistes 
serviront mieux la cause du peuple en soutenant, sans réserves et sans 
éclipses, le gouvernement à direction socialiste, plutôt qu’en 
offrant, par leur présence dans le cabinet, le prétexte aux campagnes 
de panique et d ’affolement des ennemis du peuple" (62). In fact, this 
physical dissociation from the Popular Front government was totally 
ineffective : in the minds of the conservative opposition, the Popular 
Front was directly equated with communism. Initially it had been 
relatively simple for those on the political right and centre,having 
always distrusted Soviet-German collaboration and fearing a resurgence 
of German militarism, to accept that Russia’s concern was now national 
defence rather than world revolution, and so the Franco-Soviet Pact 
had been welcomed primarily as a means of preventing a return to 
Rapallo. But this objectivity was likely to remain intact only as 
long as foreign policy continued to operate independently of domestic 
political influences : as soon as this was no longer the case, 
conservative support for the Pact evaporated rapidly.
Traditional nationalists such as Henri de Kerillis, Emile Bure and 
Louis Marin had initially seen the Pact as constituting a necessary 
link in France’s defensive system against Germany, while at the same 
time they were somewhat reassured that the alliance with Communist 
Russia was complemented by an agreement with Italy. Thus the break­
up of the Stresa Front over the Ethiopian conflict immediately 
brought the desirability of the Soviet alliance into question 63 ).
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During 1935 the Centre and Right gradually came to renounce their 
natiomList tradition by opposing sanctions against Italy while the 
usually pacifist Left, by supporting sanctions, became open to the 
charge of bellicism (64). Having once broken away from their tradit­
ional positions it was only a small step for the Left, on the one 
hand, to adopt the policy of firmness towards Germany implied in 
acceptance of alliance with Soviet Russia, and for the Right on the 
other to abandon its traditional opposition to Germany in favour of 
appeasement. It is thus significant that the minority on the Right 
who actually supported the sanctions policy, such as Reynaud,Mandel 
and Pezet, were also those who voted to ratify the Franco-Soviet Pact.
The developing identification between domestic and foreign policy was 
naturally intensified as a result of the growing strength of communism 
during 1935. When the Pact was signed, communism did not seem to pose 
a particularly serious threat in France, at least in electoral terms: 
the elections of 1932 had been a disaster for the party, whose vote 
was reduced from 1,063,943 in 1928 to 784,883 (65). Immediately 
following the signature of the Pact, however, the Communist Party made 
considerable gains in the municipal elections held on May 5th and 11th, 
Since the last elections in 1929 the communists had controlled only 
150 councils : this was now increased to 297 (66). In the Department 
of the Seine, that is, the working-class suburbs surrounding Paris, 
the number of communist-controlled municipalities was increased from 
9 to 23 (67). L ’Humanité neglected even the Soviet Pact in favour of 
euphoric celebrations (6 8 ). In fact, the communist successes were 
very much confined to large towns and industrial centres, whereas in 
other, predominantly rural areas, the moderate Centre and Radical 
parties made substantial gains. But as Francois Goguel had said.
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"sur le moment, on comprit mal la significance du scrutin. On 
s ’hypnotisa sur les gains realises par 1 ’extrême-gauche dans les 
grands centres, et l ’on négligea le mouvement en sens inverse qui 
s ’était produit dans les campagnes" (6 9 ).
At the same time, Stalin’s National Defence' declaration had removed 
the last practical obstacle to French communist collaboration with the 
social-democratic parties. On July 14th a massive popular demonstra­
tion held at the Buffalo stadium in Paris witnessed the signature of 
the official "Appel au Rassemblement" by forty eight national 
associations (70): the People’s Front, uniting the Communist,Socialist 
and Radical parties, was rapidly taking shape. In the autumn the CGTU 
suddenly accepted all of Jouhaux’s conditions, which it had so long 
opposed, and the two unions, communist and socialist, announced unity 
of action, while in October at the Radical Party Congress, Herriot 
declared his party’s support for the new coalition, as well as for the 
Franco-Soviet Pact. Finally, on 12th January 1936, the programme of 
the Rassemblement Populaire was published.
Thus, when the slightly leftish government of Albert Sarraut finally 
brought the Pact before the Chamber for ratification in February, it 
immediately became clear that the Pact had become a largely domestic 
issue. Blum pointed out that had Laval still been at the Ouai, then 
his faithful majority would have found it very difficult to criticise 
the Pact; since it was defended by Sarraut and Flandin, it would be 
easier for the Right to attack it. In effect, "les organisateurs de 
la propagande réactionnaire se flattent d ’avoir découvert enfin en le 
pacte franco-soviétique la plate-forme électorale qu’ils cherchent en 
vain depuis des mois et des mois" (71). As a result, the arguments
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put forward by opponents of the Pact against its ratification were 
dominated by fear of communism. Philippe Henriot, for example, 
claimed to have evidence showing links between Stalin and a M.Eberlein, 
who had been arrested by Strasbourg police and charged with spying 
against France, having apparently worked to promote revolution in 
France for the last seventeen years (72), while the complete lack of 
distinction between domestic communism and the Soviet Union was shown 
clearly by Fernand-Laurent who cried, "Une entente avec le peuple 
russe, pour la sauvegarde de la paix, sans réserve et cordiale,ouiî 
Une entente avec l ’internationale communiste, soviétique et révolution­
naire, jamais’"(73). 353 deputies voted to ratify the Pact(including
118 socialists, 12 communists and 138 Radicals, with nearly 50 moderate 
deputies following the example of Reynaud and Flandin) and 164 on the 
Centre and Right voted against it (74). Had the Pact been ratified 
one year earlier, when domestic communism still seemed relatively 
weak, it is probable that the voting in favour would have been much 
greater.
The Chamber debate also showed how in the minds of the opposition 
the future of the Pact was inextricably linked with the Popular 
Front coalition. In particular, M.Montigny warned that, "ratifier 
le traité d ’assistance mutuelle, c ’est signer un pouvoir blanc au 
gouvernment d ’aujourd’hui et, surtout, à ceux de demain." (75).
These instinctive fears seemed justified when in May, immediately 
following the victory of the Popular Front, a wave of sit-in strikes 
paralysed much of private industry. Recent analysis has shown that 
in fact the majority of strikes occurred in those areas where union 
and communist organisation was weakest, (76), and the role of the 
communist leaders in restraining the strikers does not suggest that
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their main concern was to provoke revolution (77); indeed, although 
sources in Berlin asserted that Dimitrov and a number of Soviet 
officials were in Paris during the strikes, there is no concrete 
evidence to suggest that "agents provacateurs" sponsored either by the 
PCF or Moscow, were directly responsible for their outbreak (78). It 
was not, after all, in Moscow’s interests to see France torn by civil 
war. But for most conservatives, and even some among the 
Popular Front’ allies, the strike movements were interpreted as the 
forerunner to revolution. Thus throughout the life of the Popular 
Front government and particularly at times of renewed labour unrest, 
opponents of the government warned that the Communist Party was acting 
on the direct orders of Moscow, and planning to overthrow the French 
state. In October 1936 the National Republican press called on its 
readers to take "l’engagement solennel de combattre sans merci le plus 
perfide, le plus dangereux ennemi de la civilisation : le communisme" 
(79), while Jean Goy felt obliged to denounce "le caractère révolution­
naire de l ’action déclenchée par les communistes" (80). In the press 
accusations were often supported by an array of ’facts’ : ’Gringoire’, 
for instance, claimed in January 1937 to have obtained detailed inform­
ation of meetings and organised activities which proved conclusively 
that the Comintern, through the French Communist Party, was preparing 
a putsch which would install a Soviet regime in France (81). Similarly, 
the German press claimed that France was increasingly under communist 
control. The ’Volkischer Beobachter’ reported the Clichy riots in 
March 1937 under the headline, "Communist terror and General Strike in 
Paris, 5 dead, 300 wounded, in the battle of the barricades" (82).
The violent anti-communist campaigns of the fascist and German press
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were not accepted by everyone, but many moderates were also beginning 
to fear communist influence. As Alexander Werth remarked, "The stay 
in strikes of 1936 and the labour unrest generally had given many of 
them the idea that if France was not exactly ‘Communist’, the Reds 
were playing too important a part in her internal affairs"(83) In 
particular, claims that the French party were acting under orders from 
Moscow aroused deep -seated fears that Stalin was trying to weaken 
France internally so that she might seem an easy prey for German 
ambitions, which would thus be diverted away from Russia. ’Candide’ 
declared in September 1936 under a hugh headline, "Le développement du 
plan communiste en France", that by initiating strike action, the 
communists were hoping to provoke civil war (84). On the 24th October 
1936 the Parti Social Français and the Union nationale des combattants, 
considering that the principal threat to their independence was 
represented by the criminal propaganda of the Communist Party, agreed 
to form local ententes to denounce "l’action de Moscou" and to disarm 
"ceux qui préparent la guerre civile et veulent nous entraîner dans un 
conflit général" ( 85) •
The belief that Russia was attempting to involve France in a war with 
Germany was seen to be confirmed by the Soviet policy with regard to 
Spain, and in particular by the French Communist Party’s attempts to 
pressurise the French government to intervene on behalf of the Republic. 
Thus one French source reported that the Russians had been particularly 
pleased by the news that German troops had landed in Morocco, since 
they hoped that this would exacerbate Franco-German tension and so 
divert German attention from the east ( 86) • At the same time it was 
assumed that Soviet intervention was designed to provoke revolution in 
Spain, and Coulondre warned Litvinov in November 1936 that "sur le
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terrain de la politique extérieure, la poussée idéologique dont elle 
sent la pression dans l'affaire espagnole en particulier inquiète... 
l'opinion française" (87).
As a result of such fears it was widely asserted that anyone,whatever 
his political affiliations, who supported the idea of alliance with 
bolshevik Russia, was communist. Pierre Cot, for instance, was actually 
a member of the Radical party, but as the most outspoken supporter with­
in the government of alliance with the USSR, he was immediately dubbed 
a Sovietophile by his opponents . Between July and September 1936 the 
extreme right-wing newspaper 'Candide' attacked Cot on at least seven 
separate occasions, accusing him of undermining the French airforce on 
behalf of his Soviet masters. Edouard Herriot, who was on the right 
of the Radical Socialist party but had been instrumental in the original 
rapprochement with the USSR, complained that every time he argued the 
importance of the alliance with Russia, "on me traite de communiste ou 
d'imbécile "(88), and indeed, follwing his attendance at a meeting of 
the 'Amis de l'Union Soviétique' in Lyon, the 'Echo de Paris' proclaimed, 
"Attention! Cet homme est dangeureux. C'est l ’Ennemi public n.1!"(8g). 
Even Paul Reynaud, a Centre-Right deputy who opposed the Popular Front 
on domestic grounds, was violently attacked as a result of his ceaseless 
campaign in favour of a Soviet alliance : two days before the May 
elections, the 'Action française’ published a declaration by Marshal 
Petain against the Pact and added, "Nous pensons qu’il n ’y aura plus 
personne dans cet arrondissement de Paris pour voter pour Paul Reynaud"
(90).
Even Reynaud, it seems, would have had difficulty in consolidating the 
Franco-Soviet Pact : for a government elected with communist support.
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the task was even harder. In fact, any attempt by the Popular Front 
government to establish further contact with the USSR brought down a 
torrent of abuse in the Chamber and the Press, not only from extremists, 
but also from moderates whose predominant concern was the communist 
threat. On July 6th 1936, for example, the 'Echo de Paris' revealed
that Pierre Cot had agreed to sell the patent of the Hispano Suiza
aeroplane canon to the USSR. Denouncing, in common with the German 
press. Cot's sovietophilia, the article accused him of "sending the 
Soviets the most valuable secrets of our national defence" and asked, 
"Have we already fallen under Russian dependence? Are we a dominion 
of Moscow?" ( 91). Then on the 10th, de Kerillis made an .interpolation
in the Chamber criticising the "sending to Russia of armaments which
the national interest required to be kept secret". The '23' canon was 
in fact a very recent development of two earlier models of which 
Britain and Czechoslovakia had requested the patents : the fact that 
the Russians had specifically requested the most modern version, the 
'23', said de Kerillis, indicated that they had information not avail­
able to France's other allies.
Cot's reply was that Russia had already bought the patent to the engine 
before the Popular Front came into office and anyway the canon was not 
even a French invention or the sole property of the French government : 
its Swiss designer was entitled to sell the patent to whomsoever he 
pleased. Moreover, Cot insisted that he was fully prepared to undertake 
technical collaboration of this kind with any country prepared to sign 
a mutual assistance pact with France ( 93 . To the aeronautical 
commission Cot also explained that in return for the sale, France was 
to have received help with the organisation of parachute units,although 
this information could not be made known in the Chamber.
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Although the parliamentary debate led to largest vote of confidence
that the government had yet received, that is, 403 votes to 152, the 
fact that the 'Echo' had a widespread, fairly moderate readership 
meant that its accusations were far more damaging to the public image 
of the Popular Front than the consistent hate campaign of ’L'Action’ 
or 'Candide'. Moreover, the 'Echo' had several famous retired military 
leaders, such as General Castelnau, on its staff and was often seen as 
the interpreter of General Staff ideas, and, it was said that half of 
the officers in the French Army read it. As a result, says Cot, when 
the newspaper made such claims "even decent people who lacked critical 
sense imagined that France was being betrayed by the Popular Front 
government" ( 93).
Fears of the possible repercussions of an alliance with Communist 
Russia on France's internal stability were in fact based on an over­
estimation of the strength and influence of the French communist party. 
In electoral terms the successes of May 1936 marked the zenith of 
communist achievement, since the greatly increased vote probably did 
not represent an equally increased support for communist ideals. The 
British Ambassador suggested that it was the dishonesty of former 
governments and the despair of the small shop-keeper class which "made 
extremists of normally non-extremist elements" ( 94). In the months 
following the elections, many of these temporary supporters were 
alienated from the Communist Party, holding it responsible for the 
strikes, and disliking its aggressive policy towards the government on 
the Spanish issue : as a result, the communists lost a considerable 
number of votes to the socialists in the by-elections held in January 
1937 ( 95). In the same way it was totally incorrect to assume, as did 
many of its opponents, that the Popular Front government was controlled
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by the Communist Party. Blum himself was no friend of the communists, 
having emerged as the leader of the 3FI0 after the schism at Tours in
1920 at which the majority had voted to adhere to the Third Inter­
national, thus forming the French Communist Party. He had since 
steadfastly refused all communist proposals for the unification of the 
two parties, which had been intensified after the formation of the 
United Front, since he was aware that this would merely comprise a 
communist takeover of the SFIO (96). Moreover, during the antagonistic 
period of Comintern policy, the SFIO had often been singled out for 
criticism. At the 13th plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee in 
December 1933, Thorez insisted that the SFIO was a fascist party,while 
the Hungarian communist Bela Kun insisted that "the central points of 
our attacks on the social fascists (in France) must be to split the 
Socialist party" (97).
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Blum himself, while realising 
that the change in communist tactics was a direct reflection of the 
needs of Russian foreign policy, asked himself in July 1934, "Comment
y \ /
s'assurer que la 3e Internationale ait renonce a son hostilité de 
principe contre la 'social-démocratie', et que par des voies plus 
insidieuses, elle ne poursuive pas toujours le même dessein d'agression 
et de destruction?"( 9^. In fact, Blum never changed his policy in 
response to communist pressure. Certainly he was unprepared to lose 
communist support for his government : speaking at Orleans in October 
1936, for example, Blum told the local Radical Socialist Federation 
that although some of the government's allies felt that as part of the 
original Rassemblement, their elimination from the coalition would make 
a dissolution and fresh elections necessary, and would constitute the 
first step towards the formation of a government of national union.
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excluding the socialists and radicals as well as communists. He added 
that communist and trade union support was essential for the government 
to be able to steer a middle way between weakness and brutality in the 
preservation of public order (9 9 ). Indeed, faced with a violent 
communist attack on his government's foreign policy on December 5th, 
Blum immediately considered resignation. But the conduct of the 
communists during that debate actually demonstrated that Blum was 
effectively in a very strong position with regard to the communists, 
who could not afford to vote against the government since wither Blum 
would resign after a vote of confidence in the Chamber and hold new 
elections at which the communist vote might be reduced, or he would 
resign and be succeeded by a majority further to the right. Thus, as 
long as there remained a slight possibility that the Popular Front 
government would consolidate the Franco-Soviet Pact, it was the govern­
ment who effectively controlled the PCF, and not vice versa.
It is ironical that the Popular Front government, far from being the 
tool of Moscow as was claimed, shared the same fundamental anxieties 
about Soviet-communist agitation in France as its own opponents.
Indeed, this issue was to prove a fundamental stumbling block through­
out the government's diplomatic relations with the USSR. When in 
October 1936 Robert Coulondre prepared to leave as the new French 
Ambassador to the USSR one of the very few instructions he received 
from the Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, was that he must demand that 
the Soviet government stop all interference in French domestic affairs. 
Although Coulondre was himself, like his predecessor Alphand, a 
vigorous supporter of the Pact, he too believed that Russia "était 
manifestement à l'origine de l'agitation sociale qui secouait notre 
pays", and remained convinced that such interference constituted the
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single most important obstacle to the consolidation of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact (100). Consequently, Coulondre raised this issue at his 
first meetings with both Litvinov and President Kalinin, arguing that 
since the basis of the Franco-Soviet entente was the Non-Interference 
pact of 1932, then if that pact did not operate, the whole machinery 
of entente would collapse. In reply, Litvinov produced an official 
declaration that, "Le gouvernement soviétique n ’a pas été et n ’est en 
aucune relation soit directe soit indirecte ni avec l ’activité du P.C.F, 
en son entier, ni avec les paroles des représentatants de ce parti, ni 
avec les écrits de l'Humanité", and he insisted that his government 
had even forbidden its diplomatic missions to have any relations with 
the party (101). Indeed, this Soviet response to repeated French 
demands that the Soviet Union abandon the Comintern never wavered : in 
January 1938, nearly two years after the accession to power of the 
Popular Front in France, Delbos complained to Litvinov at Geneva, 
"Comment en effet ceux qui voient le gouvernement attaqué avec une 
telle violence par le parti communiste sur le plan notamment de la 
politique extérieure et qui constatent l'identité et le synchronisme 
de ces attaques avec les propos des dirigeants et des journaux 
soviétiques pourraient-ils croire a de bonnes relations entre nous?" 
Litvinov merely repeated that the Soviet government had no control over 
the Comintern, let alone the PCF (102).
In the same way, the French government was just as peturbed as its own 
opponents by evidence of Soviet intervention in Spain, though often 
on practical rather than ideological grounds. The practical difficult­
ies caused by the Soviet position in the everyday running of the non­
intervention committee, for example, were a source of considerable 
embarassment to the French government. On September the 23rd,for
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instance, the Sub-Committee on Non-Intervention met to consider the 
question of indirect assistance which had been raised by the Italian 
representative, but although a large majority of members felt that a 
discussion of the issue would be useful, the Soviet representative 
insisted that it was entirely outside the competence of the Committee 
and could only be examined directly between governments : since he 
refused to withdraw, the issue was adjourned (103). Similarly, in 
October 1937 the intransigence of the Soviet representative on the 
issue of belligerent rights, (the Soviets would consider the recog­
nition of belligerent rights in Spain only after the immediate and 
total withdrawal of all foreign troops) led to a virtual breakdown in 
negotiations with the German and Italians (104), who could obviously 
cite Soviet obstructionism as a justification for withdrawing from 
the talks. The French government was clearly displeased (105), but 
failed to persuade the Soviets to stand down.
At the same time the French were clearly very concerned about the 
possible consequences of Soviet involvement in Spain. In October 1936 
Alexis Leger sent for the Russian charge (Potemkin was absent), to 
discuss the action of the Soviet representative on the NIC. It was 
the first time, he said, that there had been such a serious, and public 
divergence between French and Russian policy, and he felt obliged to 
point out that the present policy of the Soviet government would lead 
to war, which was contrary to the spirit of the Franco-Soviet Pact.
The French government had reliable information that four or five 
Russian cargo boats had recently left the Black Sea for Spanish ports 
with cargoes of arms on board, and since these boats could have been 
intercepted before reaching their destination, thus provoking open 
conflict with Germany and Italy, Leger failed to understand how the
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Russian representative could in all sincerity continue to attend the 
meetings of the NIC in London. Hirschfeld agreed with Leger's facts,
though denying that the Soviet action would lead to war, and was 
confident that it would be possible to find a way of avoiding serious 
conflict. But, he added, whatever happened the Soviet government was 
now prepared to go to any lengths to help the Madrid government to 
resist Franco and prevent the establishment of another Fascist regime: 
Léger begged him to warn his superiors that the French government would 
regard this as a very serious statement, and indeed he himself told 
Mr.Lloyd Thomas at the British Embassy that "this disagreement on a 
major issue of policy might well affect the whole future of relations 
between France and Russia and of the workings of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact" (106).
y
Although Leger was probably exaggerating in this, it is clear that 
Soviet policy in Spain made an improvement in Franco-Soviet relations 
less likely. At the same time, French complaints about the activities 
of the French communists might in many ways have been justified: 
l'Humanité had, for example, conducted a personal campaign against 
Delbos in the early weeks of 1938, hoping that he would be removed from 
the Quai ( 107). But while insisting that the Soviet government admit 
its influence over the Comintern, and thus over the PCF, the French 
government seems never to have considered the possibility that Soviet 
control over the French Communists might, if Moscow felt that the 
alliance with France was worth preserving, work in France's favour.
In July 1936 for example, the 'Courrier Socialiste', a Russian emigre 
newspaper, claimed that when the Comintern Executive Committee had 
twice proposed to use the internal situation in France to provoke a 
revolution, the plan had been categorically opposed by the Moscow
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government ( 108), and on several occasions the Soviets seem to have 
restrained the French Communists in their revoluntionary zeal. The 
PCF’s, and, by implication, Moscow’s, opposition to the Popular Front 
became apparent only once the government’s lack of interest in the 
Soviet alliance was finally recognised (109).
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which fears of communist 
underground activity in France were justified. It is indeed possible 
that the French Communists might, in spite of instructions to the 
contrary from Moscow, have continued their subversive work in France 
throughout the years of the Popular Front governments, as their 
opponents so often claimed, although their reaction to the strike move­
ment suggests that any such activity would have been the work of a 
zealous minority rather than official policy dictated by the Party’s 
Central Committee, its own activities strictly monitored by Moscow. 
Undoubtedly the Soviet Union had not abandoned its aim to promote 
world revolution, but as long as it remained postponed it seems unlikely 
that the Soviet government would have encouraged, by means of the 
Comintern, activities within France which countered its own defence 
policies. The existence of the Franco-Soviet Pact might not in itself 
have restrained all communist subversion in France : it is unlikely, 
however, that it promoted it.
Moreover, the Popular Front government was not, as its opponents 
claimed, controlled by the Communists. Indeed, Popular Front govern­
ments were capable of acting quite independently of the French Communiât 
Party, and in practice did so, most notably in tbs failure to consoli- 
date the Pact. And yet, in spite of its determination to work without 
any ideological interference or prejudice in foreign affairs, the
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Popular Front’s relations with the USSR were in practice forcibly 
shaped by the activities of the French Communist party, and by the 
overall issue of communism. At home, its opponents persisted in 
regarding the Popular Front as a prelude to revolution as in Spain, 
or as a stepping-stone to the establishment of a Soviet regime in 
France, and so any attempt which the government made to improve its 
relations with the USSR was invariably blocked by domestic opposition; 
while at the same time the government’s own relations with the Soviet 
Union were considerably hampered by the possibly insoluble issue of 
Soviet interference in French domestic affairs. Thus, while the 
Popular Front was more likely than its predecessors, and in particular 
the Laval government, to consolidate the Franco-Soviet Pact, it was 
ironically, by virtue of the very composition which made it so, the 
least-suited government to execute such a policy.
* * * * * *  * * * * . » * . * . * .
-  70 _
REFERENCES
1 ) Herriot, op.cit., p.523
2 ) Maxim Litvinov, Against Aggression, pp.8 1-85
3 ) Jane Degras, ed. The Communist International ,1919-43 :
Documents, Vol.Ill 1929-43 p.217 —
4 ) Cited in Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste
français.II.: De la guerre^à la guerre, 1917-39, p. 112
5 ) Degras, op.cit. p.247
6 ) See p. 249
7 ) Extracts from Molotov's report to the 7th Soviet Congress in
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol.Ill:1933-41 (SDFP)
P.m.
8 ) J. M. Mackintosh, "The Red Army, 1920-36" in B.Liddell Hart ed.
The Soviet Army, p.161
9 ) DDF, 2e, IV No.354
10) Degras, op.cit. p.249
11) Ibid, p.263
12) The Times
13) Cogniot,Georges. "Le Parti communiste français et L'Internationale 
communiste" in Willard et.al., Le Front populaire, p. 126
14) Georgi Dimitrov "Report to the 7th World Congress of the 
Comintern, August 1935", in The People's Front against 
fascism and war.
15) Cited in Kermit E.McKenzie, "The Soviet Union, the Comintern
and world revolution:1935", in Political Science Quarterly June 1980 
June 1980, p.214.
16) DDF, 2e, V, No.156
17) Ibid.
18) Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p.338
19) DDF, 2e, V, No.16.
20) EMA/2e, 7N 3130 : Renseignement, 11th September 1936.
21) Gindin in Willard et.al. ,op.cit. ,p. 155
22) EMA/2e,7N 3 1 3 0 :Renseignement,9th October 1936
-  71 -
23) DBFP, 2nd,XVII, no.270
24) Thomas, op.cit., p.339
25) DDF, 2e, V, no.156.
26) FO 371/21105, N506/506/38
27) George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, p .57
28) MAE, E1004 : Alphand to Laval, 23rd October 1934
29) Coulondre, Robert. De Staline à Hitler. Souvenirs de deux
ambassades 1936-9. p.8.
30) EMA/2e, 7N 3130:Renseignement, 17th October 1935.
31) DDF, 2e, IV, no.60.
32) FO 371/20346, N2730/136/38
33) Fauvet, op.cit., p.115
34) Ibid., p.141.
35) Maurice Thorez. France today and the People's Front, p. 169
36) Cogniot, "Georges Dimitrov..." op.cit., p.220
37) Cogniot.in Willard et.al. op.cit., p. 132
38) Cogniot, "Georges Dimitrov...", op.cit. p.221.
39) Cogniot in Willard et.al., op.cit., p. 113
40) Ibid., p.114
41) Ibid., p.134
42) E H Carr, The twilight of Comintern, 1930-5, p.181
43) Cogniot in Willard et. al.,op.cit., p.136.
44) SDEP,III, p.131
45) Jacques Duclos, Mémoires.II:1935-9. Aux Jours ensoleillés du 
Front populaire, p.40
46) Le Populaire, 27th May 1936
47) Degras, op.cit., p.401
48) Maurice Thorez, "The Congress of the Communist Party of France, 
in Communist International 1936, p.34.
49) Cited in Gindin, Willard et.al.,op.cit., p. 161
-  72 -
50 p^23^ Cattell, D. Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War
51) J 0., Ch., Débats, December 5th 1936
52) Ibid.
53) Bower, op.cit., p.199
54) J 0., Ch., Débats, January 13th 1938
55) FO 371/21598, C341/55/17
56) DDF, 2e, VII, no.390
57) MAE, Z1005 : Meeting between Delbos and Litvinov at Geneva,
29th January 1938
58) L'Humanité, January 19th 1938
59) F0371/22285, N262/26/38
60) FO 371/21598, C606/55/17
61) Fauvet, op.cit., p.211
62) Ibid., p.197
63) C A Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany, p.53
64) Duclos, op.cit., p.60
65) Fauvet, op.cit., p.Ill
66) Brower, op.cit., p .86
67) Duclos, op.cit., p.34
68) L'Humanité, May 1935
69) Francois Goguel, La politique des parties sous la Ille
Republique,tome 111:1933-9, p.264
70) Duclos, op.cit., p.44, and Goguel op.cit., p.268 
For National Defence declaration see p. 12
71) Le Populaire, 11th February 1936
72) J 0.,Ch.,Débats, 18th February 1936, p.462
73) Ibid., 11th February 1936, p.359
74) See Appendix II
75) J 0.,Ch.,Débats, 13th February 1936, p.383
-  73 -
76) Antoine Prost, "Les grèves de Juin 1936" in Léon Blum 
op.cit., pp.69-87   ’
77) See p . 11
78) F0371/19857, C4319/1/17
79) Prost. op.cit.. Appendix XIX, p. 197
80) Ibid. Appendix IX p.186
81) Gringoire, 8th January 1937
82) Badia, "Un jeune français en Allemagne/ï^itlérienne, 1936-8"
in Les relations franco-allemandes, 1933-9. p. 111
83) Alexander Werth, Twilight of France
84) Candide, 17th September 1936
85) Léon Blum, op.cit.. Appendix XII, p. 188
86 ) EMA/2e, 7N 3130 : Renseignement, 16th January 1937
87) DDF, "e, III, no.472
88) Herriot, op.cit., p.522
89) Ibid., p.607
90) Reynaud testimony in Commission,I, p.89
91) L ’Echo de Paris, 6th July 1936
92) Ibid., 11th July 1936
93) Cot. op.cit., p.361
94) FO 371/20684, C913/18/17
95) Ibid., 0558/18/17
96) Fauvet, op.cit., p.119
97) Degras, op .cit.,pp.291-2
98) Le Populaire, 8th July 1934
99) FO 371/19859, 07348/1/17
100) Coulondre, p.8 .
101) DDF, 2e, III, no.497
102) MAE, Z 1005:Meeting between Delbos and Litvinov at Geneva, 
29th January 1938
-  74 _
103) DBFP, 2nd, XVII, no.225
104) Ibid, XIX, no.252
105) Ibid, no.254
106) Le Populaire, 29th June 1938
107) See.p.276
108) EMA/2e, 7N 3130 : Renseignement, 23rd July 1936
109) See p.282
-  75 -
CHAPTER 4
THE POPULAR FRONT AND HITLER'S GERMANY
It was in the search for entente with Germany that the Blum 
government, rather surprisingly, acted most vigorously. In view of 
its left-wing bias, it was anticipated by supporters and critics alike 
that the new Popular Front government would adopt a firm, and perhaps 
rather intransigent, attitude to the fascist dictatorships, while 
being inclined as a result of a certain ideological affinity to draw 
closer to the USSR. Certainly the fall of Laval could only reduce the 
likelihood of a Franco-German rapprochement. Laval had made no secret 
of his aim to establish an entente with Germany ( 1 ), and in October 
1935. the Paris correspondent of the "Munchner Neueste Nachrichten” 
warned his readers that after the fall of Laval a new offensive against 
Germany could be expected, since it was only "la nécessité de ceder 
à l ’influence de la gauche qui a empêché M.Laval de suivre son but 
idéal : une négociation franche et si possible directe sur les rapports 
franco-allemands" (2). Indeed, Laval had several times indicated to 
the Germans that if a Franco-German understanding could be reached, 
then "the Russo-French treaty would cease to exist altogether" (3).
The Blum government soon made clear, however, that it did not intend to 
undertake an ideological crusade against Germany, stressing that 
"democracies will peacefully tolerate the existence of dictatorial 
states alongside them" (4 ), and insisting that it would be prepared to 
undertake any negotiation which might aid the cause of peace. But afte 
months of propaganda, resulting in the reoccupation of the demilitarised 
Rhineland zone, which had made clear the German attitude towards
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France’s pact with Russia, Blum must have been aware that the attempt 
to reconcile friendship with Germany and friendship with the Soviet 
Union would constitute the most difficult aspect of his foreign policy.
Many Frenchmen were evidently worried that continued French support 
for the Pact would give Hitler a pretext for yet further assaults on 
the European security system. This emerged particularly clearly from 
the ratification debate where opponents of the Pact, such as Jean 
Montigny, warned that its continued existence would prevent any 
rapprochement with Germany being possible (5), while Joseph Rossé, an 
Alsatian deputy, argued that although the government might insist that 
the Pact was not incompatible with Locarno, that it remained open to 
any powers who wished to join it, and that it was not directed against 
Germany, what really mattered was that ’’le Reich continue a interpreter 
ainsi le pacte franco-soviétique" (6 ). Moreover, although it was never 
explicitly stated, it was already apparent that Germany intended to 
make rejection of the Russian Pact by France a condition for Franco- 
German rapprochement. For example, shortly before the Pact was 
ratified. Hitler warned Bertrand de Jouvenal that "mes efforts personnels 
vers un tel rapproachement (franco-allemand) subsistent toujours. 
Cependant, dans le domaine des faits ce pacte, plus que déplorable, 
créerait naturellement une nouvelle situation" (7).
More specifically, German officials began to indicate that Germany was 
unwilling to participate in any agreement which included Russia, or 
even in an agreement with countries who were allied to Russia. In 
July 1935 the German Ambassador to London told Eden, then Minister 
for the League of Nations, that the position with regard to the 
proposed Eastern Pact had been profoundly modified by the conclusion
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of the Franco-Soviet Pact, an alliance directed solely against Germany: 
to sign a non-aggression pact now would be to imply approval for the 
Franco-Soviet Pact, indeed, he said, that was one reason why the French 
and the Russians wanted such an agreement (8 ). Five days later von 
HoeschVisiting Vansittart the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, repeated his belief that it would be ridiculous to expect 
Germany to condone the conclusion of an anti-German alliance (9). 
Similarly, in September 1936 M.Arnal, the French charge in Berlin, 
reported that officials at the Wilhelmstrasse had renewed their 
complaints agains the Pact, now claiming that it presented an 
important obstacle to a German entente with the western powers in the 
matter of arms limitation, since Germany could not possibly consider 
a reduction in her means of defence, as long as Russia continued to 
threaten her (10).
The Popular Front Government was naturally unwilling to submit to 
such blackmail. In February 1937, in reply to a speech by Hitler which 
was remarkably favourable to France but violently anti-Soviet, Delbos 
felt obliged to reaffirm his government's fidelity to the Pact since 
otherwise, he explained, it might seem to Germany that France was 
abandoning her Pact with Russia. Thus Delbos sought to show that 
the French position was irrevocable by emphasising that the Franco- 
Soviet Pact, concluded in a spirit of peace and open to all, was still 
very much in existence. When asked by Gaston Bergery at a subsequent 
meeting of the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee whether Hitler was 
effectively making the abandonment of the Franco-Soviet Pact a 
condition to be fulfilled before any Franco-German negotiations could 
take place, Delbos replied that while Hitler obviously implied that 
Germany was not prepared to participate in an accord to which Russia
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was a party, he had nowhere explicitly made it a condition that before 
talking to any country, that country must first break off all relations 
with Russia. Indeed, as Delbos pointed out, he had replied to Hitler 
on behalf of the French government that "je n'admettrais pas qu'on 
posât des conditions la-dessus et qu'on demandât qu'un pays soit mis 
en dehors de la communauté internationale" (11).
In spite of this unusually stirring response from Delbos, however, the 
Popular Front government was anxious to make a positive attempt to 
improve Franco-German relations. The most spectacular demonstration 
of this was the visit to Paris, in late August 1936, of Hitler's 
Minister of Finance and Economics, Dr.Schacht, and his meeting on 
August 28th with the French Premier. Schacht proposed that if France 
and Great Britain would restore her colonies, then Germany would 
participate in an international disarmament conference. Blum replied 
that "je suis marxiste et je suis juif", but that "nous ne pouvons 
aboutir a rien si nous posons ces idéologies comme des barrières 
insurmontables" (12): indeed he did not think that ideologies played 
so great a part in international affairs as was sometimes maintained, 
recalling that the Franco-Soviet Pact had been preceded by an alliance 
between Radical France and Tsarist Russia. The only cure, he added, 
was to relieve France of the apprehensions from Germany which had 
brought about these policies. In his report to Hitler Schacht twisted 
this last remark to suggest that if Germany were to cease to be a 
menace to France then the Franco-Soviet Pact would lapse, though Blum 
hotly denied having made such a suggestion (13), which does indeed
seem unlikely.
He does on the other hand seem to have been fully prepared to discuss
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the practical bases of entente. He insisted, for example, that any 
undertakings on disarmament must apply to the USSR as well as France, 
in reply to which Schacht indicated that an indirect guarantee to 
Great Britain and France that she would not attack Russia might be 
possible (14). Blum’s response was that while France could not 
envisage a bilateral accord with Germany, since she could renounce 
neither her undertakings nor her friendships, he would nevertheless 
be prepared to contemplate a general agreement, and he suggested that 
the return of German colonies was not impossible(15). Thus, while 
he refused to by-pass Foreign Minister Eden and contact Baldwin 
directly on the subject of the British-controlled colonies, as Schacht 
suggested, he agreed to raise the matter with the British government(16) 
adding that "Je suis prêt ê engager la conversation tout de suite" (17).
In fact, the much-discussed Blum-Schacht exchange was not followed-up. 
Eden, who visited Paris a few days later, says that he was unhappy with 
the proposals, suspecting that the German government had no intention 
of agreeing to a general settlement but merely wanted to regain its 
colonies (18), while Blum himself recollects that Eden was horrified 
at the suggestion, reporting the proposals to Baldwin who confirmed 
Eden’s attitude some days later in a letter to Blum (19). Nor was 
there any official response to the exchange from the German government, 
possibly because Schacht did not have the full confidence of Hitler, 
and perhaps did not even have his approval for the visit. But despite 
the failure of its first initiative, the Blum government did not give 
up hope of drawing Germany into a general settlement. On the 23rd of 
December Delbos allegedly promised Ambassador Welczeck that Germany's 
wishes would be satisfied in various areas in return for peace in 
Spain, as a result of which Welczeck commented that "Blum and Delbos
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have now...undertaken the attempt to reach an understanding with 
Germany" (20). This was followed by a speech at Lyon on January 24th 
in which Blum repeated the French government’s offer. There could be 
no bilateral Franco-German agreement, only an overall settlement of 
European problems, the basis of which might take the form of a contract 
Germany might receive assistance, in order to overcome her serious 
economic difficulties, in return for which she would participate in 
the peaceful settlement of the European situation. Blum even alluded 
to the form which the assistance might take : the opening of credits 
and concessions in the supply of raw materials, and even in the sphere 
of colonies. Thus on this occasion Blum maintained his offer of talks 
on colonial matters, adding an offer of economic and financial co­
operation (21).
In spite of these French initiatives, however, the German response 
remained negative. On the 25th of January, for example, Goebbels told 
Fran^ois-Poncet that Blum’s speech had introduced nothing practical or 
positive into the European situation. Similarly, when Schacht 
returned to Paris in mid-1937 he dismissed the idea of an eventual 
financial negotiation, saying Germany had no need of a loan, while 
maintaining German economic and colonial claims, and in particular 
insisting that Germany must be given a colonial base sufficient to feed 
her people. In return he offered nothing, thus deliberately avoiding 
Blum’s insistence on the link between economic co-operation and the 
organisation of peace (22). In fact, by this stage Schacht, who was 
soon to be disgraced, was no longer a real representative of the Hitler 
government, and it has been noted that the Berlin press passed over 
his second visit in silence (23).
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In addition to the Popular Front’s own inclination to negotiate with 
Germany, it was under considerable pressure from external sources to 
modify its relations with the Soviet Union in order to appease France’s 
traditional enemy. For example, the American Ambassador to Paris, 
William Bullitt, did everything possible to persuade the French 
government to reach an agreement with Germany. Bullitt had visited 
Russia, and even met Lenin , in 1919, and had returned full of 
enthusiasm for the great spirit of hopefulness he had seen there. He 
played a major role in the negotiations which led to the American 
recognition of the USSR in 1933, and one year later had returned to 
Moscow as the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. But by 1935 
his attitude had changed to one of open hostility. The reasons for 
this abrupt reversal are not altogether clear : in general terms he 
seems to have been bitterly disappointed by the tense atmosphere of 
Soviet life in 1934 as opposed to 1919, while more specifically he 
suspected that Litvinov was guilty of deliberately misunderstanding the 
accord with Roosevelt on diplomatic recognition in 1933, in claiming 
that the Americans had agreed to supply the Russians with funds to use 
however it chose, in contrast to the limited credit agreement 
envisaged by the Americans. Various minor disagreements, for example 
over the American Embassy building in Moscow, exacerbated Bullitt’s 
irritation until finally, in 1935, he was outraged by the open meeting 
in Moscow of the Seventh Comintern Congress and its support for world 
revolution, which he saw as a direct contravention of the Soviet 
agreement in the 1933 accord to ban all organisations seeking to over­
throw the U.S.government from its territory (24). Whatever the reasons 
for Bullitt’s disillusionment, he undoubtedly became, for the next three 
years, as implacable an enemy of the USSR as he had formerly been a 
supporter.
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In August 1936 Bullitt was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Paris, where 
he was said to have established considerable influence over Daladier 
(25). It was now Bullitt's belief that "Russia's great wish is to 
provoke a general conflagration in which she herself will play but 
little part, beyond perhaps a little bombing from a distance, but after 
which she will arise like a phoenix...and bring about a world 
revolution" (26), and he began increasingly to urge the French 
government to abandon its pact with Russia, and turn instead towards 
Germany. The U.S. Ambassador to Germany, William Dodd, claims that as 
early as mid-1935 Bullitt had warned the French government against the 
Pact, and had even tried to prevent a possible French loan to Russia 
in the autumn by informing a strategic official in the French 
government that Russia could never repay it (27). Once the Pact had 
been ratified Bullitt continued his campaign against it, and in late 
1936, on hearing reports that France had agreed to military talks with 
the Russians, rushed to ask Gamelin if it were true : Gamelin reassured 
him that the rumours were false (28).
Moreover, it seems that Bullitt did not merely confine himself to 
criticising the Soviet Union, but offered practical suggestions and 
help towards Franco-German rapprochement. Thus he tried in December 
1936 to negotiate between the German Ambassador to Paris, von Welczeck, 
and the Finance Minister, Georges Bonnet, both of whom had indicated 
an interest in rapprochement, and he told the French government that 
if it was decided to give Germany the Cameroons in an attempt at 
reconciliation, then the American government would not disapprove. 
Similarly, he suggested to Blum in 1937 that France and Germany should 
negotiate on the basis of removing the barriers to international trade 
and the limitation of armaments, and he encouraged Delbos when he
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mentioned the possibility of negotiations with Hitler on the humanis­
ation of warfare, saying that Hitler would probably agree (29). At 
the same time, Bullitt established close contacts with German agents in 
France, as well as with the British appeasers, informing a gathering 
at the Astors in May 1936 that "Blum depends on Russia and Delbos was 
Moscow’s choice for Foreign Minister" (30).
Though not so hostile as Bullitt, many British officials were also 
anxious about the consequences of the Franco-Soviet Pact. In particular 
the British were worried that any news of Franco-Soviet military talks 
would be used by Germany as a pretext to withdraw from the tenuous 
negotiations for a new western pact (31). As early as January 1936 
the German air attache to London had indicated that Germany would have 
to contemplate a first-line strength equal to the total of the French 
and Russian air strengths combined, since parity with France alone 
would no longer be of any use once the Pact was ratified. Wenninger 
admitted that he was speaking unofficially, but nevertheless suggested 
that "if the English can stop the French from ratifying the Franco- 
Soviet Pact, we will sit around the table with you and the French and 
will agree to having equal strength. Each country could have a first- 
line strength of approximately one third of the Soviet strength".
The British Air Minister, Air Vice-Marshall Courtney, believed that 
this request was not unreasonable, and Mr,Sargent at the Foreign Office 
stressed that as long as the Pact was not ratified, it would be a lever 
in French hands. Only Vansittart pointed out that the attache’s demarche 
constituted blackmail, adding that he very much doubted whether the 
German government had the slightest intention of concluding an air pact, 
anyway (32).
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During 1936, however, even Vansittart began to fear that news of Franco- 
Soviet military contacts might seriously affect the chances of a 
successful five-power conference since, as he told the French Ambassador, 
German propaganda "dira que non seulement la France n'a pas voulu 
modifier le pacte franco-soviétique qui faisait obstacle , à la 
continuation des pouparlers, mais qu'elle l'a renforcé de manière a en 
accentuer considérablement la pointe offensive" (33). Moreover, quite 
independently of any pressure which might have been exercised, the Blum 
government had itself no desire to ruin any chance, however slim, of 
bringing Germany into a Western European agreement. Thus Blum agreed 
with Eden in October that staff talks would seriously damage the 
proposed Five-Power meeting (34), and Delbos told Bullitt that the 
French government would not allow any such negotiations until a con­
ference had taken place, or until it had become apparent that it would 
not take place, since it was anxious to avoid giving Germany a pretext 
to withdraw from the Conference (35).
At the conference on Leon Blum's government held in 1965, his Minister 
of Commerce, Paul Bastid, emphasised "cet effort poursuivi par le 
gouvernement Leon Blum en vue d'arriver à un arrangement satisfaisant 
avec L'Allemagne hitlérienne" (36). In fact there were many Frenchmen 
who thought that the government's maintenance of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
was the primary reason for the failure of this policy of "achat de paix", 
and indeed this was the reason given by the German government. At the 
same time the Russians clearly regarded a French agreement with Germany 
as fundamentally incompatible with the Soviet alliance. On 23rd of 
July 1936 Karl Radek wrote a biting article in Pravda criticising the 
indecisiveness of the western powers meeting at the London Conference
(37), thus betraying the deep Soviet distrust of the negotiations for
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a new Locarno, while in October Léger complained, probably with some 
justification, that recent Soviet action on the Non-Intervention 
Committee, as well as rumours spread by Litvinov of an imminent Franco- 
Soviet military accord, were designed to prevent the conclusion of any 
western agreement (38). Similarly, in a speech at the Renault factories 
on September 2nd, Thorez bitterly attacked the government for allowing 
Schacht to visit Paris just two days after Hitler had announced the 
creation of any army of 1,200,000 men (39).
The Blum government did not in fact abandon the Pact in response to 
German pressure, and even took care to reassert fidelity to it in public, 
but was undoubtedly anxious not to antagonise Germany further than this. 
Thus it was hoped that if Franco-Soviet military contacts were postponed, 
Germany would accept that she had nothing to fear from the Pact, and 
would be induced to join in a general European settlement. But post­
ponement of the talks was not enough, and Germany continued to hope 
that France would denounce her alliance with Soviet Russia. Thus the 
German press claimed that news of the Purges constituted a moral 
catastrophe for those states which had believed in the USSR, and 
expressed the hope that France might now reject the Soviet Pact (40).
At the same time Germany sought to separate France from her allies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and to exacerbate Franco-1talian rivalry,^ 
while in France itself she attempted to exploit both the pacifist, and 
anti-semitic and anti-bolshevik feeling which predominated among the 
conservative opposition to the Popular Front government, by means of 
propaganda carefully disseminated by the French department of the 
"Office Ribbentrop", run by Otto Abetz (41). Thus it is clear that 
the German insistence on French rejection of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
was part of a wider policy aimed at securing the isolation of France
- s e ­
in Europe, which could not be countered by the mere postponement of 
military talks.
In the attempt to reach an agreement with Germany, the Blum government 
was not, like later French governments, notably when Georges Bonnet 
was at the Quai, attempting to "appease" Germany at any cost, but was 
sincerely trying to draw Germany into a European settlement in return 
for what it saw as reasonable economic and colonial concessions.
Indeed, it was in effect because Blum was not prepared merely to 
appease Germany that his attempts at entente were unsuccessful, since 
he stubbornly maintained that such concessions could not be made unless 
Germany agreed to negotiate a general settlement in return. Germany for 
her part, had no intention of making any such commitment, and possibly 
would not have done so even had France rejected the Pact, while the 
Russians remained totally distrustful of French attempts to negotiate 
a western pact, which it was feared would lead to a new Soviet 
isolation in Europe. Thus, for whatever reasons and with however much 
sincerity, the Soviets and the Germans both made total rejection of each 
other the basis of any understanding with France : the Popular Front, in 
its well-meaning attempt to compromise, merely succeeded in antagonising 
both.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 5
THE DECLINE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
It has been suggested that the most important factor influencing the 
Popular Front's attitude towards the Franco-Soviet Pact was the 
fundamental antagonism between the Soviet Union and France's allies 
in central and eastern Europe (1), while at the same time French 
maintenance of the Pact has been blamed for her loss of influence 
among her allies. This argument was frequently raised against the 
Pact by its opponents, who warned that the French association with 
Communist Russia would push Poland and the countries of the Little 
Entente towards the German-ltalian orbit. Clearly the Popular Front 
government was aware of this possibility, particularly in view of the 
widespread loss of faith in France as a result of her failure to take 
effective action over the Rhineland coup (2), and it appreciated the 
truth of Alphand's warning that, "si nous n'arrivons pas a restaurer 
cette confiance, il est a craindre que de nouveaux groupements se 
forment d'du la France serait probablement écartée" (3). As a result, 
the new government adopted réanimation of the Little Entente alliance 
and improvement of French relations with Poland as one of the basic 
tenets of its foreign policy (4) : the possible alienation of her 
allies as a result of her Pact with the USSR was thus not a factor 
which the French government could afford to ignore.
During the 1920's successive French governments had sought to erect 
an elaborate security system in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
February 1921 a Franco-Polish accord was signed which provided for 
mutual collaboration in the event of unprovoked aggression : it was
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supplemented by a secret military convention which explicitly outlined 
potential military collaboration. As part of the Locarno agreements 
in 1925, France, Czechoslovakia (5) and Poland agreed to offer 
immediate aid and assistance in the event of a German failure to 
respect her Locarno obligations resulting in an unprovoked recourse 
to arms. In 1926 France signed a political accord with Roumania 
providing for common action in the event of an unprovoked attack, as 
well as a secret protocol regarding eventual military co-operation in 
the event of necessity, which was followed in November 1927 by a 
Franco-Yugoslav treaty of guarantee and security identical to the one 
signed with Roumania, but with no military provisions (6).
Many Frenchmen in the 1930’s were unaware of the exact extent of 
France's obligations in Central and Eastern Europe, indeed Pierre Cot 
visited Roumania in August 1936 believing incorrectly that a precise 
Franco-Roumanian military accord had long-since been concluded (7), 
but most were at least aware that the French undertakings were 
considerable. In fact, by the time the Popular Front came to power 
in 1936 there had developed a distinct shift of emphasis away from 
involvement in distant parts of Europe towards an inclination to 
isolate France behind a system of impregnable fortifications, that is, 
the Maginot Line. This was naturally confirmed by the very evident 
lack of interest expressed by the British government in the problems 
of Central and Eastern Europe, since the French had no doubt hoped 
that in spite of the lack of formal commitment, the British would 
nevertheless assist in the defence of France's allies, whereas it now 
seemed possible that France would find herself alone if called upon 
to fulfil her obligations. Interest, both French and British in the 
fate of Central and Eastern Europe needed to be revived : consequently
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the new Popular Front government recognised that consolidation of the 
Pact with the USSR must not in any way detract from, or endanger, its 
avowed aim of reanimating the Little Entente.
Even before the Pact was signed, the French were made fully aware of 
Polish objections to it (8). Ever since the Soviet invasion of Poland 
in 1920 relations between the two had been poor, but throughout the 
1920’s Poland had sought to preserve a balance between her two very 
powerful neighbours, Germany and Russia. After the death of the 
francophile Marshal Pilsudski in 1934, however, Poland, under the 
guidance of Colonel Josef Beck, began to move increasingly away from 
France, to whom she was still bound by the 1921 alliance, and towards 
Germany. In 1934 the French and Russians were considerably alarmed 
by Poland’s signature of a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany, 
and her support for the German position in opposing negotiations for 
an eastern pact. Beck himself was an open admirer of Hitler’s Germany 
and a fervent opponent of communism, while it was said that his 
dismissal by the French government from the post of military attaché 
to Paris in 1923 was responsible for his markedly anti-French attitude 
during the 1930’s (9). Beck was not in fact strictly a Germanophile 
in as much as his predominant concern was to serve the interest of 
Poland: thus he was determined that no foreign troops whatsoever should 
be allowed to enter Poland and he stubbornly refused the frequent 
German offers of a military alliance against the USSR (10). His 
determination to improve Poland's standing in Europe was demonstrated 
further by his insistence that Poland ought to be involved in the 
negotiations for a new western pact (11), while his initial objection 
to the Franco-Soviet Pact was that it would relegate Poland to a 
secondary position in Europe (12). But Beck remained susceptible to
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German flattery and in spite of his attempts to retain independence, 
became in effect a German tool in Eastern Europe.
Given the fundamental shift in Polish policy away from her traditional 
friendship with France and towards Germany, the signature of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact was unlikely to be welcomed in Poland. Polish objections 
were two-fold : on the one hand, the conservative Polish government 
disliked any association with Bolshevik Russia, while on the other, 
the Pact seemed to legitimise the passage across Polish territory of 
Soviet troops who, it was feared, "n'en sortiront plus jamais" (13).
Thus the Polish government sought to combat Soviet influence whenever 
possible abroad, for example at Geneva, while in the domestic sphere 
conducting an incessant war against communism : in 1937 alone, ten 
thousand Poles were arrested for belonging to the communist party, of 
whom five thousand were charged and remained in prison (14). At the 
same time, the Polish press, such as the pro-government 'Czas* newspaper 
conducted a consistent campaign against the Pact similar to that of the 
German press, stressing its uselessness from the French point of view 
as opposed to the very real advantages it bestowed on the USSR, ending 
her isolation in Europe and strengthening her position against Japan(15).
A more disturbing indication of the evolution of Polish policy than 
the anti-Soviet utterances of Colonel Beck was the changing attitude 
of Poland’s military leaders, traditionally the most pro-French 
element in the country. In January 1935, General Sosnkowski, a close 
associate of Pilsudski and an ardent francophile, warned the French 
military attache that Poland could never contemplate any alliance 
or co-operation with a bolshevik country. Moreover, while he 
recognised the potential danger of a rearmed Germany, he regarded the
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Russian danger as more immediate. The military attache warned Paris 
as a result that at a time when many Poles wanted improved relations 
with France and when Polish diplomacy faced a choice between continuation 
of the recent policy or a return to the French orbit, "la question 
russe peut leur donner, pour éviter de s ’engager dans cette voie du 
rapprochement, des motifs sur lesquels ils rallieront la quasi- 
unanimité de l ’opinion du pays" (16). Eighteen months later Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly emphasised that Poland would not support France "au cas 
oh celle-ci serait aux prises avec le Reich par suite du jeu 
d ’obligations assumées dans le cadre du pacte d ’assistance mutuelle 
franco-soviétique"(17).
In effect, the Poles seemed to be forcing France to make a choice 
between their Polish and Soviet alliances, and the French government 
was fully aware of,it. As early as April 1935 the 2e bureau reported 
that the signature of a pact with the USSR would mean the loss of the 
Polish alliance for France. As a result, Germany, covered by Poland 
against the Russian mobilisation, would be able to throw all her forces 
against France from the very beginning. Furthermore, while recognising 
that the total military aid to be expected from Russia was greater 
than than from Poland, the Staff argued that the Polish army would 
give assistance which would be both immediate and better co-ordinated 
with that of the Little Entente than any aid from Russia could be (18). 
Two years later, the 2e bureau prepared another, and more direct, note. 
Any Franco-Soviet military contact would, it was claimed, immediately 
provoke Polish-German rapprochement which would effectively give 
Germany control over a Polish army of fifty divisions, capable of being 
increased to eighty with German help. This would annihilate all the 
military benefit which might be envisaged by a closer rapproachement
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with the USSR, and would result in "une diminution de sécurité pour 
la France" (19).
While the French Staff’s assessments of the comparative military 
values of Poland and the USSR to France might have been inaccurate, 
the French government was nevertheless made very aware that the 
signature of the Pact had further damaged France’s relations with 
Poland and had made a revival of the 1921 alliance even less likely.
At the same time, France’s association with Poland was resented by 
her new ally, Russia. In early 1937, for example, Litvinov complained 
that Beck’s policy was to dislocate the Little Entente and, in 
particular, to bring about the solation of Czechoslovakia. To this 
end, he said. Beck had persuaded the Roumanian government to reject 
an assistance agreement between France and the Little Entente, and 
had tried to provoke incidents between Roumania and Czechoslovakia
(20). These accusations were expanded in the violently anti-Polish 
press campaigns of Pravda and Isvestia, which accused Beck of hoping 
to liquidate the League and collaborating with German fascism against 
Czechoslovakia. Indeed it does seem that the Polish minority in 
Teschen, for example, was told to follow Heinlein’s lead in provoking 
trouble for Czechoslovakia (21).
It is perhaps scarcely surprising that any indication of improved 
Franco-Polish relations was distrusted in Moscow, where Beck was seen 
as a Hitlerite agent. Thus, the exchange of visits between Generals 
Gamelin and Rydz-Smigly in the summer of 1936 was passed over in 
ominous silence by the Moscow press (22). These negotiations,initiated 
by Blum and Delbos in July 1936, constituted in fact the only real 
attempt by the Popular Front government to reassert French influence 
in Poland. Before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber in
-  95 -
December, Delbos explained that since Poland had been drawing closer 
to Germany, and the Polish representative in Roumania "jouait un rôle 
que n ’était pas de nature à faciliter le rapprochement francô-roumain", 
the French government had felt that it must do something to regain its 
former position in Poland (23). The result of the Gamelin-Rydz Smigly 
visits was the signature, on September 6th, of the Rambouillet 
Agreement, by which France accorded Poland a credit of two milliard 
francs at a rate of 500 m.francs a year for four years (24). Although 
Gamelin had vaguely raised the question of Poland’s relations with 
Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia during the negotiations, he had 
received no satisfactory answer, and the French made no attempt to 
make the credits conditional on any reorientation in Poland’s foreign 
policy (25). There were even some critics who thought that the 
generous French assistance might have been made dependent on Beck’s 
removal from power. In fact. Rambouillet was followed by no change 
in the direction of Polish policy which remained firmly pro-German, 
in spite of the French loans (26). There was thus some truth in the 
Soviet criticism of the ease with which the Polish Marshal had bled 
the French Treasury, while being required to give nothing in return(27)
The French alliance with Russia had undoubtedly contributed to the 
alienation of Poland, but it was more than likely that this would have 
occurred anyway, given the nature of the Polish leadership. Similarly, 
changes in Roumanian domestic policy proved crucial to her relations 
with France and the Soviet Union. The Roumanian Foreign Minister 
until August 1936, Nicolae Titulescu, was a devoted advocate of 
rapprochement with the USSR. In May 1934 he had been responsible for 
the negotiations which led to the normalisation of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries (28) which he saw as "un des actes les plus
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importants de ma vie politique" (29), and he vas a firm supporter of 
Russian entry into the League. At the same time, he seems to have 
played quite a substantial role in the negotiations for the Franco- 
Soviet Pact (3), believing that "neither the Little Entente nor the 
Balkan Entente can exist without a Franco-Soviet agreement" (31).
On 4th May 1935, Titulescu told Litvinov at Geneva that he saw the 
Pact as "une oeuvre de paix qui sera la base de la future organisation 
de la sécurité en Europe" (32), and throughout 1935 he negotiated 
with Litvinov for a Russo-Roumanian agreement on similar lines.
Indeed, just as Beck’s critics accused him of working for Hitler, so 
Titulescu was seen by his critics as the Soviets’ agent in Roumania: 
in November 1937, for instance, Pierre-Antoine Cousteau wrote an 
article in the ultra right-wing ’Je suis partout’ entitled, "L’or des 
Soviets M.Titulescu a essayé de m ’acheter" (33).
In the Roumanian press, news of the Franco-Soviet Pact was initially 
well-received, particularly by the Left and Jewish press, while the 
Right were torn between their traditional distrust of Soviet Russia 
and their reluctance to criticise an act of which Titulescu fully 
approved (34). The arguments used by both critics and supporters of 
the Pact were familiar. In a lively press debate, for example, Gafenco, 
former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and then director 
of the ’Argus’, criticised the Pact as constituting a return to the 
pre-war system of alliances, while M.Filipescu, the leader of the 
conservative party and director of ’Epoca’, argued that while it 
might be necessary to institute stricter controls against communism 
as a result of closer relations with the USSR, it was in fact alliances 
which effectively preserved the peace in Europe (35). In Parliament, 
anti-Pact feeling was mobilised most effectively by George Bratiano,
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a Liberal Party dissident, who opposed any military co-operation with 
the USSR on the grounds that he refused to "transformer son pays en 
champs de bataille des impérialismes slave et germanique" (36j This 
was indeed a very real fear among many Roumanians, and Bratianu’s 
constant interpolations on Titulescu's Soviet policy succeeded in 
swelling the opposition considerably.
In fact, while Roumanians as a whole were not so anti-Soviet as the 
Poles, Titulescu was, in his policy of improving relations with the 
USSR, " a long way in advance of public opinion" (37), and the policy 
did not have enough support to survive his ignominious removal from 
office in August 1936. On 30th August Tatatescu, the Liberal Prime 
Minister, tendered his government’s resignation and was entrusted with 
the formation of a new government, in which the only significant 
changes were the removal of Titulescu and his Under-Secretary, 
Radulescu (38). While Titulescu*s fall was certainly due to some 
extent to distrust of his policy of entente with the USSR, it seems 
to have originated in a general opposition to his rather dictatorial 
methods. In particular, he had antagonised the King, who seems to 
have resented his independence, and Tatarescu, who violently disliked 
his interference in domestic affairs and distrusted his relations with 
the opposition party, the National Peasants. There was also a 
certain amount of impatience with Titulescu’s policy of threatening 
resignation if the government did not follow his wishes, as he had 
done most recently in August after a disagreement with Tatarescu (39).
The new government was at considerable pains to emphasise that the 
replacement of Titulescu by Antonescu at the Foreign Ministry would 
not lead to any reorientation in Roumanian foreign policy (40).
-  98 -
Antonescu himself stressed that he would continue to conduct foreign 
policy on the same lines, if less "brillamment et bruyamment" than 
Titulescu (41). King Carol told the British Ambassador that he had 
tried to make Titulescu understand that opinion in both Roumania and 
abroad was becoming impatient of the "headlong manner in which he had 
flung himself into the arms of M. Litvinov, who was the cleverest man 
at Geneva" and who had warped Titulescu’s judgement and sense of 
perspective by his skilful and persistent flattery. He added, however, 
that "we shall stop kissing the Soviets, but not shaking hands with 
them" (42). But Roumanian reassurances were lost on opinion abroad.
In Paris Titulescu’s departure caused "a flutter" in both press and 
government circles, and much of the press was filled with apprehensive 
discussion of the expected anti-French reorientation in Roumanian 
policy (43). In the Polish press the news was greeted with satis­
faction, the ’Kurjer Poranny’ arguing that the Roumanian public had 
refused to accept Titulescu's attempt to lead them away from France 
and into alliance with the USSR (44), while in Italy the ’Regime 
Fascista’ asserted that Titulescu, "an evil instrument in the 
service now of France and now of England", had seduced Roumania away 
from her natural inclination towards her "Latin sister" : Antonescu, 
on the contrary, was a friend of Italy (45). Finally, Alphand
A
reported that in Moscow the fall of Titulescu "parait constituer un 
succès indirect de l'Allemagne dans un pays que l'URSS s'habituait 
a considérer comme un des bastions avancés de sa propre défense"(46).
In practice, Titulescu's departure did indeed signify the termination 
of a pro-Soviet and pro-French foreign policy, corresponding almost 
exactly to a distinct move towards the right in domestic politics. 
Anxious to detect any sign of a change in policy, the Soviet press
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reported in December 1936 that the Roumanians had recently conferred 
a decoration on the former Tsarist Minister to Bucarest,Poklewski- 
Koziell, who, it was claimed, had for some time been engaged in anti- 
Soviet 'White Guardist' terrorism (37), while more seriously it was 
rumoured in Prague that during a recent trip to Belgrade, Tatarescu 
had reached an agreement with the Yugolslav government on the adoption 
of a common policy opposing the extension of Soviet influence over the 
countries of the Little Entente (48). These rumours seemed to acquire 
a degree of authenticity when in December Antonescu and the Roumanian 
Chief of Staff visited Warsaw, in an attempt to revive Roumania's 
relations with Poland which had suffered during Titulescu's term of 
office. During 1937, foreign observers in Bucarest reported that 
Roumania seemed to be drifting increasingly into the German orbit, and 
during a visit to London in July 1937 it was noted that King Carol 
showed a certain admiration for Germany and hostility towards the 
Soviets(49). The King told Baldwin that he saw no signs of aggression 
in Germany, and that he had no desire to become further involved with 
Russia, who had been unreliable in the past and would be so again (50).
In spite of constant Soviet complaints about the new direction of 
Roumanian foreign policy, however, it was not until the end of 1937 
that an openly anti-Soviet government came into office. The new cabinet 
was headed by Goga, the joint leader of the extreme fascist and anti- 
semitic National Christian Party; his Foreign Minister, Micescu, was 
strongly nationalistic and anti-semitic; and at the Defence Ministry 
was General Antonescu, who had spent the last two years in semi-disgrace 
and who had apparently considered accepting the presidency of the 
fascist 'Iron Guard' organisation (51). In France the new development 
was viewed with suspicison, since Goga was an open advocate of alliance
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with Germany rather than France, while the Journal de Moscou warned 
that "it is to be feared that the definite orientation of Roumania 
towards a rapprochement with the aggressors may put an end to the 
reciprocal tranquillity established in recent years in the relations 
between Roumania and the USSR" (52). In February 1938, following the 
departure of the embittered Soviet Minister to Bucarest, Ostrovski, 
the Roumanian Minister in Moscow, M. Ciuntu, was recalled. Ciuntu, 
a close follower of Titulescu, had held the post ever since the re­
opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries and had 
always maintained excellent relations with the Soviet government; his 
recall seemed to mark the final break with Titulescu’s policy of 
Russo-Roumanian rapprochement (53).
France's Pact with Russia, while evidently arousing fears in Roumania, 
was not however the sole cause of her loss of Roumania as an ally. 
France herself must be held partly responsible for failing to take 
any steps to counter the growing German presence in Roumania. While 
1'Humanité's claim that Germany was maintaining sixty newspapers in 
Roumania and subsidising many journalists even in the democratic 
press (54) was probably exaggerated,German propaganda in Roumania 
was undoubtedly extensive, while there was little if any, French 
counter-activity. Moreover, as M. d Monzie argued after a visit to 
Roumania in 1935, it was totally incongruous to instruct Roumania to 
rearm herself and thenrefuse to buy her petrol: as a result of the 
lack of support from France, Roumania was buying all her canon, for 
example from Germany (55). As late as September 1938 King Carol 
warned the British Ambassador of the very serious danger of German 
economic penetration becoming irresistible unless the British and 
French governments gave assistance, such as purchasing the whole
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Roumanian wheat crop for 1938 : his plea was ignored (56). In these 
circumstances it is scarcely surprising that Roumania, her belief in 
the value of her French ally severely undermined, and fearing the 
French association with the USSR, should turn to the welcoming arms 
of Germany.
Yugoslavian faith in the French alliance was already very weak when 
the Popular Front government came into office. For Yugoslavia, the 
main purpose of its alliance with France was that it should provide 
an insurance against possible Italian expansion in the Balkans. She 
was naturally antagonised, therefore, by Laval's policy with regard 
to Italy, first at Stresa in January 1935, and then over the Ethiopian 
War, during which he proclaimed French support for the League and 
collective security while in practice seeking to accommodate Mussolini. 
Suspicion that France would fight only when directly attacked by 
Germany was soon to be confirmed by the lack of response to the 
Rhineland coup. Indeed, French credit had sunk so low in Yugoslavia 
that many were prepared to believe the rumours that French freemasons 
and communists were supplying funds to Yugoslav extremists (57).
The conclusion of a Pact with Communist Russia certainly did nothing 
to improve the French position in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs had 
firmly supported the idea of an eastern pact (58), and officially saw 
the Franco-Soviet Pact as a "nouveaux pas sur le chemin de la paix"
(59), but attitudes in governing circles soon became dominated by 
hatred of bolshevism. In particular, the Regent, Prince Paul, who 
had close personal links with the Tsarist regime, possessed an almost 
manic fear of communism which led him to oppose any suggestions of 
agreement with Russia. In July 1935, for example. Prince Paul went
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to Bucarest in order to try and dissuade the Roumanian government 
from signing an agreement with Russia (60), and he openly rejoiced 
in the fall of Titulescu which, he said, would enable an improvement 
in Yugoslav-Roumanian relations to take place (61). While Prince 
Paul denied being pro-German, as the Russians claimed, he seemed to 
admire the Nazis' achievements and admitted that he saw Hitler's 
policy as the only one which could possible save Europe from 
communism (62). Paul was clearly alarmed by the victory of the 
Popular Front in France, which he envisaged would lead to the 
establishment of a communist regime, and in March 1937 he claimed 
that the organiser of communist activity in Yugoslavia had been 
arrested in possession of about £4,000worth of francs which he 
declared he had received from a French bolshevik organisation. As 
the British Ambassador to Belgrade remarked, "This is most regrettable 
as it has further confirmred (the) Prince Regent in his belief that 
(the) present French government is not to be trusted and that France 
is rapidly going communist". Indeed, Paul said he had received 
information to the effect that the whole of the southern part of 
France had been virtually bolshevised and that a Soviet regime had 
been established at Perpignan (63).
Paul's fears were undoubtedly exploited by the anti-French and pro- 
German Stoyadinovic, since July 1935 Yugoslavia's Foreign and Prime 
Minister. The climax of Stoyadinovi6's policy was the signature 
in March 1937 of an Italo-Yugoslav Pact, which seemed to mark 
Yugoslavia's final break away from the French orbit. Both Stoyadinovic 
and Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, agreed that this re­
orientation in Yugoslav foreign policy was the main outcome of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact, although Ciano's assertion that "Stoyadinovic is
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a Fascist" (64) suggests that such a policy would have been probable 
in any case. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any French 
attempt to counter German-Italian influence in Yugoslavia. As early 
as December 1935, Pezet had warned the Foreign Affairs Commission of 
the French Chamber that intensive and skilful German propaganda was 
already producing an effect in Yugoslavia, often manifested by violent 
anti-French campaigns in the press. Moreover, as M.Baudouin-Bugnet 
complained, Franco-Yugoslav commercial relations were rapidly 
deteriorating as a result of French inactivity. At the request of 
the British and French governments, a Yugoslav economic mission headed 
by a M. Pilla, a known francophile, visited Paris and London in late 
1935 in order to find a way of compensating for losses sustained by 
Serbian commerce as a result of the sanctions policy. In London the 
mission was well-received by the Foreign Secretary himself, but in 
Paris it received such an unfriendly, even hostile, reception from 
the Ministry of Commerce that the visitors made a complaint to their 
Embassy in Paris. Moreover, the mission received only 300,000 francs - 
worth of orders as opposed to the 30 million francs-worth requested, 
whereas in London the Yugoslavs received the full 40 million francs- 
worth of orders they required (65). During 1937 Germany began to 
take over the British position as Yugoslavia's main trading partner 
until, in early 1938, Germany proposed to take 50% of all Yugoslavia's 
exports. Unwilling to let the Yugoslav economy be further invaded by 
Germany, Paul hurried to London, without even thinking of France, and 
begged Chamberlain to increase British trade with Yugoslavia : 
Chamberlain decided that this was unnecessary, and the matter went 
no further (66).
In late 1937, Stoyadinovic visited London, Paris, Rome and Berlin.
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The enthusiastic welcome he received in the latter two cities 
contrasted sharply with his very average reception in London and 
Paris (67), and perhaps represents most clearly the essential 
difference in attitude which caused France to lose Yugoslav friendship, 
although undoubtedly Stoyadinovic showed a marked propensity towards 
fascism as a system which made him an easy prey to German-Italian 
flattery. The Prince Regent, on the other hand, was less inclined 
towards fascism in itself but was dominated by an obsessive anti­
communism which made him, too, susceptible to German-Italian propaganda 
and provoked his uncle. Prince Demidoff, to warn the French Minister 
to Athens in January 1938, that "la Serbie restera, de fait, éloignée 
du système politique dont Paris est le centre, tant que subsistera le 
pacte franco-soviétique. Paul y est décidé" (68).
The existence of France's Pact with Soviet Russia undoubtedly 
accelerated the decline of her influence in Central and Eastern Europe, 
but was not the sole cause. Domestically, the governments of Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Roumania all gravitated towards the Right and, with 
significant encouragement from Germany and Italy which was not 
similarly forthcoming from France, away from the French orbit Indeed, 
France's failure to respond to the needs, both political and commercial, 
of her allies, must ultimately be held responsible for the Popular 
Front's lack of success in its avowed aim of reanimating the Little 
Entente. Recognising that French presitge was at its nadir as a 
result of the failure to respond to the Rhineland coup, the Popular 
Front governments nevertheless consolidated, perhaps subconsciously, 
the decline of French interest in Central and Eastern Europe which 
had been developing since the early 1930's. In fact, the growing 
'Maginot mentality' seems to have permeated even the government of
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Léon Blum to some extent. On June 7th 1936, on the initiative of 
Benes and Titulescu, the headb of state of the Little Entente meeting 
at Bucarest decided to propose to France that she sign a single 
mutual assistance pact with the Little Entente as a whole. 
Paul-Boncour tells us that when on the 27th Titulescu raised the 
matter with Delbos at Geneva, the reception was cold. Following a 
meeting of the Roumanian Cabinet on July 14th, which fully approved 
the initiative, and after talks with Litvinov at Montreux,Titulescu 
again approached Delbos at Geneva, this time with a more positive 
proposition. Delbos replied, according to Titulescu, that for the 
present France was not inclined to undertake any new engagements. 
When, much later, Delbos tried to revive the idea of a mutual 
assistance pact, it was the Roumanians who were cold (69).
It was not until December 1937 that, in an attempt to reassert French 
influence, Delbos decided to embark on a tour of France's allies in 
Central and Eastern Europe as Barthou had done in 1934, "only to 
discover to what an extent France's standing had degenerated during 
the three years" (70). He was well-received by both government and 
people in Czechoslovakia alone, naturally enough the only one of 
France's allies to fully approve her Pact with the Soviet Union.
In Belgrade, considerable pro-French demonstrations, construed by 
the government as anti-Stoyadinovic rioting, were firmly supressed
(71), while in Roumania "I'acceuil fait a notre Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères n'aurait pas eu d'ailleurs la meme chaleur que celui 
reserve en d'autres circonstances a M.Barthou" (72). The satirical 
journal, 'Le Canard Enchaîné' suggested that when asked by Delbos 
what had become of the Franco-Roumanian friendship treaty, Tatatescu 
had replied, "un peu ennuyé,....qu'il était au grenier. On le
-  106 -
découvrit en effet sous un tas de poussière. Une arraignée veillait 
sur lui" (73). In practical terms the tour achieved nothing. In 
Warsaw Delbos listened to Beck's complaints about the Soviet Union 
and the Comintei^é^ but failed to make any enquiries about the 
possibility of Poland improving her relations with the USSR and 
Czechoslovakia. Similarly, he made no attempt in either Warsaw or 
Bucarest to discuss the question of the passage of Soviet troops, 
although he had admitted before leaving that such a discussion would 
be desirable (74). It was indeed with some justification that Pierre 
Benard wrote in the 'Canard' that "les communiques sont unanimes : 
l'accord est complet. Il ne s'agit plus maintenant que de savoir sur 
quoi" (75). The aim of Delbos' tour was sensible enough : the only 
problem was that, as L'Humanité complained, it came eighteen months 
too late. Thus, as with the Franco-Soviet Pact, the Popular Front 
government discovered that it was not possible for France to maintain 
her position of influence in Central and Eastern Europe without making 
a considerable effort to do so in return.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOVIET PACT AND FRANCE'S WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES 
1. The loss of the Belgian alliance
While it is relatively simple to understand why the governments of 
Central and Eastern Europe were concerned by France's new Pact with 
the USSR, it is less immediately obvious why France's allies in the 
West of Europe should have felt similarly involved. In fact, as early 
as January 1936 a War Ministry note warned the French government that 
Belgium was worried about the possible consequences of the Pact for 
Locarno, since a large section of public opinion feared that Belgium 
might be dragged by France into a conflict which arose as a dispute 
between Germany and Russia, but which had involved France by virtue of 
the Pact. Indeed, "la ratification du traité, et a plus forte raison 
un accord militaire franco-soviétique, risqueraient de produire de 
fâcheuses conséquences à notre égard en Belgique, au moment ou s'accentue 
dans ce pays la propagande pour une politique de neutralité et ou 
l'accord militaire franco-belge de 1920 est violemment battu en brèche" 
(1). These fears seemed to be confirmed when, on October 14th 1936 
Leopold, King of the Belgians, announced that his government would 
henceforth adopt a position of neutrality in the event of war : Belgian 
policy must now be to possess "un appareil militaire de taille â 
dissuader un quelconque de nos voisins d'emprunter notre territoire 
pour attaquer un autre Etat" (2). Thus opponents of the Pact in France 
pointed to the loss of the valuable Belgian alliance as an undoubted 
consequence of the Popular Front's continued association with Soviet 
Russia.
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concentrated their criticisms on its effects on Belgian security, 
there was, as in France, a strong current of anti-bolshevism under­
pinning their attacks. One 'eminent' Belgian complained to Reynaud 
of the unrest caused in France by the Popular Front, and in particular 
of the gangs parading with raised fists and singing l'Internationale, 
explaining that "C'est 1973 qui recommence...Et on n'aime pas cela 
chez nous, vous savez", while several days before the King's speech 
M.Sap, a former Minister of Finance declared that "pour la Belgique, 
le danger français était, en raison de l'alliance franco-soviétique et 
des communistes, au moins aussi^grave que le danger allemand" (9).
In a conversation with Eden in March 1937 Leopold explained that the 
Pact was unpopular in Belgium because it was feared that it might lead 
her into conflict, but when Eden replied that the Pact was, after all, 
only a defensive arrangement to come into force in the event of a 
German attack, and that France, a pacifist nation, was unlikely to rush 
into conflict, the King was forced to agree ; he added, however, that 
he was apprehensive about possible communist influence on French 
policy (10).
It thus appears that Belgium, frightened by the apparent bolshevisation 
of France and fearing involvement in a far-away war, decided its own 
security would be enhanced only if it broke away from the long-standing 
military connection with France. In fact, the reasons behind the 
neutrality declaration were far more complex than simple fear of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact, as was claimed. In the first instance, Belgium's 
relationship with France, as signified by the military alliance, was 
the subject of deep political divisions within Belgium. In particular 
the Flemings were fundamentally anti-French, disliking the subordination
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The Pact was certainly unpopular with large sections of the Belgian 
public, most particularly among the Catholics and the Flemings. In 
December 1934 Paul Struye wrote in the Catholic newspaper "Libre 
Belgique" that in spite of the denials from the Quai, there was 
definitely some truth in the worrying rumours of a Franco-Soviet 
alliance, and he insisted that it would be madness to try and build 
European peace on a reconstruction of "1’alliance franco-russe de 
fâcheuse mémoire" (3) Once the Pact was signed, the same newspaper 
claimed that it would effectively reduce Belgian security, since it 
would weaken France’s obligations under Locarno (4), and it warned 
that "le resserrement des liens entre la France et la Russie crée, 
dans les milieux les plus divers, et notamment en Pologne et en Belgique, 
une impression de malaise et inquiétude qu’il serait puéril de 
dissimuler" (5). Similarly, all the Flemish newspapers were violently 
opposed to Franco-Soviet rapprochement, one warning the government that 
Belgium must net risk becoming involved in far-away battles on account 
of France’s pactomania (6). In contrast, the Pact was well-received 
by the press of the Left : "Le Peuple", for example, the organ of the 
Parti ouvrier belge, argued as early as November 1934 that one day a 
Franco-Soviet military alliance would have to become a reality, in 
response to German rearmament and aggression (7).
The press was similarly divided in its attitude to the Soviet Union 
in general. On the 12th July the Socialist press was delighted to 
report the news of the formal recognition by Belgium of the Soviet 
Union, while the ’Métropole’ of Antwerp merely observed that the USSR 
had given no assurance with regard to abstention from subversive 
propaganda in Belgium, or compensation for Belgian capital confiscated 
in the Soviet Union (8). Although the Pact’s opponents usually
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of Belgian policy to French, and as the Prime Minister, Van Zeeland, 
explained to Ambassador Laroche in July 1936, "une politique trop 
ouverteiTÆnt francophile amènerait.. .de telles réactions du coté flamand 
que le gouvernement se verrait obligé de faire marche en arrière".
In order to appease the Flemings Van Zeeland was hoping to conclude 
an entente with the Dutch, although he admitted that "une telle 
entente présenterait pour nous a ce titre un certain danger, car elle 
renforcerait le courant frontiste contre l ’accord avec la France"(11). 
Evidently, then, the issue of the French alliance was one which was 
inextricably bound up in the intricacies of Belgian domestic politics. 
The Russians were naturally anxious to exploit this aspect,vehemently 
denying that the change in Belgian policy was the result of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact. The Soviet press emphasised that the reorientation was 
motivated by the growing influence of fascism in Belgium, and the 
collusion of royalists and Flemings; in addition it referred to the 
relations between the King and the House of Savoy, and to the visit of 
Colonel Beck in Belgium in 1935. In some respects the Soviet 
explanations were clearly valid : the ’Isvestia’ of October 23rd, for 
example, blamed the frequent vacillations of French and British policy 
and the British refusal to bind itself formally to France and Belgium
(12), and in particular the French weakness exhibited on the 7th March, 
’qui aurait contribué a ébranler la confiance de la Belgique dans la 
valeur de l ’appui français" (13). That this was true was recognised 
by Blum, who later emphasised that "là aussi, les événements de mars 
1936 ont déterminé un changement grave" (14): Belgium, in common with 
France’s other European allies, naturally began to doubt French 
readiness to fulfill her obligations, in view of her total lack of 
response to the Rhineland coup, while her general faith in collective 
security had probably already been undermined as a result of the
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League performance during the Ethiopian war.
Moreover, as Delbos pointed out, the neutrality declaration was not so 
unexpected as many people supposed. There had always existed, he said, 
a feeling of nostalgia concerning prewar neutrality, even at the time 
of the 1920 accords : in June 1932, for example, M.Poulet declared that 
Belgium should not be subject to any other group of powers (15), and 
on the 20th July 1936 M.Spaak expressed his hope that "la politique 
étrangère de la Belgique soit placée résolument sous le signe du 
réalisme" (16). Delbos believed that this fear of subordinating Belgian 
policy to France was exploited by incessant German propaganda in Belgium, 
such as Von Ribbentrop’s visit in September 1935, and was aided by the 
personal feelings of the King, who was more inclined to favour autocratic 
than democratic powers (17).
It is perhaps at first surprising that French government representatives 
did not express more anxiety about the loss of the Belgian alliance, 
particularly since it was of temendous importance in military terms : 
if Belgium did indeed remain neutral in the event of a Franco-German 
conflict, then France could no longer send troops and equipment through 
Belgium to attack Germany, and at the same time would have a virtually 
undefended frontier open to German attack. In fact, before the postwar 
investigating committee Blum revealed new information which seemed to 
suggest that the neutrality declaration, issued primarily to quiet 
domestic opposition, need not have prevented Franco-Belgian co-operation. 
At the end of 1936, at Van Zeeland’s suggestion, two secret meeting 
were held, one in Paris, the other in Brussels, which were attended by 
Delbos, Blum, Chautemps and Van Zeeland. The Belgian Premier was 
anxious to clarify his government’s position : it was Belgium’s wish to
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fortify the Meuse, but if the alliance with France were to persist. 
Parliament would not vote the necessary credits, nor would it approve 
a new military law. If, on the other hand, the government were to 
denounce the French alliance, it would receive the necessary approval 
and would then be able to build up the Belgian frontier fortifications 
which would in turn benefit France, since she would have 200 kilometres 
less of frontier to defend : however, Belgium would still expect France 
to guarantee her neutrality.
It was here that Blum saw the opportunity to turn the loss of the 
Belgian alliance to France’s advantage. Arguing that France could 
only guarantee Belgian neutrality if Belgium were adequately defended 
he insisted that she must equip and fortify herself, and establish 
good relations with the French General Staff. This was subsequently 
confirmed by a diplomatic letter in which France claimed the right 
to make the nature of her operations on behalf of Belgium dependent 
on : i) the way in which the Belgian defence programme was undertaken;
(ii) the manner in which the French frontier was defended; and (iii) 
the way in which military operations were concerted between the Belgian 
and French governments. Thus, claimed Blum, any French assistance to 
Belgium would be based on strategic, rather than purely contractural, 
considerations (18). It seems probable that Blum’s explanation 
represents rather an optimistic interpretation, since military 
negotiations with the Belgians would undoubtedly have been easier 
without such a public rejection. Moreover, the French military 
attache to Belgium, General Riedinger, complained in February 1937 
that the Belgian General Staff were disinclined to pass on to him the 
kind of information they used to supply : the British military attache 
in contrast apparently received much useful information which, he was
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told, was to be exclusively for English consumption until the 
Belgian government was sure that the French would pass nothing on to 
the Soviets (19).
To some extent, then, the French alliance with Communist Russia seems 
to have contributed to the Belgian reversal, partly as a result of an 
instinctive fear of communism, partly from anxiety about involvement 
in a war which originated between Germany and Russia. Baron von 
Zuylen, for example, the Political Director of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, explained to the British Ambassador that although the Pact 
clearly was compatible with Locarno, the Belgian government doubted 
if it were politically expedient in psychological terms, given the 
German attitude to the USSR (20); similarly, an official at the Belgian 
Legation in Moscow told the U.S.charge, Henderson, that the major 
reason for the neutrality declaration was the Belgian government’s 
determination not to be dragged, by virtue of the Franco-Soviet Pact, 
into a war primarily involving Germany and the USSR (21). But the 
reorientation had far more complex causes than this alone : on the 
one hand it represented a practical triumph for the powerful anti- 
French Flemish representatives in Belgian domestic politics; on the 
other, it constituted an expression of the fundamental crisis of 
confidence in the value of France as a leader in a tense international 
situation, which was far more worrying from the French point of view 
than mere anxiety about the Franco-Soviet Pact. However great her 
dislike of the Soviet Union, it was the threat to her security posed 
by the collapse of Locarno in March 1936, and not the signature of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact, which caused the Belgian defection from the 
military alliance with France.
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2. Great Britian and the Franco-Soviet Pact
While fear of losing her allies might have exercised a restraining 
influence on the Popular Front in its contacts with the USSR, there 
is no evidence that the governments of Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia 
or Belgium ever directly pressurised the French government to abandon 
the Pact to the extent that German representatives did. It has often 
been said that the British Government, on the other hand, in an 
attempt to keep Communist Russia out of European politics, was 
directly responsible for France’s failure to consolidate the Soviet 
alliance with the conclusion of a military accord. The Popular Front 
government was indeed particularly anxious to accommodate British 
views both in the formulation and the execution of its policy. Even 
before formally assuming office, Blum asked Eden for the views of the 
British government on the Italo-Ethiopian affair "since he was most 
anxious to conform to them if possible" (22), while in June the 
British Embassy in Paris reported that the government seemed dis­
inclined to commit itself on foreign policy without first consulting 
Vansittart, Eden and Baldwin (23). On June 23rd the new government 
expounded its foreign policy to the Chamber and Senate : stressing 
that "la cooperation étroite et confiante de nos deux pays est la 
garantie essentielle de la paix en Europe" (24), the government 
indicated that the main tenet of its foreign policy was to be 
consolidation of the entente with Great Britain, upon which France’s 
other alliances were to be built. Neither were such declarations 
of fidelity merely theoretical : for example, the two governments 
collaborated closely over the problem of non-intervention in Spain 
as well as in negotiations for a western pact, while on a different 
level the French devaluation of September 1936, although dictated 
primarily by domestic considerations, had the additional advantage of
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bringing the franc into line with both the British and American 
currencies (25).
In retrospect, Pierre Cot cited British opposition to the Soviet 
alliance as an apologia for his government’s lack of activity, 
arguing that "Leon Blum craignait très justement qu’une collaboration 
avec l ’Union soviétique ne compromettre ce redressement de la 
politique française en direction de la Grande-Bretagne" (26), thus 
suggesting a fundamental incompatibility between alliances with the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain. But had the British government 
itself favoured a policy of increased rapprochement with the USSR, 
or had the French government retained some independence in the 
execution of its foreign policy, then the Soviet Union need not 
necessarily have feared close Anglo-French cooperation. In fact, as 
early as 19th June 1936, Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador, 
described the outstanding feature of the French government’s attitude 
as "their almost pathetic desire to be given a lead by, and to be 
closely associated with. His Majesty’s Government" : this was under­
lined by the fact that the new French Foreign Minister, his Under­
secretary, the Minister of Commerce and the Minister for the Marine, 
all called on Clerk at the Embassy, instead of waiting for him to 
make the first call, as was customary (27), while Lauret of the 
’Temps’ declared that the Popular Front government did not have a 
foreign policy at all, apart from its desire to collaborate with 
Great Britain (28). Thus in view of the Popular Front’s concern to 
do nothing which might antagonise Great Britain, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the British attitude to the Soviet Union and the 
Franco-Soviet Pact would have been of considerable importance.
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It was often said that the British public was opposed to France's 
alliance with the USSR, fearing that the association might involve 
France, and thus Britain, in a war in Eastern Europe. Leon Blum
wrote as early as April 1935 that the Pact must not acquire the
character of a prewar armed alliance "dont l'opinion anglaise redoute 
le retour" (29), while Vansittart at the Foreign Office warned Corbin 
in April 1937 that although the British government was not in a 
position to pass judgement on French policy, "il serait vain de se 
dissimuler l'impression que pourra produire sur le public la nouvelle 
d'un accord militaire franco-soviétique prématurément conclu" (30). 
The only direct indication which either the French or Soviet 
governments had of Brisih public opinion was of course from the press 
which, as in France, was very much divided. In general, the liberal 
press such as the 'Manchester Guardian' and the 'News Chronicle' 
were in favour of the Pact, while the conservative papers such as the
'Daily Telegraph' were critical. The 'Daily Mail' naturally led the
most consistent campaign against the Soviet Union in general, and the 
Franco-Soviet Pact in particular, but more alarming than the 'Mail's' 
anti-bolshevik tirades were the more restrained criticisms of the 
'Times', which many foreigners regarded as the official mouthpiece 
of government policy. Initially the 'Times' admitted that the Pact 
might have a salutory effect on German militarism but, in itself 
fundamentally hostile to the Bolshevik regime, expressed distrust 
of "this new-style alliance". During 1936-8 the 'Times' became 
increasingly critical of France'salliance with the USSR, arguing 
in May 1938 that this close association had made France vulnerable 
to Soviet-communist subversion (31). All that the government could 
do on such occasions was to reassure the Soviet Ambassador that the 
government did not share the views of the foreign leader-writer of
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the 'Times’ (32).
It was clear from foreign policy debates in the Commons that British 
politicians were divided in their attitudes towards the USSR in a 
similar way to those in France. The Labour Party, who faced a dilemma 
equivalent to that of their fellow-socialists in criticising the 
government's policy of conciliation towards Germany while at the same 
time opposing any suggestion of British rearmament, tended to support 
a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union : Hugh Dalton argued 
in the Commons that Russia could make an important contribution to 
European stability, while the trade union leader, Walter Citrine, 
was a consistent and vigorous supporter of Soviet policy. Similarly 
most Conservative politicians, who increasingly dominated the 'National 
Government', tended to dislike the Franco-Soviet Pact. There were some 
Conservatives who, as in France, continued to place national security 
considerations above their instinctive fear of bolshevism : Mr.Emrys- 
Evan®'. for instance, while expressing no personal admiration for the 
Soviet regime, emphasised that it would not be in Britain's national 
interest to join Hitler's anti-bolshevik campaign (33). But on the 
whole Conservative politicians, as well as some Liberal and Labour MPs, 
tended to see a strong Germany as a useful bulwark against the westward 
advance of communism.
A general feeling of distrust of communism was naturally exacerbated 
by news of the Franco-Soviet Pact. Many in Britain thought that the 
terms of Versailles had been too severe on Germany and that revision 
was therefore indispensable for the maintenance of European peace : 
the Franco-Soviet Pact now threatened to jeopardise any possibility of 
settlement with Germany. As one Conservative peer. Lord Queenborough,
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explained on resigning from the Treasury of the League of Nations,
"I would be lacking in honesty towards myself if I did not seize this 
opportunity to make known to the executive committee the precise 
motive behaind my resolution : by that I mean the conviction of the 
menace that the USSR, in its alliance with France, is bringing to 
European peace" (34). Indeed it was from the Lords that the most 
vociferous criticism of the Pact was usually heard. Lord Rankeillour 
claimed in November 1937 that not only had the Pact resulted in the 
estrangement of Belgium and the alienation of Germany but that it had, 
almost imperceptibly, caused British policy to become subordinated to 
Moscow : this could be seen, he said, in Spain, where indirect Soviet 
pressure had caused the British to adopt a totally uncharacteristic 
attitude on the issue of belligerent rights (35). Lord Lothian, a 
well-known exponent of Anglo-German rapprochement, argued that the 
Pact was clearly outside the normal procedure of the League Covenant 
and as such constituted "a technical military defensive alliance of 
the traditional kind" (36).
Although not necessarily representative of official government policy, 
parliamentary debates, particularly on inflammatory matters such as 
this, were often reported in the foreign press, thus evoking a specific 
picture of British "public opinion". Similarly, in both France and 
Russia considerable publicity was given to the pro-appeasement 
aristocracy, as represented by Lord Lothian, and his friends. Lord and 
Lady Astor. At their Cliveden estate the Astors frequently played host 
to such visitors as Geoffrey Dawson of the 'Times', Garvin of the 
'Observer', the future Foreign Minister Lord Halifax and even,on 
occasion, the German Ambassador to London, Herr von Ribbentrop.
Thomas Jones, a close confidant of Baldwin, recorded in his diary in
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May 1936 that at dinner with the Astors, William Bullitt "made our 
flesh creep with his Bolshevik stories" (37), while von Ribbentrop 
repeatedly warned of the dangers of world communism to which France 
with their Soviet Pact, Popular Front government and Socialist Premier, 
were heavily contributing (38).
Although it was rumoured that through Thomas Jones this group had 
considerable influence over the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, the 
trend towards appeasement did not really become apparent in British 
foreign policy until after the accession of Chamberlain in early 1937. 
Moreover, the opinions of the Astor circle were not representative of 
the majority view at the Foreign Office, at least when the Pact was 
signed (39), and it was, after all, the views of British officials 
which the French government really needed to accommodate. It is in 
fact even in this respect difficult to speak of a "British attitude", 
since opinions on the Soviet Union varied enormously at the Foreign 
Office. On the one hand the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Sir Robert Vansittart, believed that in order to 
counter the menace of Germany it was essential to bring the Soviet 
Union into Europe: for this reason he assisted Russian entry into 
the League and supported the Pact as a means of preventing Soviet- 
German rapprochement. In February 1935 Vansittart prepared a 
memorandum in which he advocated helping France to find a way of giving 
Russia satisfaction without, however, her having to conclude a military 
alliance. But even this policy was attacked by some Foreign Office 
officials as too dangerous. This current of opinion was represented 
most vociferously by Orme Sargent, who felt he must protest that this 
memorandum "exaggerates the dangers of a Russo-German entente and under­
estimates the dangerous repercussions of a Franco-Russian alliance"(40).
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Throughout 1935 Sargent used every available argument to put his case 
against the Pact: the existence of such an alliance would make the 
British public disinclined to honour its Locarno obligations to France; 
it would bring closer the possibility of a German-Japanese alliance, 
which would have immediate implications for British foreign policy in 
both Europe and the Far East; and, above all, it would hamper the 
possibility of agreement with Germany (41), which ought to remain the 
major objective of British policy (42). The answer, said Sargent, was 
to make a direct offer of Anglo-French military cooperation, so that 
France might be saved from "the fateful solution of a Russian alliance"
(43).
This division of opinion was shown clearly by the diverse comments on 
the possibility of Herriot taking the Quai in January 1936. Ralph 
Wigram believed, like Sargent, that Harriot's accession would 
inevitably mean the submission for ratification of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact, which in turn would "increase our difficulties in any attempt 
it may eventually become possible to make, to come to some arrangement 
with Germany": as a result, he regarded the possibility of Herriot 
becoming Foreign Minister with dismay. Laurence Collier, the Head 
of the Northern Department and the most consistent exponent of a 
policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union at the Foreign Office, 
considered on the contrary that Herriot was an infinitely preferable 
choice as Foreign Minister to Laval who, like the French Ambassador 
to Germany, André François-Poncet, was "tarred with the brush of the 
'Comité des Forges'", and hence was interested only in obtaining 
agreement with Germany, regardless of the cost. Collier added that 
it was not proper, however, that the British government should try to 
influence French internal politics (44).
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It was in fact on this particular issue that the most crucial 
divergence of opinion occurred, causing a lengthy debate within the 
Foreign Office. Sargent believed that the British government should 
seize every available opportunity to pressurise the French to abandon 
their alliance with the Soviet Union. Even after the Pact was 
finally ratified he continued to advocate this policy,arguing in 
August 1936 that "we ought to be able to strengthen the French 
government in its efforts - or indeed bring pressure to bear to force 
it to free itself from Communist domination, both domestic and 
Muscovite" (45). Others at the Foreign Office repudiated such inter­
ference in the domestic affairs of another country, though usually on 
practical rather than moral grounds. Vansittart recognised that 
Germany might become more belligerent if the Pact were ratified, but 
doubted that, "even if we could influence the issue(and we can't 
without raising a hugh storm at home as well as abroad) it would pay 
us in the long run to have given way to what is, after all,illegitimate 
intimidation" (46). Furthermore, as Collier pointed out, any such 
advice would be bound to become known and would have a disastrous effect 
on Anglo-Soviet relations, as well as on British relations with Herriot 
and the Left in France (47). It was also perhaps doubtful if any 
advice against ratifying the Pact would have any effect, since at the 
end of 1935 Anglo-French relations were far from satisfactory. In 
addition the British had already expressed approval of the Pact,albeit 
cautiously. The French had been careful to keep their neighbour fully 
informed during the negotiations for the Pact (48), and on May 2nd 
1935 the Soviet Ambassador was informed that if the Pact were concluded 
within the framework of the League, then no criticism from the British 
government need be expected (49); then, in July 1935, the British 
government issued a note fully supporting the French reply to the
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German memorandum, thus agreeing that the Pact was indeed fully 
compatible with Locarno (50). In these circumstances it is difficult 
to see how the British government could reasonably have advised the 
French not to proceed with ratification.
It was in fact the French themselves who provided the first opportunity 
for the British government to voice its opinion. In January 1936, 
Flandin asked Eden for his advice on the possible repercussions of 
ratification : Eden replied that "it was scarcely possible for HMG 
to advise the French government as to any action which they should 
take in the matter since the ratification wa a matter of French 
policy" (51). This reply seems to represent rather a feeling of 
impotence than any real determination to keep out of French affairs: 
in a Foreign Office minute Eden said that he hoped personally that 
the Senate would postpone ratification but that "we can do nothing 
about it", while he explained irritably, and not altogether truthfully, 
to his Cabinet colleagues that "we had not been consulted before the 
signature of the Pact,and there appeared to be no reason why we should 
express any opinion now" (52). The British could not object to 
ratification which, they realised, was none of their business : but 
they seem to have felt rather differently when it became a question 
of supplementing the Pact with a military accord.
Vansittart, himself a supporter of Franco-Soviet rapprochement, 
indicated the root of British anxieties when in September 1936 he 
admitted that "the tenuous prospects of a western agreement or the 
meeting of a Five-Power Conference would almost certainly be destroyed 
if, during the preliminary exchange of views,it emerged that France 
had supplemented, or was contemplating supplementing, her Treaty with
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Russia by a military agreement". Orme Sargent was naturally more 
direct, emphasising that the tales of increased Soviet pressure on 
the Quai to open military talks were very probably true and adding 
"If so, I don't think we should hesitate to put a spoke in their 
wheel" (53). When in October rumours reached London from various 
sources that Blum had promised Litvinov in Geneva that he would be 
prepared to initiate Franco-Russian staff talks, the British govern­
ment made its first direct demarche. On October 10th Eden asked 
Blum whether these reports were true, and on receiving a categorical 
denial, "I told M.Blum that I was glad to hear that such staff 
conversations were not actual, for I shared with him the conviction 
that anything of the kind would gravely prejudice the Five-Power 
meeting" (54). In December Vansittart repeated this advice to Paul 
Reynaud, but only in response to Reynaud's own enquiry about his 
views.(55)
The most serious evidence that can be found to support the view that 
the British government virtually forced the French to abandon all 
thoughts of a military alliance with the USSR is that of Eden's 
advice to Delbos to that effect in May 1937 (56). But this second 
British approach was also partly the result of French solicitation 
for advice. On April 17th Corbin asked Vansittart for his private 
and unofficial views in the event of France entering into some limited 
military agreement with Russia, with a view to the implementation of 
the Franco-Soviet Pact. Corbin added that the French government had 
resisted such a measure until now but had for some time been subjected 
to increased pressure from the Soviet government, and did not feel it 
possible to hold out any longer without causing the Russians to lose 
interest in France and turn towards Germany instead . Vansittart
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replied that he personally believed that the French government should 
postpone military conversations further if they could, because they 
would give Germany an excuse to wreck the western Pact negotiations. 
Vansittart repeated this advice to Daladier, at Corbin’s request, 
although he was subsequently informed by Léger that Daladier had not 
transmitted this advice to his colleagues in Paris (57).
When Eden met Delbos on May 15th, the pattern of the Corbin-Vansittart 
interview was virtually repeated. In fact, Delbos’ explanation was 
even more defensive than Corbin’s. The French government had no 
intention of entering into any military agreement with Russia, he 
said, and had successfully resisted all Soviet demands in this respect, 
"What was now contemplated was something which, in their opinion, 
would be entirely harmless and reasonable, namely an exchange of 
information between the military attaches on both sides", since they 
could not continue to refuse this "limited collaboration" without 
seeming to refuse Russia an equality of status with her other allies. 
Eden replied that he very much regretted the French decision, since 
it would be bound to become public and "might easily, in his opinion, 
have most serious psychological effects, both in this country and in 
the lesser countries of Central Europe". Delbos, for his part, 
continued to insist that the envisaged contacts could not be post­
poned until a final effort to bring about a Five-Power Western Pact 
had been made, as Eden requested (58). But then, on May 28th, 
Vansittart was informed by Corbin that, "Having regard to the views 
expressed by the Secretary of State at a luncheon at his house at 
which M.Delbos and M.Léger were present, the French government were 
going to reduce to the smallest possible compass any further 
developments of the Franco-Soviet Pact...Not only would the French
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government make no fresh agreement in regard to staff conversations; 
they would reduce any further contacts to the smallest possible 
proportions. The French government did not consider that anybody 
could possibly object to so anodyne an arrangement. They could not 
possibly make it more cautious and inoffensive, and they could not do 
less without letting the Franco-Soviet Pact go altogether, and that 
of course they were not prepared to do for very obvious and 
unanswerable reasons" (59).
There appears to have been no other occasion when the views of HMG 
were made known as directly as this, nor does it seem that the British 
ever gave completely unsolicited advice. In effect the French seemed 
to abdicate their own freedom of action in this as in other areas, 
without being submitted to undue pressure. Moreover, both Corbin and 
Delbos emphasised that the French government had resisted Soviet 
pressure for as long as possible, and even now had no intention of 
negotiating a military accord, and Delbos seems to have been very 
easiliy convinced that even the very limited contacts he had envisaged 
ought to be abandoned. Thus it appears that Eden's opinions probably 
confirmed a decision already reached by the French government at least 
by May 1937, and as such, the government's reluctance to consolidate 
the Pact cannot be directly attributed to British pressure. It was 
in fact the French government's own insistence on obtaining British 
views which indicated its reluctance to believe that an alliance with 
Soviet Russia could ever be reconciled to an entente with Great 
Britain.
The French had in practical terms made further development of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact dependent on an improvement in Anglo-Soviet
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relations, and so the Soviet government viewed with anxiety the new 
trend of British foreign policy during 1937 and 1938. As the personal 
control of the new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, tightened, 
it became increasingly apparent that the dominant aim of British foreign 
policy was now, as Sargent and others had advocated since 1934, 
settlement with Germany. Although official policy towards Russia 
remained unchanged, Chamberlain himself told a right-wing Tory, Sir 
Edward Grigg, that he believed Russia to be responsible for the current 
state of chaos in Europe and that if Russia did not cooperate, it 
would be necessary to "push her aside politely" which, moreover, would 
give France an opportunity to break her links with the USSR "in an 
elegant manner". One Foreign Office official told a member of the 
French Embassy in December that the Pact was "the most serious error 
of French policy", while Chamberlain's Secretaries on occasion openly 
criticised the Pact to the Press (60).
Fears of an Anglo-German settlement seemed confirmed when in November 
1937 Lord Halifax visited Hitler at the Berchtesgarden. The visit was 
surrounded by rumours that it had been planned behind the back of the 
Foreign Office by the "Cliveden set", who had apparently decided that 
Halifax should propose that in return for an Anglo-German truce,Great 
Britain would not interfere with German expansion eastwards. In fact, 
at the weekend party in question, Eden and Cadogan from the Foreign 
Office were both present, while Halifax himself was not, but the story 
first published in "The Week", was given vast publicity both in 
England and, in particular, abroad (61). Soviet anxiety was further 
exacerbated by the visit of Chautemps and Delbos to London in December 
1937, particularly since it was rumoured that Chautemps had suggested 
that a reinforcement of the Franco-British entente would enable him
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to abandon the Franco-Soviet Pact (62).
That the Chamberlain policy was deeply resented in Moscow can be seen 
by the violently anti-British campaign conduced by 1 'Humanité as a 
result of the French Cabinet crisis in January 1938. For several 
months past, it was claimed, the British conservatives who provided 
the inspiration for the Chamberlain government, led by Lords Lothian, 
Halifax and Londonderry, had been trying to dislocate the Popular 
Front coalition. Having inspired the 'pause' and the non-intervention 
policy, the City financiers had then prepared to provoke the current 
French crisis by means of golf meetings on the Cote d'Azur between 
Flandin, Vansittart and Simon, who represented the pro-German, pro- 
Japanese element in the Cabinet. The aim of the British conservatives 
was to provoke the eviction of the Communist Party from the Popular 
Front government (hence Chautemps' totally unexpected and unprovoked 
action in the Chamber debate giving back the communists their liberty), 
and the eviction from the coalition of the CGT (which accounted for 
Chautemps' threats to the workers). Thus,said 1 'Humanité,Chautemps 
was working directly on the orders of British conservatives and 
financiers (63).
These accusations may seem far-fetched, but Soviet bitterness about 
French devotion to Britain is understandable, and itwas with some 
justification that Gabriel Peri claimed in January 1938 that "les 
demarches essentielles de la politique française, si elles ont été 
toujours subordonnées au consentement de Londres, ne sont jamais 
préoccupés de l'opinion du contractant soviétique" (64). Although not 
linked by any formal alliance, France collaborated closely with Great 
Britain on virtually all matters of foreign policy, such as the
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negotiations for a new Locarno agreement and non-intervention in 
Spain. Delbos even went to confer with his British colleagues before 
embarking on his tour of France's allies in Central and Eastern 
Europe in December 1937. These Soviet fears were finally justified 
by the Munich agreement in September 1938. Since one of the main 
contingencies in which the Franco-Soviet Pact was expected to operate 
was in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, then Russia could 
justifiably expect to be consulted about that country's fate, but at 
Munich Daladier, under Chamberlain's guidance, agreed to the dis­
memberment of Czechoslovakia without even the Czechoslovaks, let 
alone the Russians, being present. Just as they had feared throughout 
the Locarno negotiations, the Soviets had been isolated by the major 
European powers: the Pact with France had done nothing to prevent it.
The French government did not, of course, regard an alliance with 
Great Britain as valueless in practical terms and may have thought 
that, militarily, British support was more useful than Soviet : the 
French General Staff, for example, argued in June 1936 that news of 
Franco-Soviet military conversations would create an unfortunate 
impression in Great Britain, "et les conversations entre Etats-Majors 
français et britannique ne pourront qu'en souffrir" (65). But the 
real issue is that the French felt obliged to make this choice at all: 
there is, for instance, no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the 
Popular Front government ever tried to use its influence in London or 
Moscow to promote rapprochement between the two, as the Russians them­
selves hoped (66). Again, in May 1937 the French Staff justified its 
opposition to the idea of a military accord on the grounds that it was 
doubtful that English public opinion would approve (67). It is possible 
that, like Delbos, the French Military were using this British argument
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to justify their own opposition to the Pact. Thus the crucial 
question becomes, not whether the British government pressurised 
France to abandon the Pact, but whether there was, in French govern­
mental and military circles, any predisposition in favour of maintain­
ing the Pact to be overcome. It is important to recognise in this 
respect that while entente with Great Britain was undoubtedly in­
compatible with the Soviet alliance, it was the French themselves, 
rather than the British, who effectively made it so.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 7
THE FRENCH GENERAL STAFF AND THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT
Before the postwar investigative committee, Leon Blum indicated that 
on several occasions the Russians had offered to reveal the exact 
nature of the military and industrial resources which could be put at 
France’s disposal in the event of a European conflict, if France would 
provide similar information in return. Blum continues, "J’ai pose 
plus d'une fois la question à M. Daladier et je me suis bien rendu 
compte que M. Daladier se heurtait à son tour, je ne dirai pas^a une 
résistance de 1 ’état-major, mais a une réticence de 1 ’état-major".
The major reason for this "reticence", Blum explains, was that "a cette 
epoque notre etat-major ne considérait pas l ’aide militaire de l ’URSS 
comme une donnée d ’importance primordiale" since "dans son for 
intérieur, 1'état-major considérait les forces militaires de la 
Pologne comme supérieures ou en tout cas plus importantes pour nous 
que les forces militaires de l ’URSS" (1).
It is quite understandable that the Blum government, in its relations 
with the Soviet Union, should have been considerably influenced by 
the views of its own military leaders : what is less immediately 
apparent is why the French Staff should have reached the conclusion 
that Soviet military assistance could be of no value to France, since 
the majority of information available from French diplomatic and 
military representatives in Moscow seemed to indicate the contrary.
Thus it is necessary to examine how far the Popular Front government 
was hindered in its relations with the USSR by the negative advice of 
its Generals, and how far that advice was the result of a miscalculation.
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intentional or otherwise.
Officially the most influential military leader in the period under 
consideration was General Maurice Gamelin. On 21st January 1935 
Gamelin, a member of Joffre’s Staff during the First World War and 
widely respected as the initiator of the manoeuvre which led to the 
Marne victory (2), succeeded General Weygand as Vice-President of the 
Conseil Supérieure de la Guerre, the army’s senior military committee, 
combining this with his position as Chief of the Army General Staff, 
which he had held since February 1931. His chief collaborators were 
Generals Georges and Colson, who succeeded Gamelin as the Army Chief 
of Staff in January 1935. General Doumenc took over the direction of 
the 1er and 4e bureaux, being succeeded as Deputy Chief of the Army 
Staff by General Victor-Henri Schweisguth, who retained that post 
until September 1937. General Pujo was the Chief of the Airforce 
General Staff, later replaced by General Vuillemin, while Vice- 
Admiral Durance-Viel, and later Vice-Admiral Darlan, headed the Marine 
Staff.
Although these were officially France’s major military figures when 
the Popular Front came to power, to them must be added two former 
leaders whose influence remained strong : General Weygand, who 
resigned his supreme position to Gamelin on account of his having 
reached retirement age, but who remained a significant military figure 
whose advice was still unofficially sought, and most important of all, 
Marshall Philippe Petain. Pétain, the hero of Verdun who had been the 
dominant French military personality throughout the 1920’s, had resigned 
his post as Chief of the Army General Staff to Weygand in 1930, but his 
influence as a hero of the Great War had continued unabated. In the
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Doumergue government of 1934 Petain was Minister of War, and even 
under the Popular Front he remained a member of the Conseil supérieur^ 
de la Defense Nationale and the Comité permanent de la Defense -
Nationale. A general unwillingness to contradict France’s military 
hero (3) had led to his views on most military matters being widely 
accepted and so Petain’s emphasis on a defensive strategy and a 
continuous front, as well as his lack of interest in the value of the 
airforce as an independent armed force and dismissal of the role to be 
played by the tank in modern warfare as emphasised by de Gaulle, had 
by the mid-1930’s become firmly imprinted on the whole of French 
military thinking.
On a practical level the General Staff could make known its views to 
the government in one of two basic ways. The first, and, it seems, 
least efficient, was through meetings of the National Defence Committees 
The role of the Conseil supérieur^de la Defense Nationale was to 
prepare plans and methods of operation in the event of war and to co­
ordinate all ministerial action in matters relating to Narional 
Defence, but it was composed primarily of cabinet ministers : the 
Premier or President of the Republic who usually acted as Chairman, 
and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Public Works, 
Finance, War, Navy, Air and the Colonies. In addition the meetings 
were attended by a Marshal of France, in other words. Marshal Petain.
The Haut Comité militaire, on the other hand, which was responsible 
for the military conduct of a war, had a more military composition 
comprising the Premier, the three service ministers, the Chiefs of the 
Army, Navy and Air General Staffs and the Inspector-General of 
territorial air defence, that is. Marshal Petain (4).
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One of the first acts of the new Popular Front government, however, 
was to replace this committee with a new "Comité permanent de la 
Defense Nationale", to work in conjunction with the newly-created 
Ministry of National Defence which had overall control over the War, 
Marine and Air Ministries. The new committee was to comprise the 
three service ministers, the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and War Staffs 
and Marshal Petain, and was directly linked to the new ministry by a 
permanent administrative staff (5). The scope of the new committee 
was extensive, ranging from matters of colonial defence and military 
aid to allies through to the mobilisation of labour and the sale of 
French arms, but while it might have played an important role in the 
formulation of French military and national defence policy, it met 
only at irregular intervals, on average once every two months, and was 
only rarely attended by the Foreign Minister, who was not in fact a 
member of the Committee. Indeed, as Robert Young has shown, there was 
no real co-ordination in any of the committees between the civil and 
military representatives (6). In fact there seems to have been little 
effective collaboration between the two at any level : General Gamelin 
recalls that whereas he had been on friendly terms with Maurin and 
Fabry, both former Ministers of War, whom he could see whenever he 
wished, Daladier was difficult to contact since as head of the Radical- 
Socialist party he was often occupied with political matters. Gamelin 
found it necessary to request an audience, on one occasion waiting a 
month to see the Minister, and concludes that "Ce ne sont pas là les 
conditions d'une collaboration vraiment étroite, encore moins suivie, 
entre le ministre et le chef d ’état-major général" (7). Indeed,
Daladier did not even convey the details of the Blum-Potemkin exchange 
of 17th February to the General for his comments until the 9th April!(8)
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A more effective means of making known its views on various issues was 
through the use of written notes to the Ministry, and it is from these 
that we can ascertain exactly the Staff’s attitude to the Soviet 
alliance. Thus on the 24 April 1935 the 2e bureau prepared a note on 
the advantages and inconveniences, both political and military, of a 
Russian alliance (9). The 2e bureau also prepared papers on the 
possible consequences of a Franco-Soviet military contact for France’s 
other alliances (10), and more specifically on the Franco-Polish 
alliance (11), as well as evaluating the purely military value of the 
Soviet accord for France. Usually the Staff’s comments were solicited' 
by the Quai, though it is not clear whether or not the government 
merely sought specialised military opinions on which to base its own 
judgement of the value of the alliance.
In addition the Staff could of course use entirely unofficial means 
of making known its views. While it might have been difficult for 
Gamelin to make contact with Daladier there seems to have been a fairly 
close working relationship with officials at the Quai : thus on 25th 
June 1936 General Colson sent Schweisguth to give Bargeton the views 
of the Army Staff on the consequences of Franco-Soviet staff talks (12), 
and Schweisguth was able to discuss his report on the Red Army 
manoeuvres extensively with Léger (13) and on one occasion with the 
Minister himself (14). On another occasion, after a Satff discussion 
on Franco-Soviet contacts. General Georges indicated that he would ’’act 
on" the director of Delbos’ cabinet, M. Langier (15). Thus Gamelin’s 
repeated insistence that the Military be kept aloof from any invole- 
ment in politics did not apply in practice, and the government was made 
fully aware of the political, as well as military, views of its General 
Staff.
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Geneviève Tabouis recalls that when Herriot returned from Russia in 
1932 advocating a close Franco-Soviet entente, "the most unexpected 
support for the plan came from General Weygand, who was more 
enthusiastic about the idea than anyone else on the General Staff"(16). 
Indeed, Weygand initiated secret talks with Soviet representatives in 
Paris, conducted for the French by the "aristocratic and reactionary"
(17) General de Lattre de Tassigny, on the basis of which military 
attaches were exchanged in the spring of 1933, and he subsequently 
encouraged the attempts of Paul-Bancour and Herriot to prepare a 
mutual assistance pact (18). And yet, only three years later, and 
having been one year retired from public life, Weygand felt it necessary 
to make a dramatic intervention in the ratification debate, circulating 
a note among the deputies which stated, "As Inspector General of the 
Army, not consulted; as a private citizen, hostile"(19). At the same 
time Weygand denied ever having favoured the Pact, and he authorised 
the ’Journal’, ’Gringoire’ and ’Candide’ to print articles saying it 
was wrong to call him the "father of the Pact" since "he had not even 
been consulted about it"(20).
It is unlikely that Weygand’s astonishing intervention had any real 
influence on the voting, at least in the Chamber, but his apparent 
rejection of the Pact, when he was thought to have favoured rapproche­
ment in its early stages, must have causée considerable confusion.
Even more disquieting, perhaps, were the series of violently anti-Pact 
articles published in the press at the time of the debate by the 
venerable Marshal Petain. Although not known as a supporter of 
rapprochement Petain had said nothing against it when in the Doumergue 
Ministry, but in April 1936 the ’Journal’ published an article by him 
which warned that "En tendant la main à Moscou, nous l ’avons tendue au
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communisme et nous avons amené a lui quantité de braves gens de chez 
nous, qui jusqu’alors s ’en défendaient. Nous avons fait entrer le 
communisme dans le cercle des doctrines avouables. Nous aurons vrais­
emblablement l ’occasion de le regretter" (21).
This was, of course, a major consideration for both Petain and Weygand 
(22), who had approved rapprochement before the change in communist 
tactics had enabled the French Communish Party to obtain a significant 
foothold in French politics, and while Cot’s interpretation of Weygand 
as a fascist who hated democracy might seem a little extreme (23), he 
undoubtedly feared the growth of communism in Europe, and regarded 
Hitler as a possible bulwark against it. Philip Bankwitz interprets 
Weygand’s change of heart more favourably, maintaining that he was 
motivated in 1933 by a morbid fear of the conjunction of resurgent 
German military power and French military weakness at the beginning 
of the ’lean years’ in 1935 which led him to grasp at any chance of 
counterbalancing Germany : by 1936 the ’lean year’ problem had, under 
Gamelin’s management receded, and Weygand, now retired, could freely 
express his own opinions (24). Certainly there is no evidence that 
Weygand ever really envisaged a military alliance with the USSR, or 
ever regarded the Red Army as being of any practical use, but the 
severity of his reaction in 1936 sees to indicate a deep-rooted fear 
whose most likely cause was communism.
Although Weygand’s and Petain’s dramatic warnings to the public in 
1936 were not typical of the official views of the General Staff, 
there were already indications of the ’reticence’ of which Blum later 
spoke. In his memoirs Gamelin claims that he agreed with Barthou that 
"la Russie représentait bien le seul grand contrepoids oriental
-  143 -
nécessaire vis-a-vis de l ’Allemagne" (26) and the journalist Pertinax 
recollects that in February 1934 Gamelin "m*avait exhorté à expliquer 
au public la nécessité d ’une politique nouvelle a l ’égard de Moscou" 
(27). But there was no suggestion that Gamelin ever contemplated a 
military alliance with the Soviet Union, the consequences of which 
he appreciated fully. Discussing the imminent ratification with his 
colleagues on February 10th, for example, Gamelin indicated his hope 
that no mention would be made in the debate of the Pact’s being 
directed against Germany (28), and on the 24th he suggested that 
ratification be postponed while the Pact were submitted to the Hague 
Court of Justice or the League of Nations for approval (29).
Unlike Weygand, however, it seems likely that Gamelin was sincerely 
motivated by fear of the Pact’s consequences rather than an abstract 
fear of the Soviet Union. When asked by Massigli at the Quai whether 
Gamelin’s suggestion was not merely a manoeuvre designed to undermine 
the Pact, Schweisguth explained that the Staff had received fresh 
information about the imminent reoccupation of the Rhineland, which it 
was hoped to forestall by removing Hitler’s pretext (30). Moreover, 
whereas the victory of the Popular Front seems to have filled Weygand 
and Petain with fear, confirming their rejection of the Soviet 
alliance, Gamelin seems to have been able to dissociate domestic from 
foreign politics. Thus while in August 1935 he "semble flotter et 
osciller", suspecting Soviet propaganda among the lower army officers, 
this was according to Pertinax only a fluctuation, and Gamelin hence­
forth repeated continually to Daladier that "les sous-offiders sont 
immunisés contre le virus communiste" (31). He was naturally concerned 
that the accession of the Popular Front to power might have
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repercussions on army morale, but was sufficiently reassured by Blum’s 
insistence on the importance of national defence to conclude that "le 
président Blum savait mettre les intérêts permanents de la France au- 
dessus des luttes entre les partis" (32). Thus Gamelin seems to have 
felt no need suddently to revise his attitude towards the Soviet Union 
and while he recognised that some Generals were clearly hostile to the 
new government, he considered he had enough authority to restrain their 
criticisms (33).
In fact, however, the General Staff had already begun to assert a 
negative influence on the government before the Rassemblement populaire 
was formed and before the Franco-Soviet Pact was even signed. In 
April 1935 the 2e bureau presented the government with an analysis of 
the possible consequences of the forthcoming pact from the juridicial, 
political and military points of view. On the technical issue, it was 
advised that the alliance must be in the form of a mutual assistance 
treaty limited to Europe, and be compatible with France’s existing- 
alliances and Locarno. The military aspect of the alliance was 
examined summarily : in the event of conflict, Russia would have sixty 
infantry divisions on the European frontier, twelve cavalry divisions, 
1,800 aircraft and 1,200 tanks. But the major section of the note 
concentrated on an analysis of the political consequences of the Pact.
The advantages envisaged were that it would prevent a return to 
Rapallo and would facilitate the creation of a Franco-Slav bloc 
(excluding Poland). On the other hand the conclusion of the Pact would 
risk throwing Poland into the German camp, thus considerably improving 
Germany’s position against France, and depriving France of valuable 
Polish aid; it would ally France to a government who had betrayed her 
in the last war, and ruined the small French creditors; and in particular
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it would make France a target for Soviet German collusion : for 
instance, Russia, in German pay in the Baltic states, might provoke 
a causus belli and drag France into war at a moment which suited 
Germany to crush her. The note concluded with the advice that the 
government either renounce the alliance "ou bien ne s ’engager que dans 
des termes qui nous laissent, dans tous les cas, notre libre arbitre, 
par exemple en prévoyant ’que les gouvernements se consulteront’, sans 
conclure aucun accord militaire"(34).
Such advice even before the signature of the Pact hardly boded well 
for its future, making quite clear that the 2e bureau at least, albeit 
for largely political reasons, was opposed to the idea of a military 
agreement. The advice was often repeated. In response to a question 
from the Ministry that the Army Staff should give its opinion on the 
usefulness of conversations and military accords with the USSR, 
Schweisguth presented Bargeton on June 24th 1936 with a resume of the 
Staff’s opinions. Since the ratification of the Pact had been used as 
a pretext by Germany for the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, it was 
only to be expected that the conclusion of a military accord would be 
followed by a new gesture of force by the German government; Poland 
would immediately turn towards Germany; the impression created in 
England would be unfavourable, and talks with the British Staff would 
undoubtedly suffer; and, finally, Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia 
could not be envisaged without a five month delay. Thus it was 
concluded that "il n ’y a pas de raison particulière de conclure les 
accords militaires avec l ’URSS" since "ces dangers ne seraient pas 
compensés par la conclusion d ’un accord militaire dont on ne voit pas 
q u ’il puisse apporter une amélioration appréciable aux difficultés 
techniques existantes" (35). A similar conclusion was reached a year
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later when the Staff advised that "tout nouveau rapprochement de la 
France vers Moscou risque de se traduire, au point de vue de la 
sécurité française, par un résultat nul ou meme négatif" (36).
In all these instances the Staff was making a political, rather than 
a military, judgement, but nevertheless one which was in many ways 
justified. It was perhaps only natural that the Army should remember 
Brest-Litovsk more bitterly than anyone else and, like the government, 
the Military might have sincerely feared that an alliance with the 
Soviet Union would lead to the alienation of France’s allies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Great Britain and Belgium, and further 
antagonise Germany. What is less easy to understand is why the Staff 
totally dismissed the military value of the USSR per se. In retrospect 
the lack of faith in the Soviet Military has usually been attributed 
to two major factors : the critical report made by General Schweisguth 
on returning from the White Russia manouevres in September 1936 which, 
in the words of one historian, was adopted by the French Staff as their 
New Testament policy on Soviet Russia until 1939 (37), and the effects 
of the military purge in Russia which devastated the High Command in 
June 1937- But as early as June 1934 the British Ambassador to Paris 
reported that the French "do not anticipate that in the event of a 
German aggression on France the Russian army, even if it were possible 
to leave its own frontiers, would be of any great practical assistance" 
(38), and a Swiss newspaper reported in January 1935 that "I’Etat-Major 
français a une opinion assez peu flatteuse de la valeur combative de 
l ’Armee rouge" (39). Thus it seems that the Schweisguth Report and 
the Purges merely confirmed, rather than produced, the opinion of the 
French General Staff.
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It was of course difficult to obtain exact information on the nature 
of the Soviet military forces since the Moscow government was 
inclined to be secretive and public displays such as army manoeuvres 
were always highly selective. However, in view of her apparently 
close political relations with the USSR, France was in a better 
position than most other countries to assess the condition of the 
Russian forces, and indeed the French Staff did receive a considerable 
amount of detailed information from its representatives, both military 
and political, in Russia. In fact almost every French observer in 
Moscow sent back favourable reports on the Red Army and Airforce, and 
recommended closer collaboration between the French and Soviet 
Military. In particular the military attaches to Moscow during this 
period were usually very complementary about the Soviet armed forces 
(40). Colonel Mendras, the first military attache, appointed in 1933, 
did everything possible to promote military rapprochement between the 
two countries, and when he was recalled in 1934 the Soviet Chief of 
Staff, Egorov, praised him warmly for facilitating the exchange of 
information between the two armies and for being ready to assist any 
project which might improve personal contacts (41). Pierre Cot 
claims that Mendras was recalled because he suggested that the French 
Army had much to learn from the Red Army (42), and while there is no 
concrete evidence to support this claim, it is striking that Mendras 
spent only one year in Moscow.
Moreover, he was succeeded by a lesser-ranking officer, Lt.-Col Simon, 
who was certainly less enthusiastic. The Russians themselves were 
unhappy with the new appointment, arguing that the USSR was surely 
important enough for France to be represented by a Colonel, or even 
a General (43) : indeed, France was represented by General Renondeau
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in Berlin, General Faucher in Prague and General Musse in Warsaw, 
while from January 1937 General Semenov occupied the post of Soviet 
military attache in Paris. In addition the Russians seem to have 
found Simon unacceptable personally. In October 1936, for example, 
Ventsov complained to Schweisguth that while Simon was clearly an 
excellent soldier he was excessively reserved, particularly with 
regard to the General Staff, with, whom his contacts "ne sont pas 
suffisants étant données les bonnes relations existant entre les deux 
armees" (44). And yet even Simon, without noticeably recommending 
d o s e r  collaboration, reported quite favourably on the strengths of 
the Red Army. In 1937 Simon was replaced by Lt.-Col Palasse who, like 
Mendras, was extremely impressed by what he saw of the Soviet Military, 
and consistently recommended improved relations between the two armies.
The attachés were agreed on the tremendous assets of the Red Army. The 
most immediately obvious was the sheer numerical strength of the 
effectives, and vast reserves of manpower. It was estimated that in 
1936 the Soviet Union had peace-time effectives numbering 1,300,000 
men, and the mere size of the adult male population meant that reserves 
would be virtually inexhaustible; the regular troops, though perhaps 
poorly educated, were physically strong and had a high morale; the 
officers tended to be young and lacking in initiative, but were generally 
adequate. In terms of equipment it was estimated that Soviet capacity 
was very much improved : under the Five-Year Plans Stalin was tending 
to neglect the consumer industries and agriculture in favour of 
developing the heavy industry necessary for war, and this conscious 
diversion of resources, in addition to the importation of quality 
engineers and machinery from the USA and Germany, meant that by 1936 
a significant improvement in the production of the established heavy
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industries, such as coal (which increased to 126 million tons in 1936 
from 9 million in 1913), cast iron, steel and petrol, could be clearly 
discerned (45). One of the most notable results of this improvement 
was the production, by 1938, of between 5,000 and 8,000 combat tanks 
(46), while it was thought that the Soviet factories were producing 
about 6,000 aircraft per year (47).
On the other hand the reports from the attaches were not uncritical, 
and fully acknowledged the very evident weaknesses of the Soviet 
Military. It was thought, for instance, that army manoeuvres showed 
too great a dependence on the lessons of the civil war and that the 
High Command had failed to adapt their strategic doctrine to the 
requirements of a modern European war, continuing to disregard the 
use of firepower (48). In particular Russia’s major weakness, her 
poor communications, was recognised as critical. In June 1935, for 
example, Simon made a trip to the Volga and North Caucasus, and while 
he was surprised to note that the material well-being of the people 
seemed much improved, and that the industrial centres of the Volga and 
Donetz basin showed that colossal efforts in industrialisation were 
being made, he saw no noticeable improvement in the very poor railway 
network, which had failed to expand like other branches of the economy. 
While efforts were being made to improve the existing organisation 
there had been no attempt to create the profound transformation which 
was really necessary, and Simon concluded that the railway network 
could probably not withstand a full mobilisation, and would be unable 
to keep the armies at the front supplied (49). During the next two 
years there were significant attempts to improve the network, and by 
February 1938 the French Embassy was able to report that while the
94,000 kms. of track envisaged by the second Five Year Plan had not
-  150 -
been constructed, there were now 86,200 kms. of track as opposed to 
58,500 kms. in 1913, and that plans for the increased circulation of 
traffic had surpassed the target figure by increasing from 55,000 
loaded wagons per day in 1935 to 100,000 in 1937 : there were,however, 
still significant problems which Stalin and Kaganovitch, the People’s 
Commissar for Heavy Industry, were trying to eradicate (50).
While the General Staff simply accepted such problems as insurmountable, 
making Soviet military assistance worthless, the attaches continued 
to recommend closer collaboration. In April 1938, for example, at 
Coulondre’s request, Palasse submitted a detailed report on his 
personal view of the military potential of the Red Army. It was a 
balanced, objective account. Palasse estimated that Russia had a 
force of approximately 100 infantry divisions, 30 cavalry divisions 
which could be reinforced after a few months by a further 60 infantry 
divisions, and she had between 5,000 and 8,000 combat tanks which 
could be mobilised rapidly. Her armaments were modern and of sufficient 
quantities, though her artillery needed improvement ,and, apart from 
rubber, she was self-sufficient in raw materials. However, her 
communications network still needed further improvement, and the 
value of the High Command was doubtful following the purges. As a 
result he did not suggest that the Red Army would be able to sustain 
a long offensive war against Germany but he argued that nevertheless 
Russia could very well defend herself and could carry out a limited 
but brutal and extremely effective ’choc’ offensive (51). The report 
was sent, with Coulondre’s full approval, to the War Ministry in April 
: several weeks later Palasse received a reply which rejected his 
figures outright, and harshly told him to employ more moderation in 
his evaluation of Soviet strength (52).
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Thus it seems that the Army Staff was in no mood to listen to the 
recommendations of its own representatives in the USSR. Moreover 
the Air Staff, although holding a more favourable view of Soviet air- 
strength, was similarly disinclined to respond to positive suggestions 
from its attache in Moscow. In early 1937 the Air Staff estimated 
that Russia had a front-line strength of 4,600 aircraft, the majority 
of which would be based on the western frontier, and she seemed to be 
producing 450 machines per month. In addition, two new and more 
efficient models had been introduced during 1936, the 116 fighter 
plane and the SB medium bomber, while the organisation of the Airforce 
had been considerably improved with the creation of an independent 
airforce arm, intended to undertake purely airforce operations, 
rather than just supporting the land army (53). While the Air Staff 
recognised that the strategic use of the Red Airforce would be limited 
if she were restricted to operating from her national airbases (54), 
it was nevertheless maintained that, if only in terms of numbers, the 
Soviet air arm constituted a force which could not possibly be 
ignored (55).
Backed by an eager Minister of Air, it might have been expected that 
the Air Staff, recognising the undoubted strength of Soviet aviation, 
would press ahead with Franco-Soviet collaboration. There were weak­
nesses, of course : it was suspected that the vast quantity of aircraft 
had often been obtained at the expense of quality, since the Soviet 
authorities had been forced to accept mediocre performance in exchange 
for ease of construction, while the continual increase in the number 
of front-line squadrons made it difficult to constitute the indis­
pensable reserves (it was estimated in January 1936 that Russia had 
only 750 aircraft in reserve) (56). Moreover, since the Soviet
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aeronautical industry was still relatively new, Russia had to rely
heavily on foreign aid in the construction of her aircraft, as well
as importing foreign prototypes and motors, largely from the United
States. But as the Air Attache, Commander Donzeau, recognised, far
from merely accepting this as an inherent weakness in Soviet air
strength, the Russian reliance on foreign imports gave France a
valuable opportunity, for as he urged the Air Ministry in September
1935, for example, "la collaboration technique entre les maisons
français et soviétiques est le plus sur moyen, a la portée de nos
/
constructeurs, pour s'implanter sur le marche aéronautique soviétique 
dans le domaine moteur" (57). In other words, while the Army Staff 
might argue with some justification that the Red Army had more to 
learn from the French Army than vice versa, the same could not be 
said of the Red Airforce, whose superiority was widely recognised.
Thus it appears that the unwillingness to collaborate with the Soviet 
Union shown by all three Defence Staffs was often maintained in spite 
of considerable advice to the contrary.
Perhaps the clearest example of the French Staff's determination to 
ignore information from its representatives whcih seemed to counter 
its own preconceived views was its treatment of the report on the 
Ukraine manoeuvres submitted on his return in September 1935 by 
General Loiseau (58). Loiseau was not uncritical, but was on the 
whole impressed by what he saw of the Red Army. The men were vigorous 
and well-disciplined with a high morale; the officers and lower officers 
worked hard but lacked general initiative and a spirit of decision, 
and seemed poorly taught ; the Commard was brilliant conceptually but 
seemed to have difficulty putting its ideas into practice; the war 
material was new, modern and abundant, and potential industrial
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mobilisation limitless; and communications, though much improved, 
still required a significant effort. Loiseau was particularly 
impressed by the parachute manoeuvre, informing his superiors in 
Paris that it was indispensable to undertake the necessary studies 
to introduce this new arm into the French Army as soon as possible. 
Loiseau’s enthusiasm was shared by his fellow officers on the mission. 
Colonel Mendras, who reported on the manoeuvres in general. Captain 
le Gouest, who reported favourably on the assault tanks used, and the 
second-in-command of the Air Staff, Lt.-Col.Romatet, who believed
y
that under the energetic direction of Vorochilov "1’aviation soviétique 
...ne tardera pas a se placer aux tous premiers rangs des aviations 
militaires mondiales" (59). The general conclusion of the Loiseau 
mission was forthright : "le potentiel militaire soviétique ne saurait 
être négligé dans les années a venir : il ne faut a aucun prix l ’avoir 
contre soi".
It was not so much the report itself, however, as the subsequent 
publicity surrounding it which made it so suspect in the eyes of the 
General Staff. At an official dinner given by General Yakir before 
the mission returned to France, Loiseau praised the high level of 
technical equipment, the useful work of the Airforce, and the unique 
parachute corps. The following day some French newspapers reproduced 
large, exaggerated extracts from the Soviet press, which quoted 
Loiseau as praising the technique of an "extraordinary level", the 
"first place in the world for tanks" and a "formidable airforce". 
Loiseau’s fate was sealed when the Moscow correspondent of the 'Temps’ 
after quoting Loiseau on the attachment of the population for their 
soldiers, added that "les défenseurs actuels de l'URSS, animés par un
A  / 'V
sentiment patriotique extrement vif sans cesse renforce par le succès
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du Parti, sont certainement mieux préparés que tous les autres a 
subir les épreuves d ’une guerre nouvelle" : he failed to add that 
this was his own, and not Loiseau’s comment (60). The ’Temps' 
subsequently asserted that the words had been incorporated into 
Loiseau's speech only as a result of a printing error (61), but 
General Loiseau's reputation as a sovietophile preceded him home, and 
the General Staff proceeded to ignore his report on the White Russian 
manoeuvres.
Moreover, the accuracy of Loiseau's report was seriously questioned 
by the submission of a totally contradictory report by General 
Schweisguth one year later on October 5th (62). From a purely 
military point of view Schweisguth admitted that the tro^p seemed 
well-trained, with modern and abundant equipment, and was excellently 
disciplined, though the value of the High Command was doubtful and 
the communications difficulties meant that there would be serious 
problems involved in moving troops. He concluded that the Red Army 
was insufficiently prepared to fight a war against any large European 
power. More importantly, the Minsk manoeuvres apparently confirmed 
everybody's worst fears about Soviet intentions. If the USSR were 
attacked by Germany, maintained Schweisguth, then obviously she would 
prefer to have a powerful and faithful France as her ally : for this 
reason Russia was encouraging France in her rearmament programme, and 
pressing for a military alliance. But, he warned, "1'URSS préférerait 
naturellement de beaucoup que l'orage éclate sur la France, et il 
semble que depuis quelque temps ce soit surtout cette carte qu'elle 
joue, tout en continuant a agir en apparence comme si elle appliquait 
loyalement le pacts franco-soviétique, afin de pouvoir revenir, le cas 
échéant, au 1er tableau". Thus Russia's plan was to tempt Germany, by
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showing that France was an easy prey, and to tempt France by pushing 
her into conflict with Germany in Spain, by persuading France that 
she would be Hitler’s first victim if she did not resist immediately, 
and by showing her the dangers which rapprochement with Germany would 
bring.
The assertion that Russia would prefer a war in France to a war in 
Russia need not have caused much surprise, since there were, after 
all, many Frenchmen who hoped that Hitler would satiate his appetite 
and at the same time conveniently eradicate bolshevism in a war with 
Soviet Russia. But what was particularly worrying about Schweisguth's 
claim was that his analysis of the Soviet plan seemed to have a sub­
stantial ring of truth : Soviet policy in Spain, although not by 
September 1936 in full flight, was nevertheless already causing alarm; 
suspected communist-inspired strikes were weakening France, and thus 
in effect making her an easier target for German expansionist designs; 
and several Soviet officials, such as Biejanoff, the head of the 
Central European section of the Foreign Commissariat, Kalini and 
Weinstein, Litvinov’s representatives in White Russia and Leningrad, 
maintained to Commander Villelume that Hitler aimed to attack neither 
Czechoslovakia nor Russia, but France (63)
Moreover, in purely military terms Schweisguth's Report suggested 
that the Soviet Union could not fight a European war, whereas Loiseau 
had suggested just the opposite. Reading this, Leon Blum asked the 
General Staff for a copy of the Loiseau Report so that he could compare 
the two, but he later recalled that he received it only with great 
difficulty, and after a certain delay; when he finally read it he
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realised that virtually every line in the Schweisguth Report contra­
dicted that submitted one year earlier (64). In fact, from an exam­
ination of the circumstances in which Schweisguth was sent to the 
Russian manoeuvres, we can see that the conclusions he reached are 
really not surprising. In the first instance, Schweisguth himself was 
not an impartial observer of the Sovet Union, and there have been 
several early indications of what his subsequent attitude might be.
For example, when learning that General Loiseau was to attend the 1935 
manoeuvres, Schweisguth wondered whether this might not be too important 
a personage to send, even though he himself had attended the Swiss 
manoeuvres earlier that year (65). Then, in April 1936, several months 
before he visited Russia, Schweisguth was outspoken in his comments on 
the Soviet Military in conversation with the British military attache, 
Beaumont-Nesbitt. Indeed, "according to Schweisguth this Pact has no 
military clauses and no military value for France" : from the military 
point of view, the USSR could do nothing in the event of war with 
Germany, since even if she could obtain passage through either the 
Baltic States, Poland or Roumania, the railways were hopelessly in­
adequate. Similarly, for air assistance against Germany to be effective 
the Soviets would need to obtain right of passage. Schweisguth clearly 
did not envisage any solution to these problems, since he concluded that 
"it was obvious, therefore, that the military assistance to be expected 
from Russia was nil". In addition, Schweisguth maintained that Russia 
had gained substantially from the Pact since France, unlike Russia, 
would be in a position to intervene against Germany (66).
Whether or not this represented the view of the whole General Staff, 
as Beaumont-Nesbit believed, it is clear that General Schweisguth was 
already deeply distrustful of the Soviet Union and dismissive of
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potential Russian aid some months before he was asked to take a mission 
to Red Army manoeuvres. It would however be wrong to assume that this 
attitude was exclusively of Schweisguth's own making, for he was given 
several indications of the conclusions expected of him prior to his 
departure. On September 20th 1935, Schewisguth noted General Colson’s 
discontent with the Loiseau Report (67), and he would obviously have 
been aware of the subsequent publicity surrounding it. Then, on the 
eve of his departure, he received very specific instructions from 
Daladier : ’’être prudent sans être renfrogné ; tache de vérifier 
l ’exactitude du rapport Loiseau qui est cité constamment dans un but 
politique’’ (68). Thus, when he returned with a report which refuted 
that of General Loiseau, he was greeted with widespread approval. On 
the 8th October Schweisguth discussed the report with Alexis Leger at 
the Quai : from the military point of view, said Schweisguth, the Red 
Army presented a good facade but little else, and "quant aux possib­
ilités stratégiques de l ’armée russe dans un conflit contre l ’Allemagne, 
elles me paraissent a peu près nulles". Leger entirely agreed,explaining 
that the Quai had only ever favoured rapprochement with the USSR in 
order to prevent a return to Rapallo (69). On the 22nd Schweisguth saw 
General Georges who "est d ’avis de se libérer du pacte franco-soviétique 
et ces conséquences", and who fully approved his report on the manoeuvres 
(70). Finally, on the 31st October, Schweisguth discussed his views 
with Daladier. Although he did not agree with Schweisguth’s doubts 
concerning Soviet industrial mobilisation, Daladier shared his opinion 
of the illusory nature of researching the possibility of land assist­
ance from the USSR, and agreed with Schweisguth’s suggestion that the 
only assistance to be expected from Russia was that of industrial aid 
to the Little Entente : indeed, "o’est un accord industriel que nous 
devrions signer, mais c ’est un accord militaire que veulent les
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Soviets" (71).
It thus appears that far from causing the French Staff's doubts about 
the value of the Soviet alliance, General Schweisguth's report was 
merely a manifestation of those doubts. On the other hand, Schewisguth's 
warnings about the weakness of the Soviet Military were naturally seen 
to be confirmed with the news of the military purge in mid-1937 (72).
In military terms the effects of Stalin's purge of the Soviet forces 
were devestating. Although it was obviously difficult to ascertain 
the exact extent of the Purges, it is now estimated that there were
35,000 victims in total, which comprised half of the officer corps : 
the victims are thought to have included three out of five marshals;
13 of the 15 army commanders; 57 out of 85 corps commanders; 110 of 
the 195 divisional commanders; 220 out of 406 brigade commanders; all 
11 vice-commissars of war; 75 out of the 80 members of the Supreme 
Military Council; 90% of all generals; and 80% of all colonels (73).
In terms of districts the purges fell heaviest on the Moscow,Leningrad, 
Kiev, Belorussian and Far East commands (74). As a result, inexperienced 
young officers, often party hacks, were rapidly promoted to fill the 
vacant posts and the calibre of the Soviet Command fell drastically.
Contemporaries were not of course immediately aware of the extent of 
the Purge but its devastating effects were readily appreciated, 
particularly by the French. In Moscow Lt.-Col.Simon immediately
recognised that the loss of Tukhachevsky meant that "la premiere
/ \ / /
consequence du procès est de priver l'Armee soviétique d'un chef sur
lequel on faisait fond". He was also aware that the new commanders, 
and in particular the three new commanders of the vitally-important 
western districts, were much less competent and experienced than their 
predecessors : Boudenny, for example, was promoted from being an
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inspector of cavalry to the command of the Moscow district,while the 
new commader of the Transcaucasian district, Kouibychev, was a former 
army corps commader. Simon concluded that in view of the decimation 
of the High Command, combined with the recent stagnation of industry 
during the last few months, "on doit admettre que la crise intérieure 
que traverse l ’URSS a amoindri sérieusement son potential militaire"
(75).
Nor were the Purges confined to the Army alone. The Head of the Fleet 
since 1932, Admiral Orlov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet, 
Sivkov, and the head of the Naval Academy, Ludry, were all executed
(76), while the Airforce was thought to have lost 50% of its officers 
and higher ranks (77). Moreover, by the following year the more 
lasting, long-term effects of the Purges had become apparent,particu­
larly in industry. The Purges had deprived the Soviet Union of a 
good proportion of her builders, engineers and technicians which in 
turn had hit the aeronuatical industry particularly badly. Skilled 
engineers such as Toupolev, the aircraft designer, had been lost, and 
there had been a considerable drop in industrial production, while, 
as in the army, the airforce cadres had undergone a serious crisis in 
moral. By mid-1938 the worst of the Purges appeared to be over, but 
the French Air Staff stressed that "il n'en demeure pas moins que 
l ’aviation rouge, profondément atteinte dans ses oeuvres vives, ne 
pourra que difficilement et lentement reprendre la place de choix
que treize années d ’efforts incessants lui avaient permis d ’acquérir 
parmi les aviations militaires mondiales" (78).
For France, however, the Purges did not only represent a military 
weakening of the Soviet Union. On a practical level the Purges
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introduced a marked increase in Soviet xenophobia, as all foreigners, 
including Frenchmen, were suddenly excluded from many walks of Soviet 
life : thus the French military and air attaches found that it was 
much harder than formerly to gain any information on the condition of 
the Soviet forces (79). More specifically, Tukhachevsky was ironically
regarded as a francophile and as early as February, when his disgrace
was first rumoured, Coulondre had. warned that "s’il disparait du 
premier plan, son depart privera d ’un contrepoids appréciable 
l ’indiscutable germanophile du Maréchal Egorov, Chef d ’Etat-Major 
général" (80). In addition Tukhachevsky was thought to be particularly 
talented and Simon warned that his successor would undoubtedly be 
intellectually inferior (81). On a more fundamental level the faith 
of the French Staff and government in the Soviet ally was naturally 
severely shaken, the charge of collaboration with Germany was soon 
discounted by French representatives both civil and military, in 
Moscow, but could obviously still be used as an argument by opponents 
of the Soviet connection in France. Moreover, as Simon pointed out, 
even if the charges were untrue, "quelle peut etre la valeur d ’un
/ y /
regime que veulent détruire des hommes énergiques et instuits qui le 
servent depuis près de 20 ans ?" (82). Judging by the Soviet military 
performance in the Second World War it is now possible to see that the 
Red Army was perhaps not weakened so severely by the Purges as was 
thought at the time or as the figures of victims would suggest, and 
that while the High Command was obviously weakened, the troops were 
were relatively unaffected, except in terms of a temporary loss of 
morale, and by early 1939 there were already signs of a resurgence in 
industrial production. But this could not have been apparent at the 
time, and so French doubts about Soviet military strength as a result 
of the Purges are at least understandable.
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On the other hand, lack of faith following the Purges cannot be used 
as a blanket excuse for opposition to the Soviet alliance. In his 
memoirs Gamelin claims that when he met Tukhachevsky after the funeral 
of George V in January 1936, they agreed to intensify relations between 
the two armies. He was unaware of the real reason for Tukhachevsky's 
fall, but emphasises that "ce n'était guère fait pour nous encourager 
dans la voie des rapports personnels étroits et suivis. Je ne 
rencontrai d'ailleurs plus l'occasion d'en renouer et je demeurai sur 
ma tentative inopportune" (83). Gamelin thus seems to be justifying 
eighteen months of inactivity in the sphere of Franco-Soviet military 
relations by citing the fall of Tukhachevsky, but in December 1937 he 
told Sir Eric Phipps that while the recent executions in the Red Army 
must have seriously impaired its efficiency, France had never in fact 
attached much importance to the part that the Soviet Army might be 
expected to play in the event of war (84). The British Ambassador to 
Moscow believed that the Purges had seriously undermined the faith of 
the French government and General Staff, as well as the nation as a 
whole, in the value of the Soviet Union as an ally, and caused the 
authorities to abandon outright any idea of initiating military talks 
(85). In fact, the French Staff had long since discounted Soviet 
potential aid : the Purges were seen merely to vindicate their opposi­
tion.
Since it is difficult, even today, to assess accurately the strength 
of the Soviet military froces in the 1930's, one of the easiest ways 
of analysing the accuracy of the French Staff's assessment is to compare 
it to the judgements made by other foreign observers. To some extent 
these views were coloured by the relations which each individual country 
maintained with the USSR. Thus by far the most optimistic views on
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the Red Army came, naturally enough, from Czechoslovakia. In September
1935 General Krejci led a mission to the Russian manoeuvres, returning 
with a highly favourable report on Soviet military strength (86), and 
declaring that ”1 ’armée rouge forçait l ’admiration de tout expert 
militaire par sa discipline, son moral et son armament" (87).
Moreover, the Czechoslovaks continued to praise the Red Army even after 
the Purges : in September 1937, for example. President Benes told the 
British Ambassador that Russia had been less weakened by the recent 
executions than was often thought (88). Similarly, General Fequant 
told de Lacroix, the French Ambassador to Prague, that from his con­
versations with various Czechoslovak officers he had the impression 
that the effectiveness and vigour of Soviet industry had been less 
severely hit by the purge of the higher personnel than was generally 
supposed, and the new Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry,
Bodhan Pavlu, until recently the Czech Minister to Moscow, affirmed 
that the Russian army had not been weakened, and that it was still  ^
abundantly supplied with excellent war material(89). Thus, even in 
May 1938 the Czech Consul-General at Kiev stressed the "enormous 
effort" accomplished by the Soviet army in the last couple of years 
with regard to the problem of transport, and maintained that Soviet 
Airforce squadrons were ready to fly in force to the defence of 
Czechoslovakia after a journey of only 40 minutes (90).
These views sharply contrasted thosefexpressed by Polish representatives. 
General Sosnowski, for example, believed that the Red Army modernisation 
programme was fundamentally incompatible with the existing condition 
of the Soviet forces, explaining to the British Ambassador in February
1936 that "with this belief in modern material, they had a very 
primitive, ill-trained personnel, more specifically as regards officers.
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and he could not help feeling that when put into practice, their modern 
ideas would break down " (91). The Purges served only to confirm 
Polish suspicions, indeed "les milieux gouvernementaux de Varsovie 
estimerait pour leur part que la Russie a cesse pour un temps indéter­
miné de compter comme grande puissance", and a former Polish military 
attaché to Moscow declared openly that, as a result, Poland would be 
in a position to resist any Russian attack in the event of war (92).
In an attempt to analyse the contradiction between the Czech and 
Polish interpretations of the Red Army crisis, Daldier pointed out 
that the Czechoslovak government had a decided tendency to over-estimate 
Soviet military strength since, as Krofta stressed, it was thought to 
be in the interests of both Czechoslovakia and France to keep announcing 
that Russia was strong, while the Polish government was fundamentally 
biased against all things Russian (93).
The German government reacted slightly differently, since it hoped to 
use apparent Soviet military strength to its own advantage. Thus 
Goering and other German leaders claimed that the Russian Airforce was 
exceptionally well-equipped and well-trained, using this as an excuse 
for increased German rearmament. In fact German representatives in 
Moscow sent back fairly balanced analyses to Berlin. The Ambassador, 
von Schulenberg, told the Wermacht Academy in November 1937 that 
although the USSR had at its disposal numerous submarines, tanks and 
aircraft, the young Soviet aeronautical industry was still ill-prepared 
for the demands of war, and that the Soviet Union "has reverted to the 
old Russian principle of operating on the basis of quantity and not of 
quality" (94). Similarly the military attaché. General Koestring, 
doubted the Russian ability to achieve the same standard of organisation 
and technical efficiency as elsewhere in Europe, but believed that "the
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technical troops, Airforce, Tank Corps etc. are well-equipped, well- 
trained and must be regarded as a serious factor in a European war"
(95). Like his colleagues, however, Koestring believed that the 
effects of the Purges would be devastating, and he told Colonel 
Firebrace that as a result "the Soviet Army is no longer of inter­
national importance" (96). Indeed, it seems that it was largely on 
the evidence of the military purges that Hitler based his miscalculation 
of Soviet armed strength which led him to believe in 1941 that the Red 
Army was not fit for modern war and could not hope to match a modern 
and well-led enemy (97).
Perhaps the most impartial analysis might have been expected from the 
British who had no alliance with the USSR but on the other hand no 
particular source of antagonism with her either. In some respects 
British representatives were initially more critical of Soviet potential 
than the French. The air attache to Moscow believed that the aero­
nautical industry would find it difficult to expand in the event of 
war, since Russian factories were already working to maximum capacity, 
and there was no reserve of either skilled or unskilled labour ; similarly, 
the railways were already taxed beyond capacity, and so the burden of 
mobilisation would cause excessive strain on an already over-strained 
structure. Wing-Commander Collier believed, however, that "the Soviet 
airforces as they exist today might provide a very real threat to any 
likely opponent in the early stages of war" (98). Similarly a report 
prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on Imperial Defence in 
February 1937 concluded that the Soviet Army and Airforce were the 
largest in the world and that "in defence, the Soviet army is already 
a power to be reckoned with : in attack it would probably be less 
effective" (99).
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The British were just as suspicious as the French when it came to 
analysing Soviet motives. Lord Chilston believed that Litvinov’s 
demand for immediate mutual assistance was designed to prevent Germany 
from attacking Russia while she was engaged in the Far East against 
Japan, and that ’’he has no idea, really, of the Red Army ever marching, 
or the Red Airforces ever flying, against Germany for the sake of 
France’’ (100) Similarly, Sir H Kennard in Warsaw told General 
Sosnowski that ’’we had few illusions as to the value of the Russian 
army outside its own frontiers,beyond, perhaps, its airforce, and 
that no doubt the leopard had not changed its spots and that their 
present tactics were to filter into Europe and establish Trojan horses 
in such countries as Czechoslovakia’’ (101). In retrospect, Anthony 
Eden was very critical of this attitude, pointing out that while ’’it 
was excusable to regard Communist Russia as the anti-Christ, it was a 
mistake to defend that attitude with the argument that any way the 
Russians were not any good’’ (102), and indeed, ’’there was an almost 
universal opinion in Britain that the military power of the Soviets 
was in disarray and of poor quality. When Stalin executed the leader­
ship of the Soviet armed forces in 1937, critics combined to see in 
this the ruin of any military efficiency the Russians might have 
possessed. These exaggerated estimates were damaging to Anglo-Russian 
relations up to the moment when German troops crossed the Russian 
frontier’’ (103). Thus it appears that in Britain as in France, Soviet 
military strength was inseparable from Soviet motives, and that dis­
trust of Soviet communism was ultimately triumphant.
But in purely military terms, assessment by British experts were often 
quite favourable. Most notable in this respect is the report of the 
British mission to the Minsk manoeuvres in September 1936, which was
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considerably more complimentary than that submitted by General 
Schweisguth. General Wavell reported that the equipment of the army 
had already reached a high level of technical efficiency, and that 
in design and performance of armoured vehicles the Russians were in 
many respects ahead of the British; the personnel, though young and 
lacking in experience, seemed keen and confident. His major complaint 
was that the tactics used would have resulted in a severe loss of 
aircraft, tanks and infantry. Wavell concluded that the Red Army 
would be very formidable in the defence of its own territory, and 
though it would be clumsy and less redoubtable in attack, its size 
and the extent of its mechanical equipment would nevertheless make 
it dangerous (104).
His assessment was supported by that of the RAF representative- on 
the mission. Wing Commander Wigglesworth, whose main criticism of 
the Red Airforce was that of tactical performance: in particular it 
was used almost solely in direct support of the fighting land-troops, 
usually in the form of low-flying "storm" attacks, and there was no 
conception of serious air-fighting. The Soviets were however aware 
of this weakness, and the Deputy Chief of the General Air Staff had 
recently been to France to study special air fighting exercises and 
so it was anticipated that these tactical difficulties would soon be 
resolved. Wigglesowrth concluded that, "Judged by our own standards, 
the Russians have still much to learn regarding the strategical 
employment and the tactical handling of the air arm. Even as at 
present constituted and controlled, however, the airforces would form 
a real threat in the opening stages of a war and prove a strong 
deterrent to any nation contemplating war against the USSR" (105).
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While Czechoslovak confidence can be dismissed as wishful thinking, 
and Polish criticism the result of a strong anti-Soviet bias, it must 
be said that judged by similar criteria the French assessment of 
Soviet military strength suggests a country which was at best a neutral 
observer, and certainly not a Russian ally. In fact, in making its 
judgement the French Staff,was allowing itself to be influenced by the 
same prejudices discernable throughout western Europe. While Gamelin 
might have doubted the extent of communist influence in the French 
army, nevertheless even he was aware of a potential threat, and he was 
determined that "nos relations nouvelles avec Moscou n'eussent pas de 
répercussions sur notre politique intérieure et, par la, sur l ’Armée, 
j ’entends sur son unité morale" (106). In fact, there were many in 
the French army who were fundamentally anti-communist. This attitude, 
perhaps not surprising given the overtly anti-militarist stance of the 
French Communist Party before 1935, was exacerbated by frequent anti- 
Soviet articles carried in newspapers such as ’France Militaire’, and 
the ’Echo de Paris’, and was evident in comments such as that made by 
Colonel Lainey, formerly head of the 2e bureau, who told Lloyd Thomas 
at the British Embassy in June 1937 that "personally he was strongly 
opposed to any closer co-operation between the French and Russian 
armies" since he did not think that the Red Army would ever be of much 
assistance : he warned incidentally of the danger of disorder in 
France, particularly in the south-west around Toulouse "which has been 
contaminated by the Spanish poison", and in Paris itself (107).
There were also those officers who were prepared to put their anti- 
communism into practice. In January 1937, for example. General Gerodias 
on his own authority distributed documents throughout the regions 
pertaining to the organisation of communist ’putschs’ in France.
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Gamelin discovered on investigation that the documents had in fact 
been given to Gerodias by Loustanau-Lacau, a member of Petain’s staff, 
who explained that Petain had thought it would be useful to communicate 
these documents, supposedly containing instructions circulated among 
Spanish revolutionaries, to the regional military authorities. In 
fact, Loustanau-Lacau had already written that "the Army must be 
purged of the cells that the Communist Party is developing with the 
objective of destroying discipline and wrecking morale" (108), and 
Gamelin notes that Loustanau-Lacau was already suspected, in January 
1937, of having links with the extreme right-wing movement, the 
'Cagoule' (109).
Even those who did not fear communist infiltration in the army often 
distrusted Soviet intentions, memories of Bres^Litovsk remaining 
strong. Thus Colonel de Lattre de Tassigny, formerly a member of 
Weygand's Staff where he was known as the "Red Colonel" because of 
his early support for the Pact, and now on the Staff of General Georges, 
told the British military attache in April 1935 that he distrusted the 
increasing influence of Russia over the Little Entente since its aim 
was to use the Little Entente as a means of getting a deeper French 
commitment to the USSR: French policy, he explained, was to commit 
herself only sufficiently to neutralise Russia and to deny her re­
sources to Germany (110).
Finally, underlying the French Staff's attitude towards the Soviet 
Union there was a specific state of mind usually known as the "Maginot 
mentality", as advocated essentially by Marshal Petain, for whom 
"L'experience a démontré l'inviolabilité des fronts continus et 
fortifiés...Donc la défensive sera la reine de la guerre" (111).
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Thus, during the 1930's the French Staff came increasingly to believe 
that in the event of war, France would be safe behind the Maginot Line 
which had been conceived as a continuous defensive front against 
Germany. The fact that the fortifications were not yet completed, 
although begun in 1930, as well as the huge gap between the Maginot 
line and the sea effectively created by the Belgian defection of 
September 1936, seemingly failed to shake the French Staff’s con­
fidence in France’s impregnable defences. In addition the "Maginot 
mentality" meant that French was simply not capable of carrying out 
her obligations, since her military forces had been developed along 
purely defensive lines. Thus while the General Staff refused to 
discuss with the Soviets potential French aid against Germany since, 
in view of the common frontier with Germany, French assistance was 
"obvious", it was in fact with considerable justification that Pierre
Taittinger pointed out during the ratification debate that "nous
y / / /"
n ’avons pas, présentement, l ’armee de choc nécessaire pour pouvoir
aider immédiatement le peuple qui ferait appel à notre concours".
The point was reiterated by Paul Reynaud in "Le problème militaire 
français" published in 1937, and although Leon Blum proclaimed at 
Lyon in January that "Nous avons contracte des obligations auxquelles 
nous demeurons pleinement fidèles", the "Maginot mentality" remained 
dominant among the General Staff. As General Maurin remarked,
"Comment peut-on croire que nous songions encore a l ’offensive,
%  / N
quand nous avons depense des milliards pour établir une barrière 
fortifiée?" (112). As a result, the Staff were wary of additional 
undertakings towards Communist Russia made possible by the Franco- 
Soviet Pact, particularly since they had always regarded the Pact as 
negative in value : for, as General Schweisguth had explained in
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April 1936, "the sole factor which had carried weight with the French 
General Staff was that they could not afford to allow Russia and 
Germany to combine" (113).
In October 1936 Commander Petibon told Colonel Beaumont-Nesbitt that 
as a result of the Schweisguth Report, the French General Staff would 
have to revise their estimate of the military value of the Red Army 
(114). In fact, the attitude of the Staff had long-since been 
established. It underestimated the purely military value of the Red 
Army, despite considerable evidence from its representatives in Moscow 
to the contrary, since it was fundamentally prejudiced against Communist 
Russia, and distrusted Soviet motives. The Staff then used the
Schweisguth Report and the evidence of the Purges to justify its
assessment of military strength, and it turn used this assessment to
justify its opposition to Staff talks. Indeed, General Gamelin, in
spite of his insistence that the military be kept aside from politics, 
told Beaumont-Nesbitt in October 1936 that as long as he held the 
position he did in France, he would advise against Franco-Soviet 
military conversations (115). Thus, having examined the attitude of 
the French General Staff, it becomes necessary to analyse how far the 
Staff exerted an influence on the government, and so how far its 
’reticence’ constituted a decisive factor in the failure of the 
Popular Front Government to consolidate the Franco-Soviet Pact.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 8
FRANCO-SOVIET CONTACTS 1935-1938
It was against this background of pressures and predominantly negative 
advice that the Popular Front government had to apply its policy with 
regard to the Soviet Union. Moreover, its position was further com­
plicated by the lack of clarity in the Pact itself, which was so loosely 
worded as to provide sufficient opportunity for a wide diversity of 
interpretations as to what form Franco-Soviet collaboration might take. 
For the Russians, "collaboration" encompassed both technical exchanges 
of information and materials, with the aim that France should replace 
Germany as Russia's major supplier of equipment, and in addition close 
military negotiations which would prepare for the practical and 
effective operation of the Franco-Soviet Pact. Thus, Soviet represent­
atives in Paris and Moscow pressed consistently throughout this period 
for the exchange of stagiaires and military missions to array manoeuvres, 
improved technical collaboration and the initiation of detailed staff 
talks. The French attitude is at first more difficult to define since 
the government made few direct approaches to the Russians, but through 
an analysis of the French government's response to the repeated Soviet 
demarches, a very clear picture of its attitudeto the various forms of 
collaboration envisaged by the Russians, and thus its view of the 
Franco-Soviet Pacts as a whole, is seen to emerge.
To a large extent, the relations maintained between France and Russia 
following the conclusion of the Pact in May 1935 were such as might 
have existed between any two friendly nations : indeed, the exchange 
of officers for short-term visits as well as for military manoeuvres,
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as the Soviets requested, was a practice which had begun when rapproche­
ment first took place in 1933. In August of that year Pierre Cot, the 
Minister for Air, took a mission of military and technical experts to 
Moscow, with the aim of studying "the bases of a rapprochement between 
Soviet and French aviation" (1) : the visit was returned in August 1934 
by a Soviet aviation mission led by General Unslicht, the head of 
Russian civil aviation, which toured the principal French aircraft 
industries and made a special visit to Lyon, as guest of the mayor, 
Edouard Herriot. It seems that the French government made every 
effort to ensure the visit’s success (2). In the same year three 
Soviet officers completed long-term stays in French instruction centres 
and different army units, while two French officers, one infantry and 
one cavalry, visited the USSR (3). Soviet hopes that the exchange of 
officers and missions might increase in numbers after the conclusion 
of the Pact were not, however, immediately realised. During 1935 only 
two stagiaire officers were exchanged between the two armies, while in 
August a mission of six Soviet Commanders, headed by Sedyakin, the 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, attended French manoeuvres and 
visited various battlefields of the Great War and French frontier 
zones (4). In return. General Loiseau took a mission to the White 
Russian manoeuvres in September.
As the Russians complained, such exchanges required nothing more than 
a basis of friendly relations, (an Italian mission also attended the 
Russian manoeuvres), and whenever possible they pressed for an inten­
sification of relations in accordance with the spirit of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact. On occasion, such pressure was successful. In September 
1935, for example, Vorochilov asked Loiseau whether two or three 
Soviet officers could be authorised to visit France to learn about
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the methods of anti-aircraft defence used in the French army. The 
ministers of War and Aviation agreed that the visit of such specialists 
would bring considerable advantages in the field of technical collabor­
ation, and in November Laval indicated that he had no objection to the 
visit (5), which took place the following June. At the same time the 
new Air Minister, Pierre Cot, initiated a series of visits by airforce 
personnel. In the second half of August, for example, twenty-two 
parliamentary air delegates visited Moscow, as well as a delegation of 
aircraft constructors who visited all the air-frame and aero-engine 
factories of importance. In return, a number of Soviet airforce 
officers attended the Aero-Show in Paris that winter, as well as 
visiting various French air establishments and factories (6). Then, 
in March 1937, a French aeronautic mission spent three weeks in Moscow, 
headed by General Keller, the Inspector-General of Aerial Defence, and 
including among its members Inspector-General Dumanois, Engineer-in- 
Chief Rougeron of the technical services, and M.Devilliers, the Chief 
Engineer of the Maison Breguet (7).
Similarly, civil delegations occasionally visited Russian. In early 
1937 a medical mission, led by Professor Dezernaud, spent some days 
in Moscow, and sometimes groups of young people, such as a delegation 
from the Union Sportive des Jeunesses Socialistes, visited the Soviet 
Union, but as Coulondre noted with regret, there were only two or three 
such visits during his two years in Moscow, becoming further apart as 
the political relations between the two countries slackened (8). In 
fact, there seems to have been a distinct lack of encouragement from 
the French authorities to promote any type of exchanges. In June 1936 
the Soviet military attache. Commander Ventsov, asked General 
Schweisguth if it might be possible to arrange for long-term exchanges
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of officers between the two armies, particularly for the Russians 
in artillery and the French, for example, in aviation and tanks : one 
year might be spent in the regiments, he suggested, and a further two 
in the schools (9) Several months later Schweisguth made clear his 
own attitude to the proposal when he suggested to Gamelin that the 
Russian officers be treated as belonging to a most-favoured-nation, but 
nothing more. This would allow the eighty artilleryofficers requested 
to visit only in rotation, and in those areas already open to 
foreigners. Moreover, they would spend only six months in the troop, 
instead of the year requested. Gamelin and Daladier agreed (10).
Thus the Military, at least, seem to have regarded Russia as a friendly, 
rather than as an allied, nation.
Daladier was even reluctant to take the fairly routine decision to 
exchange missions for the manoeuvres during the summer of 1936.
Asking Delbos’ advice on a question he saw as "D’ordre essentiellement 
politique", Daladier worried that the Russian manoeuvres were expected 
to take place near the Polish border at a critical time when Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly had just agreed to visit France, while the publicity 
surrounding a Soviet mission attending French manoeuvres "peut 
eveiller des susceptibilités due coté de nos alliés belges, tchéco­
slovaques, yugoslavs et roumains" (11). Indeed, it was only in 
response to considerable pressure from the Russians that the French 
government finally agreed to an exchange of missions with its .ally 
the Soviet Union, in the autumn of 1936.
To some extent the French reluctance to promote exchanges of personnel 
was undoubtedly due to the belief, however justified, expressed by the 
2e bureau in June 1935 that "l’Armée rouge a, en effet, beaucoup a
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apprendre de nous, qui n ’avons d ’intérêt qu’à connaître simplement sa 
situation matérielle et sa valeur morale" (12). It does, however, 
seem to have been recognised that it would be in France’s interests to 
improve her commercial relations with the USSR. For example, by 
encouraging the Soviets to place orders for material in France, the 
government could hope to redress the adverse balance of French trade 
with the USSR (since while France imported a substantial quantity of 
raw materials from Russia her exports to the Soviet Union amounted to 
only \% of her total exports (13), while at the same time France could 
seek to replace Germany as a major supplier to the Soviet Union, thus 
forestalling the temptation towards a return to Rapallo. Moreover, 
the policy would have practical advantages for both countries : France 
could supply Russia with the technical knowledge and prototypes which 
she was still having to import from abroad while Russia, with her vast 
production capabilities, could assist France, particularly in the 
supply of aircraft.
It does seem that the Popular Front government did at least encourage 
the Soviets to place orders for war material in France. In August 
1936 Delbos gave authorisation for the Russians to enter into 
negotiations with the Société d 'Explosifs Alsacienne at Mulhouse with 
regard to the eventual purchase of an installation for the automatic 
charging of shells (14), while on September 22 Delbos and Gerodias, 
representing the War Ministry, both approved the Soviet request to 
purchase seven hundred rocket detonators (15). Similarly, in December 
the Foreign and National Defence Ministries gave permission to the 
Société d'optique et de mécanique de Haute précision to supply the 
Russian government with stereoscopic range-finders similar to those 
used by the Geographic Service of the French Army (16).
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That the French government authorised commercial negotiations with 
the USSR was not, however, always sufficient. In June 1936, for 
example, the USSR had given France a number of orders for the purchase 
of heavy artillery to equip the cruisers being built in the Black Sea, 
and to which it was known that Stalin attached particular importance.
On several occasions during the autumn of 1936 Blum received complaints 
from Potemkin, asking him to pressurise the company supposedly 
carrying out the orders, Creusot, to speed up its production. Then, 
in February 1937, Potemkin informed Blum that he had been contacted by 
M.de Saint-Sauveur, the Creusot manager with particular responsibility 
for relations with the USSR, who had indicated that if he could obtain 
from the French government an undertaking that the Creusot company 
would not be nationalised, as was proposed, then the Soviet orders 
would be carried out with more rapidity and better grace (17). The 
ploy was unsuccessful since the Blum government proceeded with the 
nationalisation, which came into effect on the 11th of March, but the 
incident is significant in that it indicates that even when the 
government authorised contact with the USSR, it had no guarantee that 
its directive would be carried out.
Nor was the Creusot affair an isolated example. Pierre Cot’s attempts 
to supply the Russians with the Hispano ’23’ aeroplane canon were 
effectively crippled by the virulent anti-Soviet press campaign led by 
the ’Echo de Paris’ in the summer of 1936 (18), with the result that 
the Soviets gave the contract to the Prague armaments firm, Skoda (19). 
While this did not seriously damage French political interests, it 
nevertheless indicated the danger that, thwarted in her attempts to 
make purchases in France, Russia would accept any alternative. In 
July 1936, for example, Ventsov complained to Colonel Petibon about
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the attitude of the Navy Ministry which had forced him to spend a credit 
of 50m. francs in Italy rather than in France : he now had a further 
30m. francs to spend on anti-aircraft defence naval artillery, but 
was still receiving no response from the French (20). Similarly, in 
July 1938 Benes urged the French government to profit from the Soviet 
interest in the Schneider company to assist with her naval armaments 
programme, warning that if France failed to respond to the Russian 
demarche, then the order would be placed with the Italians (21).
Indeed, as late as February 1939 President Kalinin complained bitterly 
to the new French Ambassador, Paul Naggiar, that at a time when Poland, 
Germany and Italy were all trying to improve their relations with the 
USSR, the Soviet government was inclined to see the non-execution in 
France of Soviet orders for national defence material as an indication 
of the French government's true attitude towards the USSR. As a result, 
Naggiar urged Bonnet to ensure that the Russian orders were carried 
out (22).
Moreover, it seems that the Russian complaints were quite justified.
When in October 1936 Kalinin had first complained to Coulondre that 
Franco-Soviet rapprochement "doit s'exprimer par une collaboration 
reele dans le domaine des fournitures intéressant la defense nationale: 
Or, il n'en a rien été jusqu'ici du coté français", the Ambassador was 
forced to admit that the grievance was well-founded, since French 
technicians, particularly in the War and Marine departments, had been 
very slow in carrying out Soviet orders (23). He soon recognised 
that the Air Department was similarly responsible for breaches of 
promise, such as the '23' canon which was never supplied. In April 
1938 Coulondre told Bonnet that the situation had deteriorated to 
such an extent that whenever the French made any new request, the
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Russians demanded that France should first keep all her other promises, 
and he warned that "il faut renoncer à ces méthodes qui, inspirées 
du désir d'être agréables à nos interlocuteurs, n'aboutissent en fin
N
de compte qu'a les indisposer contre nous" (24).
It was in the sphere of aviation that Franco-Soviet technical collabor­
ation was in fact the most vital. At a meeting of the Comité 
permanent de la Defense Nationale in June 1936, Cot emphasised that 
without a policy of close collaboration with her allies, France could 
not hope to equal German aircraft production. In addition, Soviet 
factories were the only ones which could escape German bombing and so, 
unlike the British factories during the war, which simply under the 
threat of German attack had shown a reduced production of 10%, Soviet 
factories could, in the event of war, continue to function at full 
strength, and thus revitalise France and the Little Entente. It was 
therefore essential to send skilled technical personnel to Russia in 
order to increase her production capabilities (25). Similarly, the 
Air attache in Moscow, Commander Donzeau, insisted on the importance 
of becoming established in the Soviet aeronautical market by supplying 
the material which she was still finding it necessary to import from 
abroad (26). In return, as Coulondre constantly stressed, the Soviet 
Union, whose aeronautical industry was so-organised that it could mass 
produce aircraft, would be able to supply France with the aircraft which 
she so desperately needed, but which her own industry could not yet 
produce.
However, the French government was, it seems, even reluctant to help 
itself. Acting on instructions from the Air Minister in Paris,
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Donzeau and Coulondre initiated in March 1938 negotiations with the 
Soviet Airforce Commissar with a view to the eventual purchase of an 
116 fighter. On the 17th they were given detailed characteristics 
of the aircraft which Coulondre, confident in an assurance of support 
given by Gamelin in October 1936 that he would regard favourably the 
supply of Soviet aircraft to France, encouraged Donzeau to take to 
Paris. Donzeau returned saying that while the Air Minister had 
expressed interest in the plan from the technical point of view, he had 
nevertheless told him to drop the matter immediately : Donzeau was 
not to examine the possibility of buying the aircraft in series, but 
was to offer only an exchange of prototypes. This, as Coulondre 
recognised, was a quite farcical suggestion, since it was well-known 
that Russia was in no position to supply prototypes, and he concluded 
that "on ne veut plus, au ministère de l ’Air, de collaboration 
technique avec Moscou" (27).
In a bewildered attempt to understand the Ministry’s change of heart, 
Coulondre suggested to Bonnet that if the Air Minister had merely 
disliked the characteristics of the 116, it would be possible to 
arrange to have one of the latest French prototypes reproduced in 
Russia. He already acknowledged, however, that "l’expérience apprend 
que vis-à-vis de ce pays-ci, les questions sont trop souvent traités 
sur le plan sentimental" (28), a view which was confirmed when, some 
months later, he challenged Gamelin on the issue. Gamelin explained 
that he had supported Donzeau in his attempt to promote the 116, but 
that the Chief of the Airforce Staff had exclaimed, "jamais une 
pareille humiliation" (29). Thus the French continued to refuse the 
frequent Soviet offer, repeated by Potemkin as late as February 1939, 
to supply those aircraft which France most needed, as a result of
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those same prejudices which had prevented Pierre Cot from realising 
his varied projects for Franco-Soviet technical collaboration. 
Bargeton at the Quai, for example, was deeply suspicious of Soviet 
motives even in this field : in attempting to purchase from France 
heavy artillery for naval use, he told Coulondre, "ils cherchent à 
nous compromettre" (30). But whatever the reasons, the results of 
French disinterest in exchanges with the Russians were clear. As
/
Coulondre bitterly pointed out, "la collaboration technique était la
S. /
seule suite concrete donnee au pacte franco-sovietique d'assistance 
mutuelle : renoncerons-nous à en tirer quelque avantage pour n'en 
garder que les inconvénients" (31).
Thus the existence of the Franco-Soviet Pact seems to have contributed 
little towards an improvement in technical collaboration between the 
two. For the Russians, however, this was not the main interest of 
Franco-Soviet rapprochement, for they undoubtedly hoped that the 
signature of the Pact in 1935 would lead to the opening of military 
staff talks, with a view to the conclusion of a military accord. On 
the 4th of May 1935 William Bullitt asked Litvinov whether military 
talks would begin at once : Litvinov replied "with a broad smile" 
that this was a military matter beyond the competence of his 
Commissariat. The journalist Karl Radek was more direct, informing 
Bullitt that the only real importance of the Pact was that it allowed 
Franco-Soviet staff talks to begin, and he was confident that they 
would be initiated at once (32).
Furthermore, the Soviets did have conisderable justification for their 
optimism. In his meeting with Stalin on the 16th of May, Laval agreed 
that in order to ensure the peaceful operation of the Pact "il convient
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de prévoir le pire et d'envisager dès maintenant les dispositions 
techniques propres à lui donner son plein effet". He insisted, 
however, that staff talks could only really be useful after the 
conclusion of an accord between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 
but "(M.Litvinov) m ’ayant alors informé de l ’accord réalisé entre 
M.Benès et lui, je me suis déclare prêt a proposer au Gouvernement 
l ’ouverture de ces conversations entre Etats-Majors dans les 
conditions de discrétion habituelle" (33). When questioned by 
Bullitt Laval insisted that staff talks would naturally take place, 
but that it was probable that "nothing spectacular" would be done as 
he was particularly anxious to ensure that the Pact appeared to the 
world as an instrument of peace, not as an alliance for war (34).
It is, of course, most unlikely that Laval ever had any intention of 
initiating staff talks, and certainly as long as he was at the head 
of the government, the constant proposals made by Ambassador Potemkin 
and the military attaché in Paris were consistently evaded (35),
Once the Blum government took office, however, the Soviet pressure 
was renewed. When passing through Paris in June 1936, for example, 
Litvinov asked that conversations be commenced at once(36). Similarly, 
at an official dinner given for the visiting Soviet D.A.T. mission in 
June, the Soviet chargé, M.Hirschfeld, insisted to General Schweisguth 
that it was now essential "de mettre au point nos rapports militaires 
comme suite au Pacte franco-soviétique" (37), For some months after 
taking office it seemed that the Blum government, too, was attempting 
to resist these and many similar Soviet demarches, but by October 
Soviet patience was clearly wearing thin, and Blum might have thought 
that some response was inevitable. For example, a member of the 
Soviet Embassy in Paris complained bitterly to a French journalist that
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"l’attitude de la France à l ’égard de l ’URSS est inqualifiable; un 
pacte est un pacte, et une signature est une signature’" (38) while at 
Geneva Litvinov suggested in conversation with Krofta that Russia no 
longer intended to rely on French aid in the event of conflict, and 
so would look for other allies instead (39).
It was at about this time that reports suddenly began to appear in the 
press to the effect that Blum had promised Litvinov at Geneva that he 
would soon initiate staff talks. Such suggestions first appeared in 
the "News Chronicle" of October 8th, which claimed that Blum had had 
to go to Geneva the week before because "the delegates of Soviet 
Russia and of the Little Entente had expressed the strongest dis­
satisfaction at the attitude of the French delegation towards the 
final implementation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, which provides for 
Staff talks between the two powers". Sharing the British fears of 
the effects of such talks on the Locarno Conference, Delbos was said 
to have endeavoured to pacify Litvinov and the Little Entente "with 
vague expressions of good will", but Blum on his arrival had realised 
that Russia was prepared to dissociate herself from the Little Entente: 
"he therefore gave verbal assurances that once the Locarno Conference 
was over, and whether it succeeded or not, Franco-Soviet staff talks 
would begin" (40). The British Ambassador reported from Paris that 
he had information to suggest that Blum had indeed told Litvinov that 
once the Five-Power Conference was over, France would agree to "unify" 
her obligations to the Little Entente in some kind of mutual pact of 
guarantee, as well as to the initiation of staff talks, provided that 
they had no official character, and entailed no written obligations(41)
In Paris a similar story was expounded by Genevieve Tabouis of ’L ’Oeuvre’
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while the Army Staff Intelligence Service sought to ascertain the 
truth of information received from a "competent and generally well- 
informed source" to the effect that Blum had formally promised 
Litvinov that "les conversations entre les états-majors français et 
soviétique prévues paraît-il au moment de la signature du pacte
j j*
franco-sovietique, sont entames incessamment" (42). We still do not 
have any evidence to confirm the existence of what was, by all accounts, 
a verbal promise, but what is now clear is that during November of 
1936, the Blum government did finally make the decision to undertake, 
in the utmost secrecy,preliminary talks with the Soviet military 
attache in Paris. Official records of these contacts are fragmentary, 
presumably since the obsession with secrecy made them purely verbal, 
with documentation minimal, but it is now possible, from various 
memoirs and in particular from the notes made by the French represent­
ative, General Schweisguth, to trace the development of what were, in 
the end, the only Franco-Soviet military talks to take place as a 
result of the Franco-Soviet Pact,
On the 7th of November, 1936, Gamelin recounted to Schweisguth a
meeting which had taken place the day before in the presence of Blum,
Chautemps, Cot, Daladier, Delbos, Gasnier-Duparc, Auriol, Rucart and 
Leger. Two groups had formed on the subject of the desirability of
staff talks, one led by Daladier and Chautemps, the other by Cot and
Rucart. After much discussion it was decided that through the inter­
mediary of the military attachés, the Soviets would be asked to define 
exactly their conception of military assistance. It is interesting to 
note that the suggestion was actually made by Gamelin, "pour que la
Guerre reste maîtresse de ces conversations et qu'elles ne soient pas
■>
menees par l'Air". The following day Schweisguth reached agreement
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with Bargeton that the talks would be held in Paris, and that before 
commencing the French would await the arrival of Ventsov’s successor, 
soon to be appointed, "pour qu’il n'y ait plus qu'un seul Russe dans 
le secret" (43). Several days later Gamelin reiterated that it was 
difficult to postpone such talks any longer without incurring the 
risk of the Air Ministry taking control, and committing imprudences(44)
Although this decision was taken in early November, it was not until 
January that General Schweisguth, appointed to conduct the talks, 
prepared a note outlining their envisaged content. The note emphasised 
that the sole aim of the contact would be to ascertain from the Soviet 
military attache the aims of the Russian General Staff with regard to 
aid which Russia might bring in the event of conflict, although it 
also suggested that ultimately, and in accordance with the results of 
this first meeting, representatives of the Airforce and Navy might 
participate in exchanges of a wider scope. The note added that in 
order to maintain absolute secrecy in this contact, it would be in the 
form of a tete-a-tete between Generals Schweisguth and Semenov, with 
only Commander Villelume present as interpreter. Gamelin approved the 
note, adding that the Air Ministry should in no circumstances be 
allowed to take the lead in this affair (45).
Villelume says that two initial meetings with Semenov took place, one 
on January 7th and one on February 2nd (46), although Schweisguth 
refers to only the second of these, at which Semenov was asked what 
assistance France could expect from Russia if either she or Czecho­
slovakia were attacked by Germany. On February the 17th Semenov 
returned from Moscow with the reply of the Soviet Staff : if Poland 
and Roumania were to fulfil their duty, either by a spontaneous
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decision or on the advice of the League, and allow the passage of 
Soviet troops across their territory, then the Soviet Union would lend 
assistance "avec toutes armes"; if they refused, then Soviet aid would 
be restricted to land forces sent by sea, and assistance supplied by 
the airforce. He added that in both cases the conditions of this 
assistance would need to be determined by specific accords. In return, 
the Soviet Staff wanted to know what assistance France could give to 
Russia if she were attacked by Germany, and how much war material she 
could supply (47).
Dismissing the Soviet request for information as superfluous, since 
France, having a common frontier with Germany, could naturally inter­
vene with all her forces, Schweisguth insisted that the Russians 
clarify their answers by giving more precise information : how many 
troops would they send, how long a delay was envisaged, how would the 
problem of passage be overcome? Stalemate quickly arose, with Semenov 
insisting that such matters could only properly be discussed through 
official staff talks, and Schweisguth maintaining that these problems 
must be discussed and resolved before any more official contacts 
could be envisaged (48). Villelume explained to the postwar commission 
that since Semenov refused to reply to these questions, "nous avons 
pensé, le général Schweisguth et moi, q u ’engager, dans ces conditions, 
des conversations officielles dont l'ampleur, à défaut même de 
l'évidente intention des Russes, n'aurait pas permis de cacher long­
temps l'ouverture, serait une entreprise pleine de périls... Une fois 
....engagés dans des négociations officielles, nous étions condamnés 
à les faire aboutir coûte que coûte, en passant par toutes les
exigences des Russess" (49). As a result, Schweisguth reported to
?
Daladier that while he had been able to carry out the first part of his
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task, that is, to ascertain the nature of Russian aid, he had been 
unsuccessful in determining the breadth and conditions of such aid, 
and so he proposed that "les sondages en cours doivent être pour­
suivis dans ce sens, sous leur forme actuelle, et qu ’il soit prudent 
d'ajourner jusqu'a leur complet achèvement toute décision relative à 
l'opportunité de passer à des conversations plus directes" (50).
On the 19th of March, over one month after Semenov's reply. Generals 
Gamelin, Colson and Schweisguth visited Daladier in order to discuss 
the question of the Soviet talks, Daladier fully approved Schweisguth's 
conclusions reached from his exchanges with Semenov, and emphasised 
that the aim must continue to be "gagner du temps, sans rebuter les 
Russes et sans passer à des conversationsd'Etat-Major, ce qui 
nécessite une decision gouvernementale" (51). In practical terms 
Daladier was content to approve yet another questionnaire, asking the 
Russians to define the conditions of envisaged assistance, which was 
handed to Semenov that afternoon. The attache warned that the Soviet 
Staff would be unlikely to agree to answer more questions, believing 
that this should only be done through official talks, but he agreed 
to take the note to Moscow (52). In fact, Semenov never returned, 
and the Schweisguth-Semenov exchanges were never renewed.
While the French seem to have been prepared to accept the disintegra­
tion of these talks, the Soviets clearly were not. On the 7th April, 
Hirschfeld asked Delbos to reanimate the staff talks (53), while on 
the 9th Potemkin made a similar appeal to Blum (54). According to 
General Colson both Blum and Delbos were sufficiently concerned by 
these requests to approach Daladier, emphasising the very damaging 
effects which a rejection of the Russians might have in provoking a
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return to Rapallo. Daladier's response was typically feeble : sending 
for Gamelin, he asked him whether he could not meet some Russian 
military personage, perhaps taking advantage of the forthcoming 
coronation of George VI, to which Gamelin merely replied that while 
he did not refuse, he was unwilling to act behind the backs of England 
and Poland (55). While the French were still trying to find ways of 
gaining time, however, Russian patience was becoming severely strained. 
On April 23rd General Keller, having just returned from Moscow, 
reported Vorochilov's anger at the new French questionnaire : the 
staff talks had been opened, complained Vorochilov, the Soviet Staff 
had indicated Soviet potential action, and had asked France to re­
ciprocate : the French only replied with more questions. He therefore 
considered that the talks were dead, and refused to discuss further 
any technical questions until the two governments had officially 
agreed to open formal negotiations (56).
It was not in fact until mid-April that the French gave any indication 
of the assistance which they were prepared to offer the Russians which 
was even as detailed as Semenov's.reply. On February 17th Potemkin 
had repeated to Blum the Soviet reply in the same terms as Semenov 
to Schweisguth, asking in return for details of possible French 
action on behalf of Russia (57). Gamelin replied that if France her­
self were not attacked, then she would be prepared to use all her 
forces in an offensive against Germany, although she could not be 
expected to supply Russia with any arms since she would need all her 
resources herself. He added that the state of France's conversations 
with Poland and Roumania did not suggest a solution to the problem of
Soviet passage (58). This reply naturally did not satisfy the Russians
:>
any more than theirs had pleased the French.
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On the 22nd of May, at a meeting of the Defence Ministers, Delbos,
Blum and Léger, the question of pacifying the Russians was again 
discussed. On this occasion it was decided to send word immediately 
to Coulondre in Moscow instructing him to assure the Soviets that the 
Pact still retained its value for France, that Staff talks constituted 
its natural accompaniment, and that the French and Soviet Staffs 
could be authorised to open them (59). But it does not seem that this 
note was ever sent to Coulondre : Bargeton told Schweisguth on the 
23rd of June that the note had not yet left the Quai (60), and 
certainly Coulondre makes no mention of having received it in his 
memoirs. He does however refer to a "project for a pre-military accord" 
which he vas given by the Quai before leaving Paris on April 15th.
This might refer to a secret War Department note of the same date 
now preserved in the diplomatic papers, which directly envisaged 
those conversations which the Russians had so long claimed. The note 
explained that since the USSR and Germany had no common frontier, the 
General Staffs of the Russian and French armies must research the 
means of making Soviet aid effective, while at the same time there 
should be technical conversations between the Staffs to ascertain 
the nature of mutual aid : thus the French Staff was authorised to 
pursue with the Russian Staff exchanges within this defined framework 
(61). However, no reference to this note is made in any other source, 
and clearly the directive it contained was never pursued. The same 
must be said of Blum’s later assertion to Coulondre that the question 
of staff talks had been broached between the French Chief of Staff 
and the Soviet military attache to Berlin (62), while in September 
1938 Bonnet informed him that contacts had been established by the 
French Staff with the Soviet military attaché and conversations of a 
technical nature would soon follow (63). Similarly, Villelume
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recollects having heard that an attempt was made to renew the talks, 
on this occasion by the 2e bureau, although he was sure that nothing 
came of them, and Coulondre does not remember any further contacts 
after the Schweisguth-Semenov exchange (64). What remains clear is 
that whether or not any further talks did take place, no agreement was 
ever reached, and certainly no military accord was ever signed.
General Schweisguth himself recognised that the French and Russians had 
entirely different aims in their pursusance of these contacts : the 
Soviets hoped that formal negotiations would lead to an agreement which 
would give them a freshmeasure of security, while the French Foreign 
Ministry hoped to reduce the negotiations to purely technical talks, 
without any tightening of the assistance links so vaguely stipulated in 
the Pacts’s text (65). It is indeed clear that the French would much 
rather not have had any talks of this kind with the Russians but, 
realising that some attempt must be made to pacify the impatient 
Soviets and, at least from Gamelin’s point of view, fearing that with­
out official leadership the Air Ministry under Pierre Cot might embroil 
France unwisely in negotiations with the Russians, it was decided that 
some form of entirely harmless "preliminary" discussions should be 
authorised : Daladier, at least, seems to have hoped that the talks 
would never reach any suitable conclusion which might make the promised 
second stage of talks, that is between the respective staffs,difficult 
to avoid.
Thus the choice of General Schweisguth as the French representative in 
these conversations, a man already noted for his dismissive attitude 
of the value of the Soviet Pact, is perhaps not surprising. Obsessed 
by the need to prevent any knowledge of the talks becoming public.
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(he was horrified to hear General Gamelin discuss the progress of the 
negotiations in May in the presence of Generals Colson, Jeannel and 
Gauche, all members of the General Staff (66),) he was well-suited to 
execute the French policy of temporising. Indeed, the Soviet complaints 
about this constant stalling were entirely justified : the French did 
not agree to the initiation of even preliminary talks until eighteen 
months after the Pact was signed, and even then they insisted on post­
poning the talks until January, ostensibly to await the arrival of 
the new Soviet military attache. Moreover, the Soviet reply to 
Schweisguth*s questions came from Moscow only days after his meeting 
with the attache in Paris : when on February the 17th Potemkin asked 
Blum that the French reciprocate, his request was not even conveyed 
to General Gamelin for consideration until the 9th of April.
Thus it seems that the most fundamental reason for the failure to 
conclude a Franco-Soviet military accord was that the French govern­
ment as a whole, whatever might have been the views of its individual 
members, did not want such an agreement. When Litvinov said at a 
reception for Laval in May 1935 that "1 trust that the signature of 
the pact will not be the culmination but the beginning of collaboration 
between the Soviet Union and the French Republic"(67), he undoubtedly 
envisaged a future of practical collaboration.In contrast the French 
decision to authorise contacts with the Soviet military attache in 
Paris in November 1936 merely represented a further attempt to gain 
time in response to repeated Soviet pressure, and by mid-1937, this 
was finally recognised by the Soviets themselves.
* * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 9
THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF SOVIET AID
Although the French government evidently had no desire to negotiate 
bilaterally with the Soviets, the Franco-Soviet Pact need not 
necessarily have remained inoperative as a consequence. Indeed, 
France was particularly well-placed to assist in the resolution of 
those very real difficulties which she herself was inclined to regard 
as rendering Soviet intervention in Europe impossible. For in one 
respect at least the French Staff's criticism of the Pact with Russia 
was justified : while France would in theory be able to assist Russia 
immediately in the event of a Russo-German conflict, by virtue of her 
common frontier with the aggressor, the geographical position of the 
USSR meant that Soviet assistance, either in the form of a direct 
attack on Germany or assistance to a beleagured Czechoslovakia, would 
necessarily be limited. Distances between the Russian and German 
frontiers varied from 300 to 1500 kilometres of often difficult 
terrain, such as the vast marshalands of Pinsk and Pripet extending 
almost as far as Pskov on the Estonian border down to Kovel on the 
Polish border (1). Moreover, in order to reach Germany or 
Czechoslovakia Soviet troops would have to cross either Roumania, 
Poland or the Baltic states which, in view of the somewhat strained 
political relations they had with Soviet Russia, constituted a 
diplomatic problem of considerable magnitude. Thus the question of 
Soviet aid in accordance with the terms of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
raised problems of both a technical and a diplomatic nature which
were regarded by some French officials, both civil and military, as
?
insurmountable, and which were constantly cited as proof of the worth-
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lessness of the Soviet alliance. In fact, as the Soviets themselves 
insisted, although the problem was immense, there were some indicat­
ions, even on occasion from the Poles, that some form of agreement 
could be worked out, and in the negotiations which would be required 
France, as an ally of Poland and Roumania on the one hand and the 
Soviet Union on the other, could naturally play a vital role. It was 
therefore in this respect that the French failure to reanimate her 
Central and East European alliances was to prove most critical.
In April 1935 the Minister of War, General Maurin, noted that Latvia 
and Lithuania, who feared Germany more than Russia, were unlikely to 
refuse passage to Soviet troops (2). If this were so, then Soviet 
troops concentrated to the south of Leningrad, between Pskov and 
Polotsk, could, after crossing Latvia via Daugavpils, use the two 
single-track railways which ran across Lithunia via Tilsitt or Kaunas 
(3). By these rather complicated routes Soviet troops could avoid 
crossing Poland and still reach the frontier of Eastern Prussia after 
a journey of approximately 600 kilometres. In this way, estimated 
Captain Lelaquet at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, between six and 
eight Soviet divisions could be immediately transported, and then 
supplied. However, this whole operation would be difficult and slow, 
since the Russian railway tracks differed in size from those in the 
Baltic countries which meant that all troops and material would have 
to be transferred onto different trains at the border. Furthermore, 
warned Lelaquet,the proximity of the sea on one side and the Polish 
border on the other might make this a very hazardous journey (4).
An alternative possibility was to send Russian men and material to 
Czechoslovakia from the Ukraine through Roumania, which bordered both.
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Unfortunately, however, the Russian and Roumanian railway systems 
intersected at only one point, at Tirespol on the Dniestr, and since 
the two railway gauges were of different sizes, this too would require 
a complete transfer. At all other points where the tracks came close 
there was not actual point of contact, and so a second transfer on to 
land vehicles would be required. An alternative route would be for 
Soviet troops to cross tte eighty miles from Odessa to Constanta or 
Galatz by sea, which would be a relatively simple operation since the 
terms of Montreux, in July 1936, made the Black Sea virtually an 
internal lake of the USSR in war time (5). The troops could then use 
Roumanian railways as far as the Sub-Carpathian region of Satu Mare, 
from where a single-track line crossed into Slovakia (6). This route 
would in theory allow for the transportation of one division per day, 
but since it was to be expected that the Roumanians themselves might 
need to use the railways in the event of conflict with Hungary, it was 
estimated that even in the most favourable conditions, it would not be 
until the fiftieth day after mobilisation that a force of between 
twelve and fifteen Soviet divisions could be assembled in Moravia.
If on the other hand the Hungarian threat had already been contained 
by the Little Entente, then this route could be of considerable 
benefit to the Russians (7).
By far the easiest land route between Russia and both Czechoslovakia 
and Germany was that across Poland, "dont l'attitude déterminerait 
étroitement les conditions de l ’appui soviétique contre l'Allemagne" 
(8). Indeed, with Polish consent or in the event of a hostile Poland 
allied to Germany, Soviet troops could threaten Germany or assist 
Czechoslovakia from several directions. From Minsk, for example, 
Soviet troops could use the double-track railway via Brest and Warsaw
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to Eastern Prussia or to the German frontier itself, while from 
Vinnitza it would be possible to travel via Lvov and Cracow into 
Czechoslovakia. Alternatively, troops could travel via Vilna and 
Kaunas to Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia, a distance of 450 kilo­
metres from Minsk, or across the 700 kilometres to Breslau in Upper 
Silesia via Lvov (9). Thus the Russians would have considerable 
choice of strategic possibilities, and Germany could be threatened 
from a particularly sensitive direction with relatively little delay. 
Indeed, taking into account the concentration of Polish troops which 
might have to be moved first, the French Staff estimated that a Soviet 
force of between twelve and fifteen divisions could be at the German 
frontier within thirty days (10).
It was expected that the most effective Soviet aid, however, would 
come from the Soviet airforce. In September 1938 the French Airforce 
General Staff set down clearly its views on possible Soviet action in 
the event of conflict with Germany, analysing separately Soviet 
potential from its own airbases, and from hypothetical ones in Poland 
(11). A rapid and smooth mobilisation of Soviet airforces could be 
expected from Russian bases since the Russian terrain leant itself 
easily to the installation of airbases (about one hundred had already 
been identified by the French from the Gulf of Finland down to the 
Black Sea), and the units stationed there were in a state of almost 
permanent alert in peacetime. However, their range of action would 
necessarily be limited. All Soviet aircraft could operate en masse 
up to a distance of 400 kilometres away, that is, approximately as 
far as Warsaw or Koenigsberg (12), but the 1931-model R5 reconnaissance 
and assault plane, whose maximum speed was only 200 kilometres per 
hour, could reach no further. The SB bombers, of which there were
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500 in service, and the 150 TSKB 26 bombers, all with a maximum speed 
of 420 km./hr. had a range of 800 kilometres, which meant that they 
could comfortably reach the whole of Eastern Prussia. Finally the 
TB3 and TB4 heavy bombers, of which there were 500 in service, as well 
as the newly-introduced 115 and 116 fighter planes, all with the 
capacity to carry 1500 kilograms of bombs, could operate, with a 
range of 1,000 kilometres over Eastern Prussia and over all Reich 
territory situated to the east of Frankfurt-on-the-Oder. The major 
difficulty with the TB3 and TB4 heavy bomber, however, was that they 
were equipped with out-moded apparatus, and their cruising speed of 
only 150 and 170 km./h. respectively meant that they could only operate 
effectively at night, and even then with considerable risks.
Thus the much-vaunted Red Airforce seemed able to offer only restricted 
assistance in the event of a European war if it were forced to operate 
from its national airbases. Moreover, international aviation law 
meant that Russia would have to have the agreement of Poland or Roumania 
in order to fly over their territory. The situation could be consider­
ably improved, therefore, if Soviet forces could be stationed directly 
on Polish territory. The French Airforce Staff estimated that Russian 
planes could be ready to operate from Polish bases a mere 24 to 36 hours 
after the mobilisation, although it was stressed that such an operation 
would need considerable military and diplomatic preparation first. 
Moreover, it was thought that there were only ten landing sites between 
the German-Polish border and Warsaw which would be suitable to take 
Russian aircraft and, assuming that five were made available, this 
meant that Soviet strength would be limited to approximately sixty
aircraft. However, these sixty would constitute a considerable threat
?
to Reich territory : those with a range of 800 kms. (the SB and TSKB 26)
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could reach Frankfurt, while the TB3 and TB4 bombers could effectively 
operate over the whole of Germany.
Similarly, the potential of Soviet assistance would be considerably 
increased if she were able to obtain air passage, and possibly even 
landing sites, in Roumania, and airbases in Czechoslovakia. Roumania 
had only twelve landing sites big enough to accommodate the Soviet 
bombers, that is 1,000 by 1,000 metres, of which five were in 
Transylvania, but if she were to lend three sites the Soviets could 
base a total of six groups there. General Vuillemin, the chief of the 
General Airforce Staff, estimated that if the indispensable material 
preparation had been carried out, then the Soviet aircraft could arrive 
at the sites ten hours after the mobilisation, and leave for their 
first attack ten hours later (13). The major difficulty would be 
supplying the airbases as a result of the difficulties in railway 
communications with Russia, but even if the use of Roumanian airbases 
proved impossible, free passage over Roumania would certainly be a 
valuable asset. Czechoslovakia was naturally the most inclined of the 
Central and East European countries to collaborate with the Soviet 
Union, since she was the most directly threatened by Germany (14), but 
her airbases were too few and too small to enable the heavy Russian 
bombers to land there. She could on the other hand accommodate fighter 
planes and the lighter SB or TSKB 26 bombers, although considerable 
bomb reserves would have to be built up first since Czechoslovak bombs 
could not be mounted on to the bombreleasing equipment with which the 
Soviet aircraft were fitted. Thus the key factor, if the Soviet Union 
were to aid France or Czechoslovakia in a conflict with Germany, either 
on land or in the air, was that preliminary negotiations must be under- 
taken with those countries separating Russia from Germany.
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Roumanian reluctance to agree to the passage of Soviet troops was 
understandable. At the peace settlement at the end of the First World 
War Roumania had received Bessarabia from Russia, an area populated 
by a considerable number of Russians and Ukrainians as well as 
Roumanians : Russia had ever since refused to acknowledge this loss 
of territory, and so the Roumanian government was naturally concerned 
that if they were once allowed to re-enter Bessarabia, Soviet troops 
would never leave. Thus, when Delbos visited Bucarest in December 
1937 he was reminded that three times in the past Russians had entered 
Roumania "avec une forte tentation d'y rester" (15). This danger was 
naturally emphasised by opponents of an agreement with Russia such as 
the Liberal party dissident Georges Bratianu, who published in June 
1936 a facsimile of a review which had appeared in Moscow under the 
title of 'Red Bessarabia' (16), while one French observer noted in 
1935 that an official Soviet map he had seen at the Soviet Embassy 
and the Soviet Economic Agency in Paris included Bessarabia within 
the USSR as an area occupied by the Roumanian army (17). On the other 
hand, it was possible that the question of the recognition of 
Bessarabia could be used by the Russians to induce Roumania to agree 
to passage and indeed, Litvinov admitted to Paul-Boncour that "Je ne 
tiens pas h la Bessarabie, mais je veux garder la question ouverte 
comme une monnaie d'échange, comme un moyen de pression" (18).
As long as Titulescu remained Foreigh Minister there was a substantial 
likelihood that some form of Russo-Roumanian agreement might be reached, 
since he recognised that "I must get on well with Soviet Russia, I must 
improve my relations with Soviet Russia and thus try to safeguard myséf 
because I am convinced that in the event of any warlike conflicts,
Soviet Russia would march into Roumania; nor would she be satisfied
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with merely occupying Bessarabia, but would march on into Moldavia" 
(19). It thus appears that far from having a naively trusting 
attitude towards the Soviet Union as his critics claimed Titulescu 
realised that the best hope for Roumania lay in obtaining Soviet 
recognition of Bessarabia, possible with a French guarantee, since he 
anticipated a Soviet invasion regardless. As a result, in spite of 
the constant denials issued by the Roumanian government (20), rumours 
persisted throughout 1935 and 1936 that a Russo-Roumanian mutual 
assistance pact, including a specific reference to the passage of 
Soviet troops, was about to be concluded. In February 1936, for 
example, Flandin told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber 
that once the Franco-Soviet Pact had been ratified, a similar agree­
ment between Russia and Roumania would be signed (21)
Although Titulescu later vigorously denies having considered according 
free passage to Soviet troops, it seems that he was involved in 
detailed negotiations with the Russians throughout this period. In 
June 1935 Benes received a telegram in which Titulescu declared that, 
following a conversation with King Carol, he was in a position to 
envisage the eventual passage of Soviet troops, again emphasising that 
"nous ne pourrions nous soustraire; il vaut mieux, dans ces conditions, 
l'accepter dès maintenant, en régler les conditions et obtenir quel­
ques contreparties" (22). What is perhaps the most striking aspect 
of this telegram is that Titulescu claims to be acting in accordance 
with the wishes of the King, who later insisted to Eden that Titulescu 
had proceeded much further than his mandate had allowed in his negoti­
ations with the Russians (23), and who was widely regarded as the
principal opponent of an agreement with Russia (24). In fact,Paul-
?
Boncour claims in his memoirs that King Carol assured him after the
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funeral of George V that, "Je la ferai, cette entente...J’ai d'assez 
mauvais souvenirs personnels, ils ont tué mes tantes, etc.etc.Mais 
je vous le promets, je sens l'intérêt qu'y attache la France, et je 
ferai cette entente", although he asked for time in which to accustom 
his people to the idea. One year later the King's attitude had 
changed since "depuis un an il s'est passé bien des choses", such as 
the abdication of France as a Great Power, Paul-Boncour suggests (25), 
but as late as September 1937 he assured General Gamelin, attending the 
Roumanian manoeuvres, that he would allow Russian troops to cross the 
northern part of his territory to reach Czechoslovakia (26). It is 
possible that the public differences between Titulescu and Carol 
during 1936 were, as the German charge to Bucarest believed, just a 
front, Titulescu maintaining the Russians' interest while Carol 
preserved the Polish alliance (27): on the other hand, Carol might 
have been merely anxious to evade public responsibility for an unpopular 
measure. But whatever the true picture, it is clear that the possib­
ility of an agreement with Russia was closely associated with Titulescu 
personally.
In fact, it now seems that an accord was in preparation when Titulescu 
was removed from power in August 1936. At the Montreux Conference in 
July, Titulescu and Litvinov agreed in principle to a draft text in 
which Roumania undertook to let Russian troops and war material to 
cross her territory in the event of German aggression against a 
state allied to both by a mutual assistance treaty, while Russia agreed 
not to let her troops remain after the cessation of hostilities "west 
of the Dniestr" (28). Thus the Soviets were required to make no
formal recognition of Bessarabia, but the effect of the agreement would
■>
be to secure Roumanian retention of the area. That such an agreement
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had been reached was confirmed by Litvinov himself, who told Coulondre 
in June 1938 that he had agreed with Titulescu that when the fighting 
was over, Russian troops would withdraw to the Russian bank of the 
Dniestr (29). It seems that it was decided to adjourn the signature 
of the accord until September, by which time Titulescu had been 
replaced by the much less favourable Antonescu, and the project was 
abandoned.
It has been suggested that Litvinov might have deliberately provoked 
this fatal delay, since Titulescu had insisted that the accord be made 
dependent on the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact (30), while 
Titulescu himself explained to the German Minister to Bucarest that 
Litvinov had shown no understanding of the kind of treaty he envisaged, 
that is, a frontier guarantee together with a mutual assistance 
obligation in the event of attack (31).However Litvinov must have 
recognised that Titulescu was the most likely person to conclude an 
agreement and indeed after his removal from office the negotiations 
foundered. In April 1937 the Soviet Foreign Office denied a Roumanian 
report that the USSR was about to renounce its claim to Bessarabia (32) 
and in May Litvinov complained to Coulondre that the Roumanians were 
continuing to insist on de jure recognition of Bessarabia : he had 
given a verbal de facto assurance to Titulescu, he said, and intended 
to proceed no further with Antonescu, whom he accused of supporting 
the anti-Soviet block which Beck was trying to establish (34). In 
July 1937 the 2e bureau noted that conversations between Roumania and 
the USSR were taking place in Bucarest but that since Litvinov had 
excluded all possibility of the explicit recognition of the Dniestr 
frontier, the negotiations were likely to be fruitless (34). It 
seemed increasingly unlikely therefore that any agreement would be
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reached by means of bilateral discussions, and increasingly Soviet 
representatives began to suggest that France might adopt a mediating 
role. Thus in May 1938 Litvinov told Bonnet at Geneva that since 
France had a friendship pact with Russia and an alliance with Roumania, 
the French government was particularly well-qualified to obtain the 
right of passage for Soviet aircraft and troops (35). Similarly, the 
Czechoslovak Ambassador to Russia urged Coulondre in April that if any 
military collaboration with Russia was to be possible, then the 
Bessarabian question would have to be solved, and in this French help 
was indispensable (36).
It could hardly be denied that it was in France’s interests rather 
than Russia’s to ensure that Soviet intervention in Europe be made 
effective, and it was made abundantly clear by the Russians that such 
assistance was directly dependent on the attitude of Poland and 
Roumania. In February 1937, when asked by Blum what form Soviet aid 
would take. Ambassador Potemkin replied that if France’s allies,
Poland and Roumania, were to accept their responsibilities and allow 
Soviet troops across their territory, either by their own decision 
or that of the League, then the Soviet Union would "prêter son 
assistance avec le concours de toutes armes, et ceci dans la mesure 
indispensable qui doit être définie par un accord spécial entre les 
états interesses". If Poland and Roumania were, for some incompre­
hensible reason, to refuse, then Soviet aid could only be sent by sea 
or air. When asked by General Gerodias why he did not envisage passage 
through Lithuania, Potemkin explained that the possibility of passage 
was being examined only across those countries who were allies of
France, and that if other alternatives were possible, then it was up
■)
to France, in agreement with the USSR, to make the necessary preparations
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(37). Thus on this and on countless other occasions the responsibility 
for obtaining the right of passage was placed firmly with the French.
Indeed some form of guarantee given by the French government that 
Russian troops would be withdrawn from Bessarabia after the cessation 
of hostilities might have considerably eased the tortuous Russo- 
Roumanian negotiations. Little could have been expected from the 
Laval government and indeed, it seems that late in 1935 the French 
government actually advised the Roumanians to slow down the rapproche­
ment with the USSR (38), but it might have been thought that the Blum 
government would make a more positive attempt to facilitate an improve­
ment in Russo-Roumanian relations. In fact, though the French 
government was informed of the Titulescu-Litvinov meeting at Montreux, 
it seems to have shown little interest in trying to intervene when the 
talks collapsed, and it gave little support to the attempts at media­
tion mad by Harriot and Paul-Bancour at Geneva. As late as September 
1938 the Minister to Bucarest, who had been very active in advocating 
the desirability of allowing Soviet troops and aircraft to cross 
Roumania, explained to Mr. Farquhar of the Foreign Office that he 
was acting on his own initiative, and not on any instructions from his 
government (39).
In view of the increasingly widespread decline of interest in the 
problems of Central and Eastern Europe (40), it is perhaps scarcely 
surprising that France under the Popular Front singularly failed to 
inspire confidence in its allies and, more specifically, failed to 
mediate between its allies and the Soviet Union. Before leaving for 
his tour of Central and Eastern Europe in November 1937, however,
Delbos admitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee that the efficient
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functioning of the Pact made the passage of Russian troops across 
Roumania desirable, and he added that "il y a une action a exercer 
qui, au cours de mon voyage, pourra être envisagée" (41). Less than 
three weeks later, in reply to a question before the same committee, 
Delbos explained that the possible passage of Soviet troops "est une 
question que nous n ’avons pas discutée, car je n ’étais pas allé là-bas 
pour modifier les accords, mais simplement pour éprouver leur 
solidarité" (42). He added that he would try to infuse a spirit of 
conciliation into both sides, and that efforts in this direction had 
already been made in Geneva.
Given the lack of real French initiative to improve Russo-Roumanian 
relations, it was hardly to be expected that the Popular Front govern­
ment would successfully persuade Poland to agree to the passage of 
Soviet troops. Memories of the war with Russia in 1920 were still 
strong in the minds of many Poles : on the one hand they remembered 
that in August 1920 Russian troops, led by Tukhachevsky, had reached 
the walls of Warsaw, on the other they recognised Soviet anger that 
by the treaty of Riga approximately six million Ukrainians and White 
Russians had been brought into Poland. At the same time Poland was 
on poor terms with Czechoslovakia who, by an agreement reached at Spa 
in July 1920, had received the major part of the economically important 
area of Teschen, which included 80,000 Poles (43). It was thus highly 
unlikely that Poland would be willing to allow Soviet troops across 
their territory to assist Czechoslovakia, particularly since this 
would make her likely to become a Soviet-German battleground. Thus 
in February 1936 the German government was informed that the Poles
would never, in any circumstances, allow Soviet troops to set foot on
?
Polish territory (44) and the Belgian Prime Minister, Van Zeeland,
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returned from a trip to Warsaw in April with a similar impression (45). 
In April 1938 the French Ambassador to Poland reported that if Germany 
were to attack Czechoslovakia, then Poland would do nothing. In fact 
"sa seule préoccupation sera, en massant des troupes sur la frontière 
sud-est, d ’empêcher toute intervention soviétique a travers son 
territoire. Il en sera ainsi tant que M. Beck sera au pouvoir" (46).
It was also rumoured that Poland was attempting to prevent Roumania 
from coming to any kind of agreement with the USSR. In June 1935 the 
French charge to Berlin reported that many Poles, fearful of the 
negotiations between Litvinov and Titulescu at Geneva and fearing that 
any treaty would be incompatible with the Roumanian-Polish treaty of 
1921, were indicating that Poland could not possibly tolerate the 
intervention of the Red Army into Roumania or the Baltic States (47), 
and the leader article of the Journal de Moscou claimed at the end 
of the month that the Polish government had protested at Bucarest 
against the supposedly imminent conclusion of a Russo-Roumanian 
mutual assistance pact (48). Similarly, the British Ambassador to 
Bucarest believed that Germany and Italy were trying to convince the 
Polish government that it would be in their interest to obtain a 
definite undertaking from Roumania not to allow Russian troops to 
enter her territory (49), and in June 1938 the German Minister to 
Roumania reported that Poland was exerting great pressure on the 
Roumanians to prevent Russian transit flights (50). Moreover, there 
were even suggestions that Poland might oppose the intervention of 
Russian troops on her own territory by force : in September 1938, 
for example General Stachiewicz warned the French military attache 
that if Russia tried to help Czechoslovakia by crossing Poland then 
Poland would declare war on Russia (51).
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Although it is possible that any French pressure would have been 
unsuccessful, this does not explain the Popular Front’s failure even 
to discuss the question of Soviet passage with the Polish authorities. 
In retrospect Daladier admitted that there should have been an attempt 
to solve this whole question at the time of Rambouillet (52), but the 
French failed to act on the suggestion of the Soviet military attache 
to Paris that France might use the opportunity to make her considerable 
financial aid dependent on a Polish agreement to allow the passage of 
Soviet troops through Eastern Galicia (53). It might at least have 
been possible to make French aid dependent on the removal of Beck, 
since the anti-Soviet, pro-German and increasingly anti-French policy 
of the Polish government was one which was strongly identified with 
Beck personally, but the issue was not raised during the Rambouillet 
discussions. Similarly, Delbos did not refer to the question of 
Soviet passage during his tour of Central and Eastern Europe, either 
in Warsaw or Bucarest (54). In fact the Poles did show some inclin­
ation towards allowing Soviet air passage, an inclination which ought 
to have been fully exploited. In the summer of 1936, General Gamelin, 
during a visit to Warsaw, enquired of Marshal Ridz-Smigly about the 
possibility of Soviet passage across Poland. The Marshal replied that 
while Poland would never allow Soviet troops onto her territory, he 
was nevertheless prepared to discuss the question not of permanent 
bases but of temporary land-sites which could be used by Russian air­
craft on their way to Czechoslovakia (55) : the offer was never taken 
up.
It was not in fact until after the Anschluss and the consequent 
deterioration in the international situation that the French government 
began to make a positive attempt to solve this vital problem. On the
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9th of May Bonnet asked Litvinov for the first time what help could 
be expected from Russia in the event of a German attack on Czechos­
lovakia : Litvinov repeated that Russia would need the consent of 
Roumania or Poland to enter or fly over their territory (56). On the 
12th Bonnet approached Comnen, the Roumanian Foreign Minister, and 
was told that Roumania could not agree to passage. On approaching the 
Poles Bonnet received a similar negative. In June the French Minister 
to Bucarest renewed the initiative and was told that Roumania did not 
regard the Soviet assurances about withdrawing her troops after 
hostilities as having any value, while a member of the Soviet legation 
to Bucarest admitted that Russia, in refusing to admit the annexation 
of Bessarabia, was reserving the right, in the event of a German 
aggression and if Roumania maintained neutrality, to reoccupy a 
territory to which she had never renounced her claim (57). Similar 
demarches were repeated as the Czech crisis approached, but the Polish 
and Roumanian answers never varied.
As late as September 1938, Litvinov insisted to Herriot that the 
problem of passage across Poland was one which it was a French respons­
ibility to solve (58), There were of course many Frenchmen who be­
lieved that this insistence, and the subsequent conduct of the Russians 
during the Czechoslovakian crisis, emphasising that Soviet troops would 
march only after French troops did so, was merely a manoeuvre on the 
part of the Russians to evade their responsibilities. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to see exactly what other course of action the 
Soviets could have taken, other than violating Polish or Roumanian 
territory by crossing without permission. This is certainly a
possibility which had been considered and, it seems, rejected by the
•>
Soviets. In March 1936 the Russian journalist, Karl Radek, often
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used as a government mouthpiece, told Jacques Chastenet of the ’Temps’ 
that if Germany were to attack France then Russia would not hesitate 
to cross Poland (59), while a high-ranking Soviet officer claimed that 
"le haut commandement rouge est prêt à executer cette opération même 
si l ’accord n ’est pas réalisé avec la Roumanie" (60). Similarly the 
Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo told his French colleague that Soviet air­
craft would fly over Roumania "avec ou sans son consentement" (61). 
Official Soviet comments were on the whole more reserved, such as 
Litvinov’s assertion to a gathering of foreign journalists that "means 
would be found" (62), or Vorochilov’s comment to the British military 
attache. Colonel Firebrace, that "where there was a desire to fulfill 
ones obligations a way could be found" (63).
During 1938, however, such claims became increasingly rare, and Soviet 
representatives began to insist on another alternative, that of await­
ing a League decision which would oblige Roumania and Poland to permit 
Soviet troops to cross their territory. This view was increasingly 
expressed by Litvinov, who emphasised that Russia would not use force 
and would only enter these countries with the authorisation of the 
League Council (64). Indeed, as Massigli pointed out in a departmental 
note in September, the USSR was perfectly entitled in accordance with 
article 16 of the Covenant to cross neutral countries in order to aid 
Czechoslovakia, provided that the League Council agreed that Germany 
was the aggressor, and the member states could even force Roumania and 
Poland to accept this decision (65). Thus in August Litvinov replied 
to Payart’s enquiry about the nature of Soviet aid by saying that since 
the forced passage of Soviet troops was unthinkable without the 
authorisation of the League, then the League should be alerted 
immediately so that is mechanism would be ready to go into operation
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as soon as an aggression had occurred (66). However, as Daladier 
later pointed out, the League of Nations in September 1938, in the 
absence of Germany, Italy and the United States and including among 
its members Poland and Roumania, was scarcely likely to reach a 
unanimous decision on this issue, let alone was it strong enough to 
impose its decision on Poland and Roumania (67), and so the Soviets’ 
insistence on a League decision was seen by many as a further attempt 
to escape fulfilment of their engagements.
Although Czechoslovakian officials continued to believe that in the 
event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia the Soviet government would 
present an ultimatum to Poland, threatening to declare war if Poland 
refused to grant passage (68), it seems that the most the Soviets ever 
contemplated was to send air assistance, by flying over Poland or 
Roumania. Moreover the Roumanians, at least, recognised that there 
was very little they could do to prevent such a violation. Comnen 
told Bonnet in September 1938, for example, that while Roumania could 
never officially agree to Soviet air passage, Roumanian defence 
artillery was so mediocre that it would be impossible to reach the 
Soviet aircraft if they flew high enough (69), and he was said to have 
told Krofta at a meeting of the Little Entente in Bled that while 
Roumania might object to the passage of Soviet troops, ’’par contre 
elle pourrait fermer les yeux sur le survol de son territoire par des 
avions’’ (70). Both the Polish Ambassador to Bucarest and Colonel 
Beck told British diplomats that the Roumanian government would 
probably ignore Soviet aircraft flying overhead, and Comnen told Lord 
de la Warr in Geneva that he saw no difficulty in allowing the transit 
of Soviet aircraft (71). The French Minister to Bucarest, M.Thierry, 
said in retrospect that between the 10th and 15th of September
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Roumania officially consentedto allow the passage of Soviet aircraft, 
claiming that 200 were in Czechoslovakia by the time of Munich, and 
he even asserted that according to General Delmas, the French military 
attache to Bucarest, when one Soviet aircraft was forced to.land, 
Roumanian technicians repaired it and allowed it to take off again(72). 
There is no other evidence available to support these claims, but what 
does seem certain is that the Roumanian government was prepared to 
ignore the passage of Soviet aircraft and possibly also the transit of 
war material to Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.
There is, on the other hand no indication that either Poland or Roumania 
had any intention, by September 1938, to allow the passage of Soviet 
troops by land. In April 1938 the Roumanian Minister to Paris told 
his American colleague that "the present Popular Front Government" 
had been urging the Roumanian government to agree to passage but the 
government had flatly refused, adding that Roumanians "would fight to 
the last man" to oppose Russian troops entering their territory, since 
they knew this would mean the end of Roumania (73). With hindsight 
it appears that Polish and Roumanian fears had considerable justifi­
cation. The Nazi-Soviet Pact signed in August 1939 envisaged a new 
partition of Poland and recognised Bessarabia as belonging to Russia ; 
in September 1939 Russia occupied a sizeable portion of eastern Poland 
and absorbed the Baltic states into her sphere of influence, and in 
1940 she annexed Bessarabia and North Bukovina. On the other hand it 
is possible that had the French government given a firm guarantee to 
its allies in Eastern Europe that Soviet troops would be withdrawn 
once hostilities against Germany had ceased then, as Titulescu
believed, Roumania and Poland might, by agreeing to Soviet passage,
■>
have been making their own position more, rather than less, secure.
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Furthermore, the agreement of Poland and Roumania to allow passage 
would have made the Franco-Soviet Pact a viable political and military 
force, and so would have removed the need for Stalin ever to turn 
away from the French alliance and to seek instead an agreement with 
Nazi Germany.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 10
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT
It could be argued that the French government failed to assert its 
influence over Poland and Roumania in order to secure free passage for 
Soviet troops as a result of its not unnatural assumption that any such 
pressure would be totally futile. However, the same could hardly be 
said of Czechoslovakia, whose attitude towards the Franco-Soviet entente, 
by virtue of its own precarious position in Central Europe, fundamentally 
contrasted that of its Little Entente- allies. The predominant concern 
of the Czechoslovak government after 1933 was the threat from Nazi 
Germany, and so the overwhelming aim of her foreign policy became to 
ensure her own security by a system of alliances directed against that 
power. Having herself been allied to France since the mid-1920’s 
Czechoslovakia welcomed the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact, comple­
menting it just two weeks later with the conclusion of her own mutual 
assistance pact with the USSR. In this way the Franco-Soviet Pact 
became an integral part of a tripartite security system in which the 
major concern of the French was to secure Soviet assistance in the event 
of a German aggression against either France herself or her ally, 
Czechoslovakia, and in which the Russians sought to secure French aid 
if Germany were to attack the Soviet Union, while ensuring that she 
would not be called upon to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany 
unaided.
Moreover, the Czechoslovakian government was particularly anxious not 
to proceed in its negotiations with the USSR without French backing, 
and so continually proposed that there should be tripartite military
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negotiations in order to co-ordinate Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak action 
in the event of German aggression. France was thus presented with a 
significant opportunity : by obtaining a Soviet commitment to the 
defence of Czechoslovakia France’s own burden would be slightly eased; 
by ensuring the co-operation of Czechoslovakia she could facilitate 
the efficient operation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and thus reinforce 
her own security; and by publicly emphasising the close relationship 
with Czechoslovakia, France could divert attention from negotiations 
with the USSR, and thus avoid unpleasant publicity. Moreover, unlike 
Poland and Roumania, Czechoslovakia was willing, indeed anxious, to 
co-operate.
The French military connection with Czechoslovakia had its roots in the 
foundation of the Republic at the end of the First World War. In 
February 1919 a French Military mission arrived in Prague to act as 
technical advisor to the Czechoslovak army, but during the Slovak 
campaign against the Magyar bolsheviks in the Spring of 1919 the role 
of the mission was considerably enlarged and its head. General Pelle, 
was named Chief of Staff and Commander-in Chief of ,the Czechoslovak 
forces. This status was maintained until January 1926, when the second 
head of the mission. General Mittelhauser, passed his functions as 
Chief of Staff to a Czech officer, while being himself succeeded by his 
deputy. General Faucher, who was to remain technical advisor throughout 
the 1930’s. Faucher records that he twice suggested that the mission 
be ended, once in 1929 and again in 1936, believing that the 
Czechoslovak army no longer needed French assistance, but on both 
occasions it was decided to retain the mission. In fact. Faucher 
believes, the mission’s political importance was increasing as its 
military usefulness decreased, since the maintenance of the mission
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gave the Czechs a certain confidence that France would fulfil her 
obligations to Czechoslovakia (1). Thus, while continuing to offer 
advice on matters such as building of fortifications, the French 
military mission to Prague came primarily to symbolise the close 
political co-operation between the two countries.
Moreover, the treaty relations between the two were quite clearly 
defined. On 25th January 1924, a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of friend­
ship was signed in Paris, in which the two governments undertook to 
co-operate in external matters whichwere likely to jeopardise their 
security or undermine any peace treaties to which either party was a 
signatory(2).The treaty was supplemented by a secret exchange of 
notes by the respective foreign ministers at the end of January, in 
which it was agreed that the General Staffs would continue to collaborate 
in the establishment of concerted plans to contain any aggression 
against either by a common enemy, and in studying the means of 
assistance to be used in the event of common interests being menaced.
On October 16th 1925, as a complement to the Treaty of Guarantee 
signed on the same day with Germany, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy, 
France signed treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which it was 
stipulated that in the event of France, Czechoslovakia or Poland 
suffering from a failure to observe the day's undertakings between 
them and Germany (Czechoslovakia and Poland had signed arbitration 
treaties with Germany), in which the failure resulted in an unprovoked 
recourse to arms, then each undertook to lend the other immedate aid 
and assistance in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant. If the 
League Council failed to reach a unanimous decision, then the under­
taking would still apply in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 7(3). 
Thus France's obligations to Czechoslovakia were on paper very similar
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to those undertaken with regard to the Soviet Union in May 1935.
In the case of France and Czechoslovakia, however, real military 
collaboration did take place. In addition to the maintenance of a 
French mission to Prague, and French assistance in the development 
of Czechoslavakia’s National Defence programme several French Army
/  j'
chiefs visited Czechoslovakia : Pètain in 1929, Franchet d ’Esperey in 
1930, Gamelin in 1934 and Schweisguth in 1936. Moreover in January 
1933 General Syrovy accompanied Faucher to Paris, and in talks with 
General Gamelin it was agreed that it was necessary to study the 
conditions of eventual intervention, to exchange information and to 
direct the Little Entente General Staffs towards defined common aims. 
From this date onwards biennial meetings between the two Staffs took 
place, in Paris in the Winter and in Prague in the Spring (4),contacts 
which resulted in the signature, on 1st July 1935, of the secret 
"Convention FTA". This agreement, the only military accord to be 
signed between the two,provided for the collaboration of the French 
and Czechoslovak airforces in the event of conflict. Based on the 
principles of collaboration already approved by the two governments 
in 1933, the convention stipulated that in the event of a conflict 
where both countries were simultaneously involved against Germany,
France was to send a certain number of aerial units to Czechoslovakia, 
with the aim of relieving the Czechoslovak airforce in reconnaissance 
and bombing at the outbreak of hostilities, (this aid was increased 
to an aerial army in November 1938). There followed a very detailed 
analysis of the conditions of collaboration, such as the designation 
of Czech landing sites for French aircraft, and the supply of war
material for the French units by Czechoslovakia (5). Thus Czechoslovkia
?
could reasonably expect considerable French assistance in the event of
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a German attack.
In her search for security against Germany, however, she was not 
prepared to rely on France alone, hoping that she could establish 
similar relations with the Soviet Union. This was not a policy which 
had unanimous support within Czechoslovakia : the Sudetendeutsche 
party naturally emphasised the dangers of collaboration with the USSR 
and called for improved relations with Germany, while the Slovak 
People’s Party, motivated like the Agrarian Party by fear of communism, 
warned that "the alliance between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia 
was the beginning of another White Mountain tragedy". On the other 
hand the policy did receive support, perhaps surprisingly, from the 
Catholic Church : in the Chamber on the 17th June 1936 Monsignor 
Svetlik, leader of the Catholic (Church) Party, declared that in the 
struggle for supremacy between the two rival dictatorships, Czecho­
slovakia could neither rely on Italy, whose main motive was ’sacro 
egoismo', nor trust Nazi Germany, and so she should keep aloof from 
both, lean upon Russia’s increasing power and help the Little Entente 
to preserve an independent Central Europe (6).
More importantly the governing Czechs and in particular the Foreign 
Minister, Edouard Benes, who succeeded Masaryk as President in late 
1935, were firmly in favour of a policy of rapprochement with the 
USSR. Benes, however, having engineered the entente with France in 
the 1920’s, was particularly anxious not to alienate this close ally, 
and so he was naturally delighted at the conclusion of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact on the 2nd May, in the negotiation of which it has been 
suggested that he played a considerable mediating role. That 
relations with Russia had already been improving was shown by the
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almost immediate signature, on May 16th, of a Czechoslovak-Soviet 
mutual assistance pact which was virtually identical to the Franco- 
Soviet Pact in wording except for one essential addition : according 
to Article 11 of the Protocol the two governments recognised that 
the undertakings to render mutual assistance would operate between 
them only in sofar as assistance might be rendered by France to that 
party which was the victim of the aggressor (7). Thus the operation 
of the Czech-Soviet Pact was made directly dependent on French fulfil­
ment of her obligations under either her alliance with Czechoslovakia, 
or her Pact with the USSR. In this way the Soviet government sought 
to ensure that she would never be called upon to aid Czechoslovakia 
while France remained aloof, and the Czechs hoped that they could 
improve their collaboration with the Soviet Union, without alienating 
her ally, France.
Moreover, Czechoslovakia’s intentions in the policy of collaboration 
with the Soviet Union were, unlike France’s, totally sincere. By 
June 1935 both parties had ratified the Pact and on returning from 
Moscow Benes urged Laval to do the same (8). Similarly in October 
he stressed to the French Ambassador to Prague, Paul Naggiar, that the 
rupture in the Stresa Front caused by the Ethiopian War made consoli­
dation of the rapprochement with the USSR even more essential, and he 
repeated his hope that the Franco-Soviet Pact would soon be ratified 
(9). The Czechoslovaks were also anxious to improve military relations 
with the USSR, particularly since there was an increasing belief that 
France either could not, or would not, fulfil its treaty obligations 
to Czechoslovakia. Leon Blum recollected after the war that even 
Czechoslovakia, France’s most secure and faithful ally, began to doubt 
the value of French support as a result of her failure to respond to
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the Rhineland coup (10), and, like Russia, Czechoslovakia feared that 
if she were to conclude a western pact agreement with Great Britain, 
France would abandon her former policy of including Central and 
Eastern Europe in her negotiations for a system of collective security 
(11). Czechoslovakia needed real military support which, if it were 
not forthcoming from France, she hoped to secure from the USSR.
In this the Czechoslovakian government was anxious to utilise any 
available means, both official and unofficial. For example, a steady 
exchange of officers and missions was maintained in order to facilitate 
collaboration. In April 1935 a Soviet air mission visited Czechoslovakia 
and a return visit was made by General Fajer at the end of May; in 
July 1936 another Soviet military aviation mission, headed by General 
Alknis, visited Prague, and on his invitation three Czechoslovakian 
aviators visited Russia in October. Similarly missions were exchanged 
each year for army manoeuvres, the Czech missions always returning 
full of enthusiasm for the Red Army. Writing in ’France Soir’ in 1948, 
Benes sought to explain his motives, emphasising that he had never 
been motivated by ideological criteria, but simply had the impression 
that ’’dans le conflit qui allait avoir lieu, la victoire pencherait du
A  / e
cote ou se trouverait finalement l ’Union soviétique’’. Benes adds that, 
worried by German preparations, the Czech government agreed to supply 
Russia with special armaments which she had not been able to obtain 
from France or elsewhere, and admits that when a new Soviet military 
mission visited Prague in the summer of 1937, "nous conclûmes certains 
accords, principalement au sujet de l ’aide que l ’aviation soviétique 
devait nous apporter en cas d ’attaque allemande" (12).
On a more practical level, it seems that the Czech government attempted
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to improve her lines of communication with the USSR by offering 
financial assistance to Roumanie if she would improve the Bukovine 
railway line. Officially, the Czech-Roumanian accord signed on July 
14th 1936 provided for substantial Czech loans to Roumanie for a 
variety of purposes, one of which, declared Antonescu, the Roumanian 
Finance Minister, was "la facilitation de la construction de chemins 
de fer, intéressant les liasons entre les deux pays" (13). The news 
immediately provoked speculation in diplomatic circles that in 
encouraging the completion of the single-line railway between 
Czernowitz and Nagyabanya, the Czech government was seeking to 
facilitate the passage of Soviet troops, and indeed the Czech Minister 
for Foreign Affairs was said to have told a supporter that Czechos­
lovakia was financing a strategic railway through Roumania to link 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR and that she had "made necessary dispositions 
with the latter, with French consent" (14). Comnen, on the other hand 
denied that such a railway was a feasible proposition in engineering 
terms (15).
Conflicting evidence such as this provoked a lengthy debate at the 
British Foreign Office, both in terms of whether such a railway line 
could be built and, if so, what its strategic value would be for the 
Russians. Colonel Paget of the War Office maintained that with a loan 
of 95m. Czech crowns (£884,000), lines were to be built linking Viscul 
to Salva and Vatra Dornei to llva Mare, which when completed would form 
part of a direct railway communication by 4'8^" gauge between Czecho­
slovakia and the Russian frontier, though the difficulties raised by 
the 5 ’ Russian gauge would still apply (16). The British Legation in 
Bucarest, on the other hand, believed that the new railway construction 
was intended to provide a reserve line of defence running north-south
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between Craiova and the Czech frontier, since the existing line in that 
direction on her western frontier (the Arad-Oradea-Satu Mare line) was 
uncomfortably close to the Hungarian frontier. Thus it was asserted 
that the new track was intended as a reserve strategic line of defence, 
rather than an attempt to improve Czechoslovak-Soviet communications(17)
From all this confusion, two points emerge clearly : the Czechoslovakian 
government did give substantial financial assistance for the improvement 
of the railway leading to her own border; and it subsequently showed 
considerable anxiety that the work be concluded quickly. Probably the 
most likely explanation of the conflicting aims and denials was that 
given by General Mittel, returning from a visit to Roumania in December 
1936 : Mittel had noticed considerable disagreement between the Czechs, 
who were offering the 300 million francs for the improvement of the 
railway link with Russia through the Bukovine, and the Roumanians, 
whose predominant concern was to double the track near the Hungarian 
border (18). Moreover, it is quite understandable that Czechoslovakia 
should have wanted her money to be used in a way which might eventually 
benefit her, just as it was natural that Roumania, in view of her 
reluctance to allow Soviet passage, would try to avoid improving the 
channel between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia, and indeed it seems 
that the envisaged improvements to the Roumanian railways proceeded 
only slowly and inefficiently. Thus it seems that the Czechoslovak 
loan to Roumania merely represented an unsuccessful attempt by the 
Czech government to improve its military communications with the USSR.
It was made even more difficult to ascertain the exact extent of Czech- 
Soviet military collaboration as a result of the violent anti- 
Czechoslovak campaign conducted by the Nazis after the conclusion of
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the Czech-Soviet Pact. In particular, Germany concentrated its attack 
on alleged collaboration between the Czechoslovakian and Russian air­
forces. On the 17th May 1935 the Berlin press published news of the 
signature of the accord, adding that it would soon be followed by an 
air convention (19), while on the 25th the German Foreign Minister 
issued instructions to its diplomatic missions abroad that the agree­
ment be attacked as forming a single military instrument with the 
Franco-Soviet Pact and, more specifically, rendering Czechoslovakia 
nothing more than a deployment area for Russian troops. It was also 
to be noted that an agreement had been reached for a regular air service 
between Prague and Moscow, which was scarcely justified by the volume 
of traffic (20).
As with the Franco-Soviet Pact, however, it was the German intention to 
use the Czech accord to its own advantage and apart from occasional 
references, such as Goering's complaint to Phipps in May that there 
were already twenty seven Czechoslovakian aerodromes at Russia’s 
disposal (21), it was not until March 1936, that is almost a year after 
the conclusion of the Pact, that the German campaign began in earnest.
On the 11th March General Milch, of the German Air Ministry, told the 
British Ambassador to Berlin that twenty-eight Czech aerodromes had 
been designated for the use of Russian aircraft, and that a considerable 
number of Soviet military personnel were already based at certain aero­
dromes (22). The campaign was readily taken up by the German press.
The ’Gazette de la Bourse’, for example, sought to support these 
assertions by offering, on April 1st, a s e r ^ s  of ’proofs’ : Taittinger’s 
’’indiscretions" after a meeting of the army committee in the French 
Chamber the year before; the visit of the Chief of the Czechoslovakian 
airforces. General Fajer, to Moscow; the presence of a Russian mission
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at the last Czech manoeuvres; and, most important of all, a memorandum 
addressed to the League by the National Slovak Council protesting 
against the development of runways and the construction of underground 
hangers, obviously destined for the use of the Soviet airforce (23).
The 'Local Anzeiger’ reproduced the usual accusations in June, but 
added a wealth of detailed information designed to demonstrate that a 
close military agreement between the Czechoslovakian, Soviet and French 
Staffs had long since been concluded (24).
More seriously, the accusations began to be increasingly used by German 
leaders. On the 8th March Goering warned the Czechoslovak Minister to 
Berlin that if the Czech government allowed their country to be a twin 
aircraft carrier for the Soviet Union, then Czechoslovakia would be 
completely wiped out of existence (25), while Hitler's anti-Czechos­
lovakian diatribes reached fever-pitch at Nuremberg in September. 
Similarly, Goebbels spoke in February 1937 of the dangers of the Czech- 
Soviet military alliance for Europe, and added that "Czechoslovakia 
today is the aircraft mother-ship of Moscow" (26). Naturally enough, 
Czech government representatives issued constant denials of the German 
accusations : on 13th March Benes assured the British Ambassador that 
Czechoslovakia had no military agreement with the USSR, and was not 
preparing any aerodromes for Soviet aircraft; there were no Soviet 
military personnel at Czech aerodromes; and Czechoslovakia had no 
intention of allowing Soviet aircraft on their way to France to land 
there (27). On June 4th Colonel Hajek, head of the Czechoslovak 
Intelligence Service, insisted to Schweisguth that no aerodromes had 
been prepared for Soviet aircraft, as German and Polish propaganda was 
suggesting : the extent of collaboration was that the two had exchanged 
missions for manoeuvres, and Czechoslovakia had sent three officers
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for a short visit to Russia (28).
It is not altogether clear whether the Germans themselves believed 
their own accusations. In June 1936, for example, a "memorandum on 
the militaro-political repercussions of the Franco-Soviet and Czech- 
Soviet Pacts of mutual assistance in Czechoslovakia and Roumania" was 
circulated by the Foregin Ministry to all diplomatic missions for 
their confidential information and guidance on the language to be 
used. It was maintained that the Moscow-Prague air service established 
in May 1935 was of a primarily military and strategic character; 
concrete decisions on airforce collaboration had been taken during the 
exchanges of missions; new aerodromes were being constructed in 
Slovakia with the help of Soviet officers; and the Soviet Military had 
permanent offices in the Czech War Ministry (29). Whether or not 
these stories were believed at the Wilhelmstrasse is not clear, but 
they were certainly regarded with scepticism by the German military 
attache to Moscow, General Koestring, who was regarded by most foreign 
observers as an important authority on Soviet military matters. 
Koestring doubted that the Moscow-Prague line would soon be operative, 
and thought it unlikely that Russian instructors and technical personnel 
were being used to supervise the aerodrome construction in Czechoslo­
vakia since airforce officers were rated too highly by the Russians.
It was moreover unlikely that the Russians would leave their most 
valuable weapon, the light bomber, in the sole protection of the Czechs, 
as was suggested (30).
But the German accusations were naturally taken up by thosepowers whose 
own relationships with Czechoslovakia were poor : thus the Polish 
charge to Moscow claimed that an agreement had been reaching according
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to which thirty six of the Soviet aircraft purchased by Czechoslovakia 
were to be allowed to fly over Roumania as long as they were flown by 
Czech pilots (31). Similarly the Hungarian Minister to Bucarest, 
while admitting that it could not be said that any aerodromes in 
Czechoslovakia were actually controlled by the Soviet airforce, never­
theless insisted that reports from the Hungarian Legation at Prague 
showed that there were far more aerodromes in Czechoslovakia than were 
required for her own civil and military purposes (32). There were even 
some officials at the British Foregin Office, however, who were unwilling 
to dismiss the rumours. It was thought to be suspicious that Krofta 
and Benes were always careful to distinguish between miliary and civil 
services when denying the existence of an air route between Moscow and 
Prague, and Krofta, while denying that any agreement had been reached, 
had nevertheless admitted that "if this country were attacked the 
government would then naturally call Soviet Russia to its assistance 
and allow them the use of its aerodromes" (33). There was even a 
suggestion from the War Office that the Russians themselves, in an 
attempt to provoke a conflict before the Germans were ready, were 
responsible for circulating the rumours about the Czechoslovakian aero­
dromes (34), as well as a suspicion that there were indeed military 
understandings behind the Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Pacts,though 
in a form which enabled them to be officially denied with truth (35).
From a position of greater intimacy with both the Czechoslovaks and the 
Russians, it might have been expected that the French might have been 
able to obtain more precise information on this issue than the British. 
Specific accusations could certainly be analysed and, usually, refuted. 
Fran^nis-Poncet, for example, on analysing the ’proofs’ offered by the 
Gazette de la Bourse (36), discovered that Pierre Taittinger, far from
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revealing secret information about Czech-Soviet military negotiations, 
had merely commented on collaboration between the Staffs, and that the 
memorandum to the League complaining of Czech preparations for Soviet 
aircraft was in fact signed by only three Slovak deputies who happened 
to be particularly hostile to the Czech majority (37). Similarly, 
Coulondre found that an article in a Soviet newspaper in February 1936 
entitled "new aviation bases in Czechoslovakia" had been reproduced in 
the 'Berliner Boersenzeitung' in August under the title, "Our airbases 
in Czechoslovakia" : the falsification was exposed at the beginning of 
September by the 'Prague Presse', but it was nevertheless the basis of a 
communique by the official German newsagency, the DND, in October 
which said, "Le temoinage documentaire publié^ par le journal soviétique 
montre clairement combien 1 'Allemagne 'a raison d'affirmer le danger de 
l'alliance sovieto-tchecoslovaque. En presence d'une telle preuve, 
tous les dementis sont inutiles" (38)
The French were little better informed than the British however, on the 
exact extent of Czech-Soviet collaboration, possibly because in spite 
of the close relations there was no French military attache to Prague, 
and General Faucher, who in his many years as head of the military 
mission had won the respect and esteem of the Prague authorities,felt 
that he would be taking advantage of his privileged position if he were 
to betray secrets confided to him which did not directly concern France 
(39). The French Ambassador, Lacroix, believed that the question had 
been studied by the Czech and Soviet Staffs and indeed landing sites 
had been designated, but his information was limited to the knowledge 
that the Skoda factory had given Russia important aeronautical material. 
Indeed, as late as April 1938 Paul-Boncour, then Foreign Minister, 
stressed that France must ascertain whether any Czech-Soviet staff
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accords had been concluded (40).
By far the easiest way for the French to obtain such information would 
have been to accept the formula which the Czechs and the Russians 
themselves envisaged : tripartite collaboration. Indeed there were 
numerous indications that the Czechs were unwilling to embark on, or 
at least pursue fully, military negotiations with the Russians without 
French approval. As early as June 1936 Lacroix reported his impression 
"que les Tchèques se tiennent sur la reserve a 1'égard des Russes en 
matière militaire et qu'ils attendent que les conversations d'etats- 
majors franco-russes aient pris tournure pour se prêter a des pour­
parlers réalisateurs" (41) and indeed in August Benes told Schweisguth 
that he had waited for the French to sign their Pact before signing 
his, and would do the same over a military accord : he had therefore 
told General Krejci that when attending the White Russian manoeuvres 
he could listen to Soviet proposals, but must not reply (42). It was 
certainly not unreasonable that the Czechs, although anxious to obtain 
Soviet support, should nevertheless tread carefully for fear of antago­
nising their French ally, and at every opportunity Benes took care to 
stress that "ma politique est une politique occidentale : je ne veux 
collaborer avec l'URSS que dans la mesure ou la France le fait elle- 
meme" (43).
The French Military's response to suggestions from both the Czechs and 
the Russians that tripartite negotiations be initiated was hardly 
enthusiastic. In October 1936, for example, when informed by Potemkin 
that at informal talks held in August in Prague between Egorov and 
Czech Staff representatives it had been agreed to subordinate all 
future negotiations to talks with France, Schweisguth irritably pointed
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out that the two Pacts had, after all,been signed independently (44).
The most that could be proposed was that, as Schweisguth told Benes,
"le jour ou nos gouvernements estimeraient opportune une conversation 
d ’ordre militaire avec les Soviets", such conversations should be 
preceded by an official entente between the Czech and French General 
Staffs to determine the nature and means of co-operation which was to 
be requested of the Russians (45). Even this idea became somewhat 
reduced in scope, however, when Gamelin agreed in July that there should 
be talks with the Czechs on what Russian aid might be through the sole 
intermediary of General Faucher (46). Clearly, as in the case of 
bilateral Franco-Soviet negotiations, the initiative would have to 
come from the government rather than the General Staff.
The value of tripartite negotiations was readily appreciated by Pierre 
Cot, whose major concern was that the Red Airforce be made operative 
against Germany. Recognising the vast political difficulties raised 
by a direct negotiation with Soviet Russia, Cot says that he discussed 
with Blum the possibility of conducting negotiations with the USSR 
through the intermediary of "son complement aerien, la Tchécoslovaquie". 
Czechoslovakia possessed a useful airforce, strategically situated at 
the heart of Europe, and Cot believed that by maintaining close relations 
with the Czechoslovak airforce and profiting from the relations between 
the Czech and Russian airforces, France would virtually be treating 
directly with Russia (47). In effect, "Czechoslovakia formed, from 
the aerial point of view, a bridge or landing stage between France and 
Russia. A network of military agreements between France and Czechos­
lovakia on the one hand, and between Czechoslovakia and Russia on the 
other, was a substitute for the Franco-Russian alliance, which France 
obstinately refused" (48). Acting on Blum’s instructions. Cot wrote
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to Benes explaining this plan, and a close collaborator of Benes’ soon 
arrived in Paris to discuss the matter. Cot claims that when he left 
office in January 1938 a tripartite aviation pact was ready to be 
signed, but says that ’’after the fall of the Popular Front, these 
projects were abandoned. My successor in the Air Ministry lacked 
imagination on an international scale and nourished the usual prejudices 
of his circle against Soviet Russia" (49).
There is in fact no record of such a draft agreement, but given Cot’s 
vociferous campaign on behalf of the Soviet alliance, it seems very 
likely that he would have attempted to use such means to make the Pact 
effective. For example, at a meeting of the Comité permanent de la _
y
Defense Nationale, called on June 26th 1936 to discuss the question of 
how Czechoslovakia might be assisted in the event of a German attack.
Cot insisted that she could not be abandoned because of her relations 
with the USSR, since the only way to reach Berlin was via this platform 
(5)). On this, and probably on other occasions too, his assertion met 
with little response from the other government and military represent­
atives present, including Blum, although Cot claims in retrospect that 
Blum fully approved his attempt at tripartite negotiations. In fact, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the government took any real 
initiative in this matter throughout 1936 and 1937, and certainly, 
despite Cot’s attempts, no such accord was ever signed.
The deteriorating international situation as signified by the Anschluss 
in March 1938, however, seems to have finally prodded the French into 
action, opening a spate of Franco-Czech-Russian diplomatic activity.
In April the Czech Ambassador to Moscow, M. Fierlinger, told Coulondre 
that Czech-Soviet negotiations had been reopened . in February, on the
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instructions of Prague „ At the time of the Russian manoeuvres in 
September 1936, he said, the passage of Soviet troops across Roumania 
had been the predominant subject of discussion, as a result of which 
Czechoslovakia had given Roumania a substantial financial contribution 
to rebuild the Bukovine railway network; the possible assistance of 
the Soviet airforce had also been discussed. When the negotiations 
were resumed in February 1938, only the last point had been taken up 
again , Fierlinger obtaining a promise of the immediate delivery of 
sixty SB bombers, twenty of which had already reached Oujorod aero­
drome in Slovakia by May (51). On April 23rd, however, when Lacroix 
told the Czechoslovak government of the importance which Paris 
attached to the Czech-Soviet military negotiations, he was told that 
it had been decided to postpone such talks .until the French position 
was clear (52).
Coulondre, for his part, had continued to press for the initiation of 
tripartite talks and was therefore pleased when, during a visit to 
Paris, he was finally instructed by Bonnet on May 20th to open talks 
with the Soviet military authorities. On 23rd May Coulondre submitted 
a text outlining the envisaged procedure of the talks, being careful 
to stress that "en vue d ’éviter des reactions inopportunes a 1 ’étranger, 
les conversations conserveront un caractère secret et auront toujours 
lieu a deux : entretiens tchéco-français, tchéco-sovietiques, franco- 
sovietiques" (53). The text was cautiously approved by Daladier and 
officials at the Quai, and by a suddenly hesitant Bonnet. Indeed,
Bonnet’ssupport for the project was extremely short-lived : almost as 
soon as he returned to Moscow Coulondre noted a distinct lack of 
interest from Paris which he was at a loss to understand, until on July 
1st he received a report from Osuski, the Czechoslovak Minister to Paris,
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which stated that "Le gouvernement français ne donne pas suite, pour 
le moment, aux projets de conversations militaires franco-soviétiques 
pour ne pas éveiller les susceptibilités des conservateurs anglais". 
Coulondre concluded that a remark made during his visit to Paris, 
transmitted by Genevieve Tabouis to Polyakoff of the Daily Telegraph 
had succeeded in alerting the British government to the possibility of 
a Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet military accord (54).
In fact, very late on the evening of May 22nd, the British Ambassador 
to Paris had communicated to Bonnet a telegram from Lord Halifax, which 
warned that "if the French government were to assume that His Majesty’s 
Government would at once take joint military action with them to 
preserve Czechoslovakia against German aggression, it is only fair to 
warn them that our statements do not warrant any such assumption" (55). 
Thus the French government was made fully aware that even if she were to 
concert her action to -save Czechoslovakia with the USSR, she could 
expect no support from Great Britain. Bonnet was quick to respond, 
agreeing to put any pressure on the Czechoslovak government which 
Britain thought desirable, and even suggesting that "if Czechoslovakia 
were really unreasonable the French might well declare that France 
considered herself released from her bond" (56). Thus Bonnet was 
acquiescing to a policy laid down with extreme clarity by Halifax 
to Phipps on June 17th. Believing that "it may well be the root of 
the German-Czech difficulty is not so much the situation of the German 
population in Czechoslovakia as the foreign relations of Czechoslovakia 
and, in particular the undertakings of assistance she has received from 
and given to France and the Soviet Union", Halifax proposed that "in 
order to satisfy what is reasonable in Germany’s complaint and at the 
same time to reduce the liability of France’s being called upon to
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honour her treaty obligations", Czechoslovakia should be "invited" to 
"remodel" her treaty relations with France, Great Britain and the USSR: 
this would include Czechoslovakia being relieved of her obligations to 
go to the assistance of France or the Soviet Union in the event of an 
attack by Germany, which would have the effect of reducing the 
probability of France and so Russia, having to fulfil their undertakings 
to Czechoslovakia (57). It is difficult to believe, that Czechoslovakia 
would have been inclined to believe that such a plan would improve her 
own security.
In spite of the lukewarm reception in Paris, however,Czechoslovak 
representatives continued to pressurise France throughout 1938. On 
July 12th Benes once again raised the question of tripartite negotiations 
in a discussion with Faucher. His policy had, he stressed, always been 
to subordinate Czechoslovakia's actions to those of France, but he felt 
that there was danger in the uncertainty of the military collaboration 
with the Soviet Union, and he wondered if "le moment serait maintenant 
venu d ’examiner, comme nous y avions pense autrefois, en commun,quelle 
attitude nous pourrions avoir vis-a-vis de 1 ’état-major de Moscou, 
quelles propositions nous pourrions leur faire après nous êtres 
concertes, Paris et Prague" (58) In particular, Benes proposed that 
the French government respond favourably to Soviet requests for the 
participation of the Schneider firm in her naval armaments programme, 
stressing that the Italians were likely to win the order if France 
refused. On the 18th July Gamelin sent a record of this conversation 
to Daladier with the comment that this was a matter for diplomatic 
study, that is, for the National Defence Ministry in conjunction with 
the Marine (59).
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Daladier in his turn consulted Bonnet, who replied on August 12th 
that the Czech and French military attaches in Moscow, in conjunction 
with the Ambassadors, should work out the suggestions ultimately to be 
made to the Soviet military authorities. Then, he hoped, conversations 
would be undertaken between Czech and Soviet technicians, with the 
French military and air attaches intervening eventually at a moment 
judged opportune by the Embassy, thus avoiding all tripartite negot­
iations (60). Daladier informed Gamelin on the 20th that it was 
necessary to organise preliminary conversations between the French and 
Czech Staffs, and on the 22nd, that is, six weeks after Benes' original 
enquiry. Faucher was informed that the project had been accepted on 
condition that the talks were exclusively between Franch and Czecho­
slovakia and in the utmost secrecy (61). Finally, on August 30th, 
General Fiala, accompanied by General Faucher, met representatives 
of the French Staff in Paris for the long-awaited talks. However, the 
minutes of this interview indicate that its scope was limited : it was 
merely decided that in order to study, together, the value of Soviet 
military aid, both the French and Czech Staffs should establish a 
synthesis of the information in their possession on the military and 
aerial potential of the USSR and the methods of execution ; the results 
would then be compared, and any differences dicussed, at a later meeting 
(62). This second meeting, it seems, never took place.
Such an exchange as this was hardly what the Czechs, Soviets, and those 
such as Pierre Cot envisaged when they spoke of tripartite negotiations, 
but it was the closest the French government came to an attempt to 
activate the Franco-Czech-Soviet security system. Moreover, even if an 
exchange of information between the Czech and French Staffs on the Red 
Army might have been a useful preliminary, such discussions could have
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been held at any time from 1935 onwards, rather than waiting until 
August 1938. The obvious conclusion of the French failure to accept 
the role envisaged by Czechoslovakia and Russia was to create an 
atmosphere which made the Munich agreement possible in September 1938. 
After years of political and military collaboration with Czechoslovakia, 
and despite repeated assurances that France would honour her obligations, 
the French government agreed at Munich to a plan whereby the Czecho­
slovaks were to begin, on October 1st, the evacuation of all territory 
where, according to German claims, more than 50% of the population was 
German : this was to be completed by the 10th October. In other words, 
the French government accepted the German dismemberment of the Czecho­
slovak state.
Daladier seems to have recognised that France was betraying her Czech 
ally,but faced with a General Staff assuring him that France could not 
fight, and fully aware that no support could be forthcoming from Britain, 
who had long since made clear her lack of interest in the problems of 
Central and Eastern Europe, Daladier had little choice. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that the French government gave any credence to 
the repeated assurances from Russia that she would march on behalf of 
Czechoslovakia if France did, that is, she would fulfil her obligations 
under the terms of the Czech-Soviet Pact, Whether or not Russia was 
sincere in this may well never be known, since it is quite possible 
that she was convinced that France would do nothing, and thus hoped 
to escape any action herself. The Soviet position certainly won the 
everlasting gratitude of President Benes, on the other hand, who insisted 
after the war that Russia had been the only power who had wanted to 
crush Germany for her violation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 (63),though 
his opinion could derive from Czechoslovakia's bitterness at being
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abandoned by her other ally, France. Furthermore, the Czechoslovaks 
had been noted throughout the 1930's for their optimistic praise of 
the Soviet Military, and unbounded confidence in Soviet loyalty.
On the one hand positive action on Czechoslovakia's behalf by the 
French government would certainly have brought stronger pressure to 
bear on the Soviets, possibly forcing them to act : on the other, the 
Russians could be forgiven if they showed a certain disinterest in the 
fate of Czechoslovakia since they were not even invited to the 
Conference at which it was decided, while it was possible to argue from 
a purely technical point of view that the tripartite security system 
in which Czechoslovakia had such confidence need not have come into 
operation as a result of Munich : Hitler could not be designated an 
agressor since France, Great Britain and Italy had given their official 
approval of his plans for Czechoslovakia. But the "shameful relief" 
which Blum felt when he first heard of the agreement was surely indic­
ative of the deterioration of the French position in Europe : the 
sacrifice of Czechoslovakia was a moral surrender by the French govern­
ment and a complete violation of the spirit which had led to the creation 
of the French security system, and had been particularly symbolised by 
the Franco-Soviet Pact.
Indeed, although Georges Bonnet declares that "le pacte franco-soviétique 
sort donc intact des accords de Munich et il garde toute sa portée"
(64), others were immediately aware of the potential practical con­
sequences of the agreement for the future of Franco-Soviet relations.
The German Counsellor in Moscow, von Tippelskirch, reported on October 
3rd that, as a result of Munich, Litvinov's policy had become a complete 
fiasco, since faith in the League and collective security had collapsed.
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He estimated that the Kremlin would soon return to the revolutionary 
Comintern line, and added that since France had lost much of her value 
as an ally, the circumstances were considerably more favourable for 
the conclusion of a German-Soviet economic accord (65). Coulondre 
reached the same conclusions. The Soviets had lost all faith in 
collective security, and so "nous devons nous attendre en France a un 
redoublement d'activité du Komintern"; in addition, Moscow no longer 
relied on the Franco-Soviet Pact, preserving it in form only so that 
she would not appear isolated, and would probably now turn towards 
Germany (66).
Although the official Soviet response to Munich was muted and, as 
Coulondre pointed out, the agreement was not followed by an immediate 
Soviet rejection of the Pact, it was clearly regarded as an attempt by 
the four major western powers to isolate Russia in Europe, and the 
Russian press, at least, was free to voice its criticisms : on October 
4th, for example, the Journal de Moscou asked, "who will believe again 
the word of France? Who will remain her ally? Why would the French 
government, which has just annuled 'of her own accord', her Pact with 
Czechoslovakia, respect the Franco-Soviet Pact?" (67). At Munich France 
not only lost thirty-five Czechoslovak army divisions, and any remaining 
prestige in the eyes of Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia, who now re­
doubled their frantic attempts to reach a settlement with Germany : in 
addition, as Coulondre bitterly pointed out,"pour autant que nous ayons 
jamais trouve l'URSS, on peut considérer que nous l'avons perdue a 
Munich" (68).
* * * * * * * * * *
-  246 -
REFERENCES
1) Faucher testimony in Commission, V pp.1191-1193
2) League of Nations Treaty Series, 25th Jan.1924
3) LNTS. Vol.54, p.289
4) Mares, Antoine. "La faillite des relations franco-tchécoslovaques
la mission militaire française a Prague,1926-38" 
in Revue d'histoire de la 2e guerre mondiale.
No.28, 1978, p.52
5) Etat-Major de L'Armée de l'Air, 2B 98: Franco-Czechoslovak 
aviation collaboration, 1933-8
6) FO 371/20378, R3673/1799/12
7) LNTS, Vol. CLIX pp.347-61
8) MAE, Z978 : Telegram from Alphand, 11th June 1935
9) Ibid. Z980 : Telegram from Naggiar, 14th October 1935
10) Blum testimony in Commission, I. p. 127
11) FO 371/20378, R6032/1799/12
12) Cited in Reynaud, Coeur, op.cit. pp.80-2
13) FO 371/20378, R4388/2172/12
14) FO 371/20385, R 5 6 8 6 /1 6 4 4 / 6 7
15) FO 371/20384, R 5 8 4 3 /5 7 8 /6 7
16) Ibid. R6320/578/67 - see Map. Appendix III, p. 305
17) Ibid
18) Schweisguth papers : 351/AP3, dossier 10
memento 10th December 1936
19) MAE, Z977 : Telegram from Berlin, 17th May 1935
20) DGFP, C, IV, No.105
21) DBFP, 2nd, VIII, No.166
22) FO 371/19889, C1681/4/18
23) DDF, 2e, II, No.3
24) EMA/2e, 7N3124 : François-Poncet to Delbos, 19th June 1936
-  247 -
25) FO 371/20376, R1371/1162/12
26) DBFP, 2nd, XVIII, N o . 160
27) FO 371/19889, 01807/4/18
28) Schweisguth, 351/AP3/9 : Memento 4th June 1936
29) DGFP, C, V, N o . 392
30) Ibid. No.427
31)  DGFP, D, II, N o . 262
32) FO 371/21128, R2554/188/12
33) FO 371/20376, R1814/1162/12
34) Ibid. R1983/1162/12
35) Ibid. R1681/1162/12
36) See above p.231
37) DDF, 2e, II, No.3
38) Ibid. Vol.Ill, N o .496
39) Mares, op.cit. p.57
40) DDF, 2e, IX
41) Ibid. Vol.Ill, N o . 361
42) Faucher, testimony in Commision V, p.1198
43) DDF, 2e, IX, N o . 256
44) Schweisguth, 351/AP3/10 : Memento, 23rd October 1936
45) Faucher, testimony in Commission V p.1199
46) Schweisguth, 351/AP3/9 : Memento, 2nd July 1936
47) Leon Blum, op.cit. p.367
48) Cot. op.cit. p.36
49) Ibid. p.363
50) DDF, 2e, II, No.369
51) Ibid. Vol.iX, No.199
52) Ibid. N o . 223
53) Coulondre op.cit. p.143
-  248 -
54) Ibid. p.153
55) DBFP 3rd. I, No.271
56) Ibid. No.286
57) Ibid. No.421
58) Faucher : testimony in Commission V P.1199
59) EMA/2e, 7N3131 : Gamelin to Daladier, 18th July 1938
60) DDF, 2e, X, No.372
61) Mares, op.cit.p.57
62) DDF, 2e, X, No.505
63) Benes Ou vont les slaves? p.207
64) Bonnet, op.cit. p.339
65) DGFP, D, IV, No.476
66) Coulondre, op.cit. p.165
67) Cited in William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic
p. 388
68) Coulondre, op.cit. p.164
-  249 -
CHAPTER 11
THE PACT AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING SOVIET-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT
It could be argued that the Popular Front government should not be 
criticised for failing to make the Franco-Soviet Pact a positive and 
effective factor in the maintenance of European peace, since it was 
never intended that the Pact should play anything more than a purely 
negative role, that it, to prevent Russia from returning to a policy 
of collaboration with Germany. Certainly this aim was uppermost in 
the minds of French negotiators of the Pact, who had been fully aware 
of the danger to France of the Soviet-German contacts which had taken 
place during the 1920*s. Under the Rapallo treaty, signed in April 
1922 and confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1926, Germany and the 
Soviet Union had undertaken to consult each other on all political 
and economic problems concerning them both, and to remain neutral if 
the other were attacked by a third power. More importantly, secret 
military clauses meant that throughout the 1920’s Germany was able to 
train military forces, forbidden to her under Versailles, on Russian 
soil, and import quantities of raw materials from Russia, while in 
return the Red Army received German technical assistance. Although 
the accession of the violently anti-Russian Hitler to power was 
immediately followed by assurances on both sides that relations would 
remain unchanged, the Reichstag fire and the dissolution of the German 
Communist Party meant that relations soon became strained, and it 
seems that in mid-1933, at Soviet instigation, military contacts between 
the two ceased (1)„
The importance of the deterioration in Soviet-German relations and the
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subsequent Soviet policy of entente with the western democracies was 
readily appreciated by the French government, whose predominant concern 
was that Germany should be denied the vast natural resources of Russia. 
Thus, when in early 1934 the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, Dovgaleski, 
proposed a close Franco-Soviet alliance, Barthou admitted that "if we 
do not take advantage of it, we would be throwing the Soviets into the 
arms of the Germans (2). Once undertaken, it was necessary to continue 
with the negotiations, since to drop them would be, according to the 
journalist Pertinax, "to restore to the Treaty of Rapallo and the Russo- 
German agreement of April 1926 all the vigour that Hitler’s madness had 
stripped them of". He added that the most important tangible result 
of the Franco-Soviet negotiations was that "the Reichswehr had been 
definitely cut off from Russia’s formidable reservoir of raw materials 
and manpower" (3)
In view of the value to Germany of Russian natural resources, the
negative role of the Franco-Soviet Pact was certainly of paramount
importance, and was frequently stressed as a justification.(4)'Le Temps’
argued, for example, that it would be a grave error if the Pact were
/
not ratified since "a défaut d ’un tel accord, un nouveau glissement de 
la Russie soviétique vers l ’Allemagne est une éventualité qui ne devrait 
pas être écartée" (5). In fact, although Barthou and Harriot, and 
committed supporters of the policy of rapprochement with the USSR, 
hoped that a Franco-Soviet Pact would also have a positive value,that 
of providing for Soviet military assistance to France in the event of 
a Franco-German war, for many, particularly among the Military, it 
seems that prevention of Soviet-German rapprochement was the sole 
motive for the Pact. General Gamelin believed that because of the 
dangers of a new partition of Poland, and the consequent alteration
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in the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe, "il importait, 
surtout et avant tout, d'éviter une collusion germano-russe" (6), 
while a former member of Weygand’s Staff, Colonel de Lattre de Tassigny, 
explained that France, in her policy of rapprochement-with the USSR, 
intended to commit herself only sufficiently to neutralise Russia and 
to deny her resources to Germany (7). General Schweisguth, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, told the British Military Attaché in April 1936 that 
"the sole factor which had carried weight with the French General Staff 
was that they could not afford to allow Russia and Germany to combine", 
and also claimed that according to Leger, "le Quai d ’Orsay n ’a jamais 
été partisan du rapprochement avec la Russie que pour éviter la contin­
uation ou la reprise de la politique de Rapallo" (9). Since this was 
apparently the main, indeed possibly the only, reason for Franco-Soviet 
rapprochement, it is therefore necessary to examine the value of the 
Pact as it existed in May 1935, and as it remained throughout the next 
three years, in the same terms as those in which it was originally 
conceived, and in which even opponents of the Pact were inclined to 
agree that it might have a role to play : that is, how far the Franco- 
soviet Pact was an effective means of preventing a return to Rapallo.
The French government was well aware that important elements within 
both Germany and Russia continued to favour rapprochement, in spite of 
the antagonism between the two governments. Official German policy 
towards Russia was at best reserved. In 1934 the German Ambassador 
to Moscow, Rudolph Nadolny, whose overriding personal ambition was to 
restore cordial relations between Germany and the USSR, returned to 
Berlin with his own proposals for a rapprochement. Incensed by Hitler’s 
refusal even to conisder his proposals, Nadolny resigned (10). He was 
replaced by Count von Schulenberg, a close friend of the Foreign
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Minister, von Neurath, who instructed the new Ambassador to keep open 
all possibilities without antagonising anyone, but without ever taking 
the initiative : for the next six years, von Schulenberg followed this 
policy faithfully (11). In fact, the German anti-Soviet policy seems 
to have been very strongly identified with Hitler personally, whom 
both General Blomberg and Goering saw as the sole obstacle to rapproche­
ment between the two (12). A typical example of Hitler's attitude 
towards the Soviets was his refusal in January 1936 to receive the 
Soviet General,Tukhachevsky, who was passing through Berlin after 
representing Russia at the funeral of George V in London : he also
forbade any of the Military to establish any contact with him (13).
And yet, in spite of Hitler's uncompromising opposition to Soviet 
Russia, considerable sympathy for the USSR persisted, particularly in 
military circles. In April 1937 the French Ambassador identified three 
major areas of support for Soviet-German rapprochement : among 
diplomats who remained faithful to the Bismarckian tradition of foreign 
policy, industrialists who saw the USSR as the best market for German 
products, and who were particularly concerned by the loss of Russian 
supplies of manganese and petrol, and members of the General Staff who 
had established close ties with the Red Army during the 1920*s (14).
When members of the Estonian General Staff visited Berlin in December 
1936 both Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch indicated that the 
Reichswehr was strongly in favour of rapprochement with the USSR (15), 
and there were suggestions that Field-Marshal Goering preferred Russia 
to Italy as a potential ally (16). It is significant, moreover, that 
the German Military was represented in Moscow by General Koestring, 
who replaced the lesser-ranked Colonel Hartmann in 1935, since Koestring 
had been brought up in Russia and was a much-respected expert on Soviet 
military affairs (17). Moreover, before leaving Berlin Koestring was
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instructed by Generals Fritsch and Beck, as well as by General von 
Stulpnagel, head of the military attaches section, to try and improve 
relations between the two armies (18). Indeed, the British Military 
Attache believed that "the General Staff still hope that they may 
eliminate Herr Hitler's other advisors as they eliminated Captain 
Roehm. If and when this happens I feel confident that their objective 
is to come to an understanding with Russia" (19). Similarly, an 
important official at the Foreign Office declared to the American 
Ambassador in February 1936 that he and others at the Wilhelmstrasse 
were actually working for an improvement in Soviet-German relations, 
adding that "the last word has not been said on both sides" (20).
In the same way it was recognised that influential sections of opinion 
in Russia favoured a return to Rapallo. Karl Radek, for example, the 
journalist with the responsibility for preparing the Russian public 
for the change in foreign policy in 1934-5, privately told Krivitsky 
that "only fools can imagine we could ever break with Germany" (21)and 
frequently emphasised that nothing could permanently block Russia's 
road to friendship with that country (22). Moreover, on several 
occasions Soviet officials publicly expressed regret at the deteriora­
tion in Soviet-German relations. At a regional party conference in 
January 1934, Kaganovitch lamented that Hitler's policies were com­
pelling the Soviet government to discontinue its dealings with Germany, 
while in his speech to the Seventh Congress of Soviets in January 1935 
Molotov said that even the Nazi doctrine of a German master race need 
constitute no obstacle to mutually friendly relations. Gustav Hilger, 
an official at the German Embassy in Moscow, found among many Soviet 
leaders "a deep and lasting nostalgia for the old days of German-Soviet 
collaboration" (23), but says that nowhere was this nostalgia stronger
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than among the army officers. In October 1933, for example, 
Tukhachevsky told the German charge, von Twardowski, that in spite 
of recent political developments, the sympathy and goodwill of his 
fellow officers towards the Reichswehr had not in any way diminished, 
and that the German Army's invaluable aid in building up Russia's 
forces during the 1920's would always be remembered (24). Indeed, in 
Russia as in Germany, it was among those who had collaborated under 
Rapallo that sentiment in favour of rapprochement was strongest.
Marshal Egorov, who had collaborated closely with the Reichswehr in 
the 20’s, was recognised by the 2e bureau as the strongest exponent 
of a policy of rapprochement within the Red Army : General von 
Blomberg indicated that the German Staff placed its greatest hopes on 
the possibility of Egorov establishing a pro-German military dictator­
ship and the Estonian Chief of Staff, General Laidoner, a former Staff 
officer in the Tsarist army and as such an associate of Egorov,warned 
the French Minister to Tallinn that the realisation of German hopes 
was not unlikely (25). There was also a strong belief within French 
and British Intelligence circles that the pro-German tendency among 
the Soviet Military was actually led by the Soviet Chief of Staff, 
Marshall Vorochilov (26).
Fully aware of the tendencies towards rapprochement already existing 
in Moscow and Berlin, the French government also received a considerable 
amount of information concerning Soviet-German contacts during this 
period. Officially the negotiations were of only a commercial nature.
In April 1936 a fairly routine trade agreement was signed with the aim 
of reviving the traffic of merchandise between the two countries, but 
the agreement was surrounded by rumours : the French Embassy in Moscow 
reported that Germany, anxious to obtain supplies of Russian petrol.
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manganese and wood, had offered a credit of one milliard marks, re­
imbursable after a five year delay (27), while the Berlin Embassy 
suggested a figure of 500 million marks (28). Similarly, in December 
1937 the 2e bureau received information that the German government had 
recently offered a credit of three milliard marks to Russia, the 
greatest part of which was to be subscribed by the Krupps firm (29).
On January 22nd 1938 the British Ambassador learnt from a member of 
the German Embassy in Moscow that the German government had offered 
a credit of 200 milliard marks, Goering having apparently decided 
that Germany could not afford to sacrifice to ideological prejudices 
the immense possibilities offered by the USSR both as a market for 
German products and a source of raw materials; but, the informant 
added, there could be no political rapprochement (30).
That such negotiations existed is confirmed by German sources. In 
July 1938 a German Foreign Office memorandum explained that in order 
to secure from the Soviet Union the flow of raw materials which 
Germany so badly needed, negotiations had been opened with the Soviet 
Trade Mission in March for the granting of a large credit to the USSR 
for the purchase of German-finished goods : by July the negotiations 
had still not been concluded because of "dilatory treatment by the 
Soviets" (31). In February 1939 the Director of the Economic Policy 
Department noted that on the orders of Goering and with the agreement 
of von Ribbentrop negotiations had been in progress for some time, 
with the aim of increasing German imports of raw materials from the 
USSR. The current offer was for a credit of 200 million reichsmarks 
to be granted if the USSR undertook to make definite deliveries of 
raw materials to Germany during 1939-40, amounting to a value of 300 
million marks (32), but on this occasion the negotiations were broken 
off by the German government, which felt that the German export
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capacity was not sufficient to supply the Russian orders (33).
Since the commercial accord which had been rumoured for so long was 
not actually signed until August 1939 (only days before the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact), it might be supposed that the Russians were indeed very 
unwilling to respond to German pressure. For example, when Eden 
visited Moscow in April 1935 Stalin, denying that the Soviet govern­
ment had ever made the first approach, described how the German govern­
ment had recently begged for Soviet orders, offering a credit of 
200,000 marks. In order to test German sincerity the Soviets had 
included in their lists of orders some important contracts for war 
material, and were astonished when the Germans accepted. Eden,however, 
was sceptical of this astonishment since, as he had learnt when visit­
ing the Junkers aircraft factory near Moscow, there had been many such 
orders before (34).
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the initiative for a 
political, rather than purely economic, rapprochement came from the 
Russians rather than the Germans. Gustav Hilger claims that in July 
1935 the head of the Soviet Trade Delegation to Berlin, David Kandelaki, 
thought to be one of the few people in Stalin's confidence, abruptly 
asked Schacht in the middle of routine commercial negotiations whether 
it would not be possible to improve political relations between the 
two countries (35). Hitler is said to have rejected the proposal, but 
indicated that it might be more acceptable if the Soviet Union were 
to move away from the idea of international communism and towards 
the establishment of an absolute despotism, preferably under the 
Military (36). The Russians continued to press the issue until the 
end of 1935, but in the face of Hitler's opposition gradually lost
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interest (37). In early 1937 the initiative was renewed when on 
January 29th Kandelaki delivered to Schacht a verbal proposal from 
Stalin and Molotov that the Soviet and German governments should open 
direct negotiations. On February 10th the proposals were conveyed 
to Hitler, and on the 11th von Neurath informed Schacht that no 
practical result could emerge from pursuing the Soviet suggestion(38).
Many observers believed that it was Hitler, and not Stalin, who was the 
real obstacle to Soviet-German rapprochement. Krivitsky, the Chief 
of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe at that time, 
maintains that the consistent aim of Stalin's foreign policy through­
out the 1930's was to come to an agreement with Germany, indeed "the 
true picture of their relations was that of a persistent suitor who 
would not be discouraged by rebuffs. Stalin was the suitor" (39). 
Krivitsky suggests that the Nazi victory only strengthened Stalin's 
desire for entente, since his overriding belief was that it is essential 
to come to terms with a superior power, and the whole of Soviet policy 
throughout these years is interpreted as a series of manoeuvres 
designed to improve Russia's bargaining position. Thus Soviet entry 
into the League, rapprochement with the western democracies and policy 
in Spain, were all intended to put pressure on Germany to reach an 
agreement with Russia (40). Although these claims were written when 
Krivitsky was in America after breaking with Stalin, and as such 
should be treated with some caution, they seem to be confirmed by 
other sources. The Polish Ambassador to Moscow between 1932 and 1936, 
Lukasiewicz, got the impression that any possible German-Soviet 
understanding would depend on Hitler entirely, since Stalin was always 
ready to come to an agreement (41), while the Finnish Ambassador in 
Moscow said he believed that "Russia would end in half an hour the
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agreement with France, if only Germany would sign a Pact" (42)
Similarly, a Polish Army Chief told the French Ambassador in December 
1937 that a possible Soviet-German entente "ne depend que des 
Allemands" (43).
Although the French government could not have known Stalin's personal 
views on Soviet policy towards Germany, they were obviously aware of 
the various rumours circulating about the possibility of Soviet-German 
rapprochement. In April 1937, only weeks after the Kandelaki demarche 
in Berlin, 'L'Ordre', the 'Petit Parisien' and the 'Manchester Guardian' 
simultaneously published information regarding a direct Soviet approach 
to Germany, which was thought to derive from articles in the Czechos­
lovak and Polish press (44). Immediate denials were issued in the 
Russian and German press, the latter claiming that the rumours were 
the work of the Soviets themselves and thos countries "seeking to 
justify in this way their own collaboration with bolshevism" (45). 
Perhaps in response to this scare the 2e bureau prepared a memorandum 
on April 16th examining the possibility of Soviet-German rapprochement. 
It was noted, for example, that the German press had recently begun to 
adopt a more moderate tone towards Russia, and that the Soviet press 
had begun to concentrate its attacks on Italy rather than Germany.
Also, in November Goering had told Ward Price of the 'Daily Mail' that 
"the Russian army is constantly proposing that we bury our ideological 
quarrels and divide the world between Nazism and Bolshevism", while 
during a visit to Berlin the Japenese Ambassador to Rome, M.Sugimura, 
was told by German leaders that the Rapallo treaty "est toujours en 
vigeur". The note concluded that while there were no actual facts to 
support claims of Soviet-German contacts, there was certainly evidence 
of a growing desire among the Reichswehr and the Red Army for improved 
relations (46).
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The possible existence of Soviet-German military contacts seemed to be 
dramatically confirmed by the news in June 1937 that Marshal Tukhachevsky 
and seven Red Army Generals had been arrested and executed on charges 
of treason : they were specifically charged with having indulged in 
counter-revolutionary sabotage at Trotsky's instigation on behalf of 
enemy powers, by implication, Germany and Japan (47). Stalin's motive 
in extending the purge to the armed forces, and thus undermining Soviet 
military strength, have ever since been a subject of debate, but is is 
now generally agreed that the charge of collaboration with Germany was 
completely false. It now seems probable that Stalin himself passed on 
information alleging contacts between the Soviet Generals and the 
Reichswehr to Heydrich of the SD via a double agent named Skobline.
An incriminating dossier of 'evidence' was then prepared by Heydrich 
and fed back to the OGPU, possibly by deliberately leaking the inform­
ation to the Czechoslovak government (48). Certainly, Benes warned 
Leon Blum at the end of 1936 that "les dirigeants du grand etat-major 
soviétique entretenaient avec l'Allemagne des relations suspectes"(49), 
and he later told Churchill that the Czechoslovak police had passed all
their information on to the Russians (50).
A slightly different interpretation is given by Krivitsky who maintains 
that the conspiracy was planned at least six months before the alleged 
discovery of the plot. The evidence itself was, he believed, completely 
faked by the Gestapo who passed it through the "Goutchkov circle" (a 
very active group of White Russians who had intimate links with German 
Military Intelligence), to General Miller, a White Russian emigre 
living in Paris. The intermediary, Skobline, was a member of Miller's 
group but also an OGPU agent, and so the information was filtered back
to Stalin. Since Miller was one of the few who knew of Stalin's
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involvement, says Krivitsky, Stalin then had him liquidated, which 
accounts for his disappearance in September 1937 (51). The Russians 
themselves, on the other hand, claimed that the information had been 
supplied by the French government : Potemkin argued that the 2e bureau 
had had evidence of an army plot since February 1937 (52).
Whatever the truth behind the ’Tukhachevsky plot’, the French government 
was naturally alarmed by the possibility of Soviet-German military 
contacts. On 27th June, for example, the French were disturbed to learn 
that the British government had information suggesting that General 
Kork, one of the executed Generals, had indeed been in treasonable 
correspondence with the Reichswehr, and there were indications that 
the Germans were alarmed at the speed with which the negotiations had 
been broken (53). But while Blum claimed that it was Benes’ warning 
which had caused him to abandon his hopes of Franco-Soviet military 
contacts (54), it seems that once the conspiracy became known in June 
the accusations were given very little credibility, either in France 
or elsewhere. The U.S.Ambassador to Moscow, Joseph Davies, was virtually 
the only foreign observer to believe that the charges might actually 
be true. Believing that Stalin was a ’’clean-living, modest, retiring, 
single-purposed man with a one-track mind, devoted to communism and the 
elevation of the proletariat", Davies reported to the Secretary of State 
that the Soviet government had felt threatened by a counter-revolutionary 
conspiracy which had the support of the foreign enemies of the Soviet 
Union, and so had been forced to act accordingly (55). This view was 
not shared by the other members of the American Embassy, who felt that 
Davies’ training in American law had made him rely too heavily on the 
appearance of public trials, although the sole ’evidence’ used was that 
of a series of monotonous confessions by the accused : no documentary
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evidence was produced. Five days before Davies addressed the above to 
the Secretary of State the American charge, Henderson, had written 
that not a single foreign observer of any value in Moscow believed 
that the officers were guilty of the crimes attributed to them (56).
In February 1938 the Czechoslovak Military Attache to Moscow, Colonel 
Dastich, told Henderson that he had never found any confirmation of 
the charges that Tukhachevsky and his colleagues were in the service 
of a foreign government and had never believed that they were (57). 
Similarly, the Italian Ambassador to Germany, who had formerly been 
the Ambassador to Moscow, Hernando Attolico, believed that Tukhachevsky 
could not possibly be accused of treason towards his country (58),while 
the Moscow Chancery of the British Embassy denied that any of the 
liquidated Soviet Generals could have been in German pay (59).
Naturally enough, the French were particularly alarmed at the suggestion 
of Soviet-German military contacts, but after considerably analysis, 
reached similar conclusions. The military attaché in Moscow,Lieutenant- 
Colonel Simon, believed that the accused were neither in contact with 
foreign powers, nor plotting to overthrow Stalin (60), pointing out 
that Vorochilov had escaped the Purge even though he had apparently 
been responsible for appointing traitors as the heads of the White 
Russian and Kiev military districts, the Military Academy and the 
Ossoaviakhim. Simon concluded that the trials were essentially 
political, possibly due to Tukhachevsky's opposition to the newly- 
created military councils (61). Coulondre agreed, believing that 
Stalin’s motive was to remove all potential, rather than actual, 
opposition, and that Tukhachevsky and the others had merely been too 
free with their criticism (62).
After years of close military collaboration with the German Staff, it
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was probable that Tukhachevsky and the Generals, most of whom had been 
trained at the German General Staff College during the 1920's, had 
retained considerable admiration for the Reichswehr, and might have 
wised to see an improvement in German-Soviet relations (63), but this 
did not mean that they were in treasonable correspondence with the 
German Staff. Moreover, paradoxically, Tukhachevsky was generally 
regarded as a francophile while the two leaders considered by the 
French, as well as the Germans themselves, as being the most pro-German, 
Egorov and Vorochilov, escaped any connection with the affair. Hilger 
believes that it is absurd to suggest that the Generals were in 
treasonable correspondence with the Reichswehr since any feelers which 
they might have put out had the approval of the highest Soviet Chiefs 
of State and, moreover, Tukhachevsky had been one of the first to warn 
against the German danger and to endorse the Litvinov-policy (64). 
Similarly, King Carol of Roumania gave no credence to the accusations, 
but warned that a Soviet-German detente was in fact possible under the 
leadership of Vorochilov (65), while Krivitsky even claims that 
Tukhachevsky and the others were arrested as German spies at the very 
time when Stalin himself was negotiating with Hitler (66).
Some observers did indeed recognise that the Tukhachevsky affair, while 
it did not indicate the existence of Soviet-German contacts, did not, 
on the other hand, preclude the possibility of rapprochement taking 
place. Coulondre, for example, while disbelieving the accusations 
against the Generals, nevertheless saw sufficient evidence in Moscow to 
warn Paris repeatedly of Soviet-German detente. He cited, for instance, 
the silence of the Soviet press, which during 1935 and 1936 had been 
full of invective against the Nazis; the favour with which Koestring 
was received in army circles, and even by Vorochilov, who was cold
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towards Coulondre; the long meetings between Schulenberg and Litvinov; 
and the acute nervousness of the Baltic Ministers in Moscow (67). 
Similarly, the French charge, M.Payart, warned in late 1936 that the 
deterioration in Soviet-German relations was not the result of differ­
ences in ideology, but rather the Soviet fear of German rearmament 
which would create an inequality of forces between the two countries, 
and he concluded that, "il convient de ne pas perdre de vue que le jour, 
s'il devait venir, ou l'URSS aurait une armée puissante et un potentiel 
économique correspondent, les raisons qui l'avaient fait renoncer a la 
politique de Rapallo ne subsisterait plus" (68). In particular, 
Coulondre warned that if the French were to water down the Pact in any 
important respect, then the Soviet Union would throw herself into the 
arms of Germany rather than risk having to fight her single-handed(69).
The Russians were evidently anxious to exploit this threat to the full. 
In December 1937, for example, Luciani, the influential Moscow corres­
pondent of the 'Temps', had an interview with Litvinov during which he 
enquired whether the Soviet Union could fairly be described as withdraw­
ing into isolation. Litvinov replied, "Evidemment, puisque en ce 
moment, on ne veut pas de nous. Nous attendrons encore...et puis nous 
verrons". When asked specifically whether Soviet-German detente was 
possible Litvinov replied, "Perfectly !" (70). This thinly-veiled 
threat clearly constituted a Soviet attempt to put pressure on the 
French government to consolidate the Pact; indeed, many of the rumours 
concerning imminent German-Soviet detente were said to have originated 
in Moscow. The British government was particularly sceptical in this 
respect, maintaining throughout that there was little possibility of 
rapprochement as long as Hitler remained in power (71). For example, 
Vansittart saw the scare of 1937 as a deliberate Russian attempt to
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force France into signing a military accord (72), and the German 
Ambassador to Moscow, von Schulenberg, was convinced that Litvinov 
frequently used the bogey of rapprochement with Germany in order to 
activate Soviet relations with France (73). This was undoubtedly 
true, but the aspect which seems to have been overlooked,particularly 
by the French themselves, was that such threats demonstrated clearly 
the Soviet dissatisfaction with the Pact and with Franco-Soviet 
relations in general, and as such indicated the ever-increasing like­
lihood of Soviet-German rapprochement.
The Germans, on the other hand, believed that exponents of the Pact 
in France used similar methods to justify their support. An interest­
ing case in this respect was the publication in July 1938 of an article 
in the ’Revue des Deux Mondes’ entitled, "After the Moscow trials, 
German-Soviet relations". In this article, Jean de Saint-Chamant 
claimed that the trials had revealed the existence of close relations 
between an anti-Stalinist opposition group and the Reichswehr. 
Tukhachevsky, it was claimed, had taken the opportunity of his visit 
to Berlin after the funeral of George V to establish fresh contacts 
with the German Staff, while another of the accused, the Military 
Attaché to London, General Putna, was known to be in close contact with 
his German colleague (74). While it might be assumed that the purpose 
of this article was to secure France's abandonment of the Pact, the 
German Ambassador in Paris, Count von Welczeck, believed that the 
article was actually written by Georges Luciani with the backing of 
the Quai, and that by suggesting that Germany was trying to establish 
contacts in Russia, the French government was seeking to revive the 
fear of a return to Rapallo. Since the fundamental basis of French 
policy was that "National Socialist Germany must be kept away from
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the Soviet Union's reservoir of raw materials and manpower", the 
article thus represented a plea for the reinforcement of the Franco- 
Soviet Pact (75). Although this interpretation might not seem very 
credible with regard to this particular article, the general con­
clusion which Welczeck was outlining was a perfectly viable one which 
does not, however, seem to have been drawn widely from the 
Tukhachevsky affair. Coulondre was one of the few to argue consist­
ently that if there were indeed a substantial element in Russia which 
favoured rapprochement with Germany, then only consolidation of the 
Pact would ensure that the Litvinov-policy remained dominant.
In November 1937, Delbos told the American Ambassador, William Bullitt, 
that "he doubted the wisdom of abandoning the Soviet Union at this 
moment as he still feared greatly that Germany and the Soviet Union 
would come to an immediate agreement if France should abandon Russia 
altogether" (76). This sttitude was based on the erroneous assumption 
which persisted throughout this period that the mere existence of a 
mutual assistance pact with France, devoid of any military content, 
would be sufficient to prevent a return to Rapallo if such a policy 
were in Russia's interests. In April 1938, for example, a Departmental 
note at the Quai d'Orsay claimed that "l'existence du pacte franco- 
soviétique a précisément servi de frein jusqu'ici a ce courant german­
ophile" (77). It is even now difficult to ascertain the full extent 
of Soviet-German negotiations during the 1930's, but it seems certain 
that a measure of contact was maintained throughout. During the ten 
years of the Rapallo era the Russians had not only established strong 
links with the Reichswehr, but had also received much valuable military 
and technical aid, and the loss of this assistance was undoubtedly 
felt severely. The Soviet hope was that France should become a
- 266 -
replacement while at the same time, fully aware of the very real 
danger posed by Nazi Germany’s expansionist aims, the Soviet govern­
ment sought to reinforce her own security by a policy of collaboration 
with the western democracies, and in particular with France. As early 
as April 1937, Paul Reynaud had justified his advocacy of a military 
agreement by warning that "il ne servirait de rien aux hommes légers 
qui raisonnent avec leurs nerfs de verser des larmes de sang le jour 
ou la Russie tomerait d ’accord avec l ’Allemagne, ce qui n ’est pas 
peril imaginaire" (78). Indeed, once it became fully apparent that 
the policy of rapprochement with France held little practical value, 
either in political or military terms, the Soviet Union returned to 
the very policy which the Pact had been designed to avoid, but which 
she had carefully maintained as an alternative throughout : that of 
alliance with Nazi Germany.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSION : THE POPULAR FRONT AND THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT
In its relations with the USSR, the Popular Front was subjected to 
considerable outside pressure, often implied rather than explicit, 
which undermined any attempts which might have been made to consolidate 
the Franco-Soviet Pact. It emerged from the Blum government’s 
declaration on foreign policy in June 1936 that policy towards the 
Soviet Union would be developed within the framework of France’s other 
alliances, and so the views of Great Britain, Belgium, Poland and 
the countries of the Little Entente, as well as those of the potential 
enemy, Germany, would naturally have been taken into consideration 
when policy towards the Soviet Union was being formulated. At the 
same time the government found itself obstructed by its own General 
Staff, who advised against further development of the Pact. It is not, 
however, sufficient merely to accept these factors,influential though 
they were, as an explanation of the deterioration in France’s relations 
with the USSR : it is necessary first to examine how far the Popular 
Front governments attempted to overcome these objections, and thus to 
ascertain whether there was, among the Popular Front itself, any real 
will to animate the Franco-Soviet Pact.
To some extent it is difficult to speak of a "Popular Front foreign 
policy", since policy obviously fluctuated in many respects as the 
political composition of the governing coalition shifted towards the 
right after the fall of the first Blum government. There was, however, 
considerable continuity in personnel, particularly in the Foreign and 
Defence Ministries. Yvon Delbos, who became Foreign Minister in June
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1936 under Leon Blum, retained the post during the two Chautemps 
Ministries until he was replaced by the Independent Socialist, Paul- 
Boncour, in the second Blum administration of March 1938; Edouard 
Daladier remained as Minister of National Defence and War until he 
succeeded Blum as Premier in April 1938; Pierre Cot persisted at the 
Air Ministry until January 1938, when he was replaced in the second 
Chautemps government by Guy la Chambre. The most significant changes 
in personnel were the loss of Léon Blum from the head of the government 
returning after his fall in June 1937 only to preside for one month 
during the Austrian crisis of March 1938; the promotion of Chautemps 
who, from Minister of State in the first Blum government, rose to hold 
the office of President du Conseil between June 1937 and March 1938; 
and the growing influence of Georges Bonnet, who was brought back from 
his virtual exile under Blum as Ambassador to the U.S.A. to serve as 
Chautemps' Finance Minister in June 1937 and then, in April 1938, 
Daladier's Foreign Minister, a position he retained until September 
1939. It is therefore in an examination of these key figures that the 
development of any overall "Popular Front foreign policy" is likely to 
emerge.
In their attitude to the USSR, Pierre Cot and, to a lesser extent, Blum 
and Delbos, were initially the most sympathetic. Blum was ever- 
anxious to stress in public that France would always maintain the Pact: 
speaking to the Chamber on December 5th he defended his government’s 
policy unequivocally sayirg "nous avons...entretenu dans sa réalité et
dans sa vérité ce pacte franco-soviétique dont nous ne rougissons pas
et dont personne ici, pas même ses adversaires, ne supporterait,
/ 'n /  A
j ’imagine, qu’une pression etrangere quelconque prétendit nous imposer 
l ’abandon" (1). And yet, only three days earlier, Blum had told
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Philip Jordan of the ’News Chronicle’ that "he wished to see it 
preserved, but not to grow teeth " (2), and in February 1937 the 
British Ambassador reported that "while M.Blum undoubtedly regards 
France as bound by the Franco-Soviet Pact he has, as far as it is 
possible to ascertain, shown himself up to the present opposed to the 
idea of military conversations with the Soviet Union" (3). In fact, 
Blum had already agreed to the initiation of military talks in November 
which suggests that while these comments might have reflected his 
personal feelings, he was nevertheless prepared to make some posiitive 
response to Soviet pressure. His subsequent readiness to abandon the 
attempt as a result of Benes’ warning about the possibility of secret 
Soviet-German military contacts, was almost certainly the result of his 
personal misgivings about the morality of military alliances which he 
had managed to overcome only superficially in response to the growth 
of the Hitlerite menace.
Yvon Delbos, although deeply committed to the cause of peace, does not 
seem to have been troubled by such doubts to the same extent as Blum. 
For him, the most important obstacle preventing consolidation of the 
Pact was the Soviet Union’s continued interference in French domestic 
affairs. Indeed, this issue contributed substantially to his deterior­
ating relationship with Maxim Litvinov. Signs of strain were already 
evident in October 1936 when Litvinov requested to meet Blum at Geneva 
without Delbos being present, a move which was attributed by the 2e 
bureau to differences in policy over Spain, Ethiopia and Danzig : 
"d’ailleurs, M.Delbos ne cache pas son peu d ’enthousiasme pour les 
Soviets" (A). But it was not until early 1938, following Delbos’ tour 
of Central and Eastern Europe from which Moscow was excluded, that the 
mutual bitterness emerged fully. Meeting at Geneva in January,Litvinov
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handed Delbos a list of complaints about French policy, Delbos denied 
that he had told Beck in Warsaw that the Franco-Soviet Pact was un­
popular in France and that it had lost much of its value, as Litvinov 
claimed, and he denied on Chautemps’ behalf a statement attributed to 
the Premier while in London that a reinforcement of the Franco-British 
entente would permit a relaxation in the links between Paris and 
Moscow. In addition, Delbos underlined that France had always refused 
to modify her policy as expressed by the Franco-Soviet Pact, and had 
made no diplomatic demarches likely to influence it without first 
informing the Soviet government and gaining its approval.
Delbos then listed his own complaints. He was angered, he said, by 
the recent virulent attacks on French policy made by Molotov and 
Zhdanov, and remained dissatisfied with Litvinov’s reply that Zhdanov 
was not a member of the government, since he was, after all, the head 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and his assertion that Molotov had 
made no such comments, upon which Delbos produced the text of Molotov’s 
speech. In addition, Delbos pointed out that while in France it was 
the opposition press who attacked the Soviet government, in Russia it 
was the official press who attacked France. His major complaint,however, 
concerned the activities of the French Communist Party. Refusing to 
accept Litvinov’s juridicial distinctions between the Comintern and the 
Soviet government, Delbos insisted that when the Communist Party 
attacked the French government, provoked social agitation and called 
on its militants to make violent demonstrations against members of the 
government, it was acting, under the influence of Moscow, in direct 
contravention of the spirit of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and in so doing 
seriously damaging the chances of improved relations.
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Litvinov, for his part, continued to insist that the Soviet government 
had no control over the activities of foreign communist parties, and 
to lament that the general tone of the French press, of Parliamentary 
debates, and sometimes even the declarations of French Ministers "ne 
donnent point l ’impression que les relations entre les deux pays 
soient telles qu'elles devraient résulter du Pacts d'assistance 
mutuelle que ces pays ont conclu". He also, perhaps surprisingly, 
claimed that the Svoiet government had never pressurised the French 
government for the conclusion of a military accord, as the French press 
claimed, and he asked that the French government take every available 
opportunity to deny this. Delbos agreed, but in his report of the 
meeting added in parentheses that "En réalité-mais je ne puis en faire 
état auprès de M.Litvinov-si le Gouvernement soviétique n'a rien 
demande explicitement, son désir d'un renforcement militaire du pacte 
ne paraît pas douteux" (5).
This "highly acrimonious discussion" (6) is interesting in that it 
demonstrates the extent to which a fundamental and entirely mutual 
distrust still permeated Franco-Soviet relations. To some degree,both 
were justified in their complaints. The Soviets were understandably 
bitter that, in spite of the early promise by Laval that the conclusion 
of the Pact would soon be followed by the initiation of staff talks, 
the French government had failed to show any interest in the further 
consolidation of the Pact : thus, on 24th January 1938, Litvinov, in 
conversation with Luciani of the 'Temps', "took the opportunity to 
deliver a violent diatribe against M.Delbos, adding that if the French 
did not mend their ways, the Soviet government might well be driven 
into the arms of Germany" (7). Similarly, the validity of many of 
Delbos' complaints about the Soviet press, as well as the French
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Communists, could hardly be denied. On 15th January, for example,
’Pravda' had attacked the policy of compromise pursued by the Chautemps
Cabinet in foreign affairs, adding that "Lors de son recent voyage en
/
Europe Centrale et dans les Balkans, M.Delbos s ’est montre impuissant 
a rétablir le prestige de la France dans ces pays’’ (8). At the same 
time, ’L ’Humanité’ launched a violent attack on the Popular Front 
Foreign Minister. In particular it was critical of the government’s 
devotion to England, arguing that ’’après la mésaventure du tour 
d ’amitié, M.Delbos étant ministre, il nous est impossible, a moins 
de nous adresser au F.O., de savoir comment se définit la politique 
de la France’’ (9), and on January 13th it called on the government 
to provide a foreign minister ’’capable de pratiquer une politique 
extérieure démocratique’’ (10). When Delbos finally left the Foreign 
Ministry in March, ’L ’Humanité’ concluded that ’’son eviction salutaire 
est même très certainement le trait le plus heureux du gouvernement 
nouveaux’’ (11 ). As long as such attacks were permitted by Moscow then, 
as Delbos saw it, no further improvement in Franco-Soviet relations 
was possible : from the Russian point of view, such attacks would 
continue until there were signs of an improvement in Franco-Soviet 
relations.
In spite of this belief, however, Delbos clearly never had any 
intention of renouncing the Pact, as Germany hoped. Like Blum,Delbos 
argued in the Chamber that campaigns against the Pact would have no 
effect since ’’c ’est un pacte de paix auquel nous restons attachés et 
auquel les passions politiques ne sauraient enlever ni son caractère, 
ni sa valeur’’ (12), while at St.-Dizier on May 9th 1937, he pleased 
the Soviet press immensely by explaining that he ’’yielded to no-one 
in rendering homage to the desire for peace of the Soivet Union. No-
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one was more determined than he to respect the Franco-Soviet Pact, 
and to preserve its significance" (13). Similarly, in a rare moment 
of accord, Delbos and Litvinov issued a joint communique on the 18th 
May which stated that they had "réaffirme leur fidélité au pacte qui 
unit les deux pays et leur volonté de poursuivre dans le cadre de la 
Société des Nations une loyale politique de collaboration internat­
ionale" (14). Delbos was, however, unwilling to develop the Pact, and 
was thought to be opposed to even the limited negotiations initiated 
by Blum (15). Indeed, Coulondre later recalled that Delbos never 
regarded France's relations with the USSR "avec une particulière 
chaleur" (16), and certainly, the remarkable speed with which he 
accepted British criticisms of military contacts with the Russians, 
does not suggest any personal inclination in favour of consolidating 
the Soviet Pact. It is difficult to ascertain whether Delbos would 
have been fully prepared to develop the Pact even had the Soviets 
been willing to abandon the Comintern, but it remains clear that as 
long as he detected the hand of Moscow in the activities of the French 
Communist Party, then the Popular Front Foreign Minister would 
continue to oppose the extension of the Pact.
Pierre Cot seems to have been totally untroubled by such considerations 
Throughout his term of office at the Air Ministry Cot made every 
attempt to promote the Soviet Pact, urging the government to open 
military talks and trying to facilitate an exchange of information and 
material, but in so doing he incurred considerable hostility and 
criticism not only for the opposition, but also from many of his 
Cabinet colleagues. Indeed, when forming his Ministry in June 1937 
Cot's fellow-Radical, Camille Chautemps, attempted to exclude him from 
the government altogether, and was only prevented from doing so as a
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result of a threat by the Socialist Ministers to withdraw their 
support if Cot were not retained at the Air Ministry (1 7 ). Moreover, 
Cot’s attempts to establish contacts with the Russians were often 
thwarted by party colleagues, and in particular by Daladier. At a 
meeting of the Comite permanent de la Defense Nationale in June 1936 
Cot asked that talks with the Soviets be opened and that a mission be 
sent to the Russian manoeuvres : Daladier dismissed the suggestion(18 ' 
Similarly, Daladier opposed Cot’s plan in October to hold a£.conference 
which would announce the initiation of airforce conversations,saying 
that this was a question which the government must settle first (1 9 ). 
Then, in January 1937, Cot asked Daladier to send to Moscow Colonel 
Mendras and a French airman in order to establish contacts, but 
Daladier refused (20). Pierre Cot’s enthusiastic pursuit of the 
Soviet connection was hardly sufficient in itself to overcome such 
obstructions from within his own government.
As Minister of National Defence Daladier exercised overall control 
over the three Defence Ministries, and as such, his attitude towards 
the Soviet alliance was crucial. Having hesitated even to send a 
mission to the Soviet manoeuvres, he fully approved Schweisguth’s 
interpretation of Soviet motives as well as military strength, and in 
October 1936 advised Delbos that ’’dans les circonstances actuelles, 
ces conversations d'Etat-Major, susceptibles d'alarmer certaines 
puissances amies et de fournir à l'Allemagne le prétexte facile d'une 
tentative d'encerclement, présenteraient a mon sens de graves 
inconvénients, dont vous êtes mieux a même que moi d'apprécier la 
portée’’ (2 1 ). It has been said that Daladier was considerably 
influenced in this respect by the anti-Soviet American Ambassador, 
Bullitt ( 23 , as well as by the French General Staff (23 ), who
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persuaded him that Russia could not take any offensive action to help 
Czechoslovakia (24); in addition, he seems to have become increasingly 
dominated by anti-bolshevism. Having led his party into the Popular 
Front Daladier moved steadily towards the right in domestic politics 
until in March 1938 he refused to join Blum’s second ministry if it 
were to include the communists (25 ). Once Daladier was himself 
Premier, leading a government in which neither the Communists nor the 
Socialists participated, his relationship with the PCF deteriorated 
alarmingly, as the Communists increasingly attacked his government’s 
domestic and foreign policy, while Daldier accused them in return of 
warmongering and of causing social unrest (26). Although in retrospect 
Daladier claimed that an attempt should have been made to solve the 
question of Soviet intervention at the time of Rambouillet,there is 
every indication that, largely as a result of his own growing anti­
communism, he himself would have opposed such a move.
When visiting France in July 1937, King Carol of Roumania gained the 
impression that the new Chautempts ogovernment was inclined to relax 
France’s ties with the USSR (27). Chautemps himself was more explicit 
when, in conversation with Bullitt in December, he explained that ’’he 
would be quite ready to give the Germans all the assurances possible 
that France would never make a military alliance with the Soviet Union 
directed against Germany, or indulge in military conversations with 
the Soviet Union, and he would tell them frankly his own highly un­
favourable opinion of the Soviet Union and Bolshevism, but he could 
not formally abandon the treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet 
Union’’ (28). That Chautemps’ own views on the USSR were dominated by 
his attitude towards the French Communist Party was clear from his 
definition of ’’National Government’’ during the ministerial crisis of
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early 1938. Chautemps explained that he would insist on the exclusion 
of the communists from any government which he might form, since "they 
would report every conversation to Stalin" : the Socialists would 
consequently refuse to participate and, in the absence of any working- 
class representatives, the government would be constantly menaced by 
strikes if it did not follow a policy approved in Moscow. He added 
that "Chamberlain had telephoned him that Paul Reynaud’s statement 
that he, Chamberlain, favoured the inclusion of a Communist in the 
French Government and military conversations between the French and 
Russian General Staffs was the exact contrary of the truth".
Chautemps continued that if Blum were to form a government, on the 
other hand, he would insist on the inclusion of the communists, and 
so the Centre and Right would refuse to join, thus making the govern­
ment unworkable. The third alternative was that Harriot could form 
a government without actual communist participation, since the 
communists’ faith in Harriot was such that they believed he would 
carry out their policy without a party member being included in the 
government : the danger of this alternative was that the communists 
would demand the immediate inauguration of military talks and public 
military support for the Spanish government which, Chautemps feared, 
would lead to a declaration of war by Germany (29). Thus Chautemps’ 
attitude to the USSR was representative of that of many French 
politicians and military leaders in the period, as well as large 
sectors of the public, in that it was influenced not by any adverse 
assessment of the value of the Soviet military nor solely by fear of 
antagonising France’s allies, as is often claimed, but predominantly 
by the belief that the French Communists, acting on orders from 
Moscow, were creating social unrest in an attempt to undermine the
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French nation, and thus lead her into war with Germany.
Pierre Cot claims in his memoirs that Bonnet destroyed the Franco- 
Soviet Pact by his negotiations with Von Ribbentrop in the winter of 
1938 (30). In this. Cot is optimistically attributing some of his 
own unwavering support for the Soviet connection to his colleagues in 
the French government, possibly because he was writing in America at 
a time when many former Popular Front leaders stood accused of causing 
the fall of France, at the Riom trial under Vichy. For although it 
was not until Bonnet became dominant in foreign affairs that France 
had a leader openly devoted to the policy of appeasement at any cost, 
including the abandonment of the Franco-Soviet Pact, it had already 
become evident that the Popular Front had no real intention of 
expanding the Pact. Under the terms of the text itself, the Pact 
would not technically have lapsed until early 1941, but it is unlikely 
that anyone seriously regarded the Pact as having any value at all 
after the Czechoslovak crisis of September 1938. Certainly, during 
the tripartite Franco-British-Russian negotiations of spring 1939, 
which might at first sight appear to represent the culmination of the 
Franco-Soviet rapprochement of the preceding five years, the Franco- 
Soviet Pact played no significant role. The negotiations were under­
taken in entirely new circumstances following the German occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in March, not least of which was a direct reversal in 
positions : France and Great Britain now pursued a reluctant Russia. 
Moreover, by this time the decisive shift in Soviet policy had already 
been signalled with the announcement, on May 3rd, of the removal of 
Litvinov, who had so long worked to make Franco-Soviet rapprochement 
an effective reality.
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That France could wait until May 1939 before initiating talks with the 
Russians only underlines the weakness of the Popular Front in failing 
to develop the Soviet alliance during the three years when the Russians 
would undoubtedly have responded favourably to any French demarche. 
Indeed, had the government been truly committed to such an undertaking, 
to the same degree as Pierre Cot or Paul Reynaud, than it might have 
been possible to overcome the many obstacles. Moreover, a reinforcement 
of the Pact would almost certainly, by virtue of the very association 
between the French Communist Party and the Soviet government of which 
successive French governments complained, have ensured the Communists’ 
loyal support for the Popular Front. Indeed, apart from sporadic 
attacks on the government’s Spanish policy, which even then did not 
result in an adverse vote, the Communists continued to support the 
governments of the Popular Front, in spite of increasingly reactionary 
domestic policies, until it became clear that the Soviet Pact was being 
disregarded by all of them. In the same way, the Communists attacked 
only those politicians whom it saw as responsible for the disintegration 
of the Pact, such as Chautemps, Daladier and ultimately, Delbos,while 
unreservedly praising men of the political right and centre such as 
Harriot and Reynaud. Similarly, fortification of the Pact might have 
improved, rather than further undermined,France’s international standing, 
since in so doing she would have needed to assert her independence from 
Great Britain, to whom she in effect abdicated control over much of her 
foreign policy, while at the same time recovering some of the prestige 
which she had lost in the eyes of her smaller allies as a result of the 
Rhineland coup, by reasserting her position as the champion of democracy 
in the struggle to prevent the spread of fascism.
In this way, the Popular Front’s failure to animate the Pact is vitally
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important in an understanding of the whole of French foreign policy 
during the later 1930's, since it reflects closely the French attitude 
towards Germany, and in particular the unwillingness of the western 
democracies to recognise that Hitler’s aggression could be stopped 
only by force. The first Blum government was initially more inclined 
to adopt a bold policy towards Germany than its successors or its 
counterpart in Great Britain, showing itself willing to offer con­
cessions but only in return for global discussions, and in doing so 
showed that it was prepared to overcome its own instinctive revulsion 
from fascism : but it had neither the will, nor the real ability, to 
complement such a policy successfully by strengthening the Pact with 
Russia. We cannot know for certain whether the conclusion of a Franco- 
Soviet military accord would have provoked Germany to declare war, as 
was feared, or if it would have deterred Hitler in his plans of 
aggression, but it was already clear by June 1936 that Hitler did not 
regard the Pact as a serious threat; rather he saw it as a convenient 
pretext for his denunciation of Locarno. Moreover, it was argued that 
Germany might use any news of Franco-Soviet military talks as a 
pretext to withdraw from the Five-Power Conference, or as a justifica­
tion for further acts of aggression in Europe : no Franco-Soviet 
military accord was in fact signed, but the negotiations for a ’’new 
Locarno’’ and arms limitation agreement were still unsuccessful, and 
Germany proceeded with her aggression against Austria and Czechos­
lovakia regardless. Finally, though it might have helped to postpone 
it, the Pact failed to prevent a return to Rapallo, as had been in­
tended. The Popular Front government, compromised from the beginning 
by its relations with the Communist Party, and torn between its fear 
of losing its allies, and fear of Soviet-German rapprochement, would 
not abandon the Pact, but would not extend it as the Russians wished.
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As a result it did nothing, and the Franco-Soviet Pact under the 
Popular Front rapidly lost the little value it had ever had.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
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APPENDIX I
1. FRANCO-SOVIET PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
Le President de la République Française et le Comité Central 
Exécutif de l ’Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes,
Animés du désir d'affermir la paix en Europe et d'en garantir 
les bienfaits à leurs pays respectifs en assurant plus 
complètement 1'exacte application des dispositions du Pacte de 
la Société des Nations visant à maintenir la sécurité nationale, 
l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique des Etats,
Décidés a consacrer leurs efforts à la préparation et a la conclusion 
d'un accord européen ayant cet objet^ et, en attendant, à contribuer, 
autant qu'il dépend d'eux, a l'application efficace des dispositions 
du Pacte de la Société des Nations,
Ont résolu de conclure un Traité a cet effet et ont désigné pour 
leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:
Le Président de la République Française;
M. Pierre Laval, Sénateur, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
Le Comité Central Exécutif de l'Union des Républiques 
Soviétiques Socialistes:
M. Vladimir Potemkine, Membre du Comité Central Exécutif, 
Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de l'Union 
des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes près le Président 
de la République Française.
Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 
bonne et du forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes;
Article premier
Au cas où la France ou l'U.R.S.S. serait l'objet d'une menace 
ou d'un danger d'agression de la part d'un Etat Européen, l'U.R.S.S. 
et réciproquement la France s'engagent a procéder mutuellement à 
une consultation immediate en vue des mesures a prendre pour 
l'observation des dispositions de l'article 10 du Pacte de la 
Société des Nations.
Article 2
Au cas où, dans les conditions prévus a l'article 15» paragraphe 
7, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, la France ou l'U.R.S.S. serait, 
malgré les intentions sincèrement pacifiques des deux pajs, l'objet 
d'une agression non provoquée de la part 'd'un Etat européen, 
l'U.R.S.S. et réciproquement la France se prêteront immédiatement aide 
et assistance.
Article 3
Prenant en considération que, d'après l'article 16 du Pacte de
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la Société des Nations, tout Membre de la Société qui recourt à 
la guerre contrairement aux engagements pris aux articles 12, 13 
ou 15 du Pacte est ipso facto considéré comme ayant commis un acte 
de guerre contre tous les autres membres de la Société, la 
France et réciproquement l'U.R.S.S. s'engagent, au cas où l'une 
d'elles serait, dans ses conditions et malgré les intentions 
sincèrement pacifiques des deux pays, l'objet d'une agression 
non provoquée de la part d'un Etat européen, à se prêter immédiatement 
aide et assistance en agissant par l'application de l'article 16 du 
Pacte.
La même obligation est assumée pour le cas où la France ou 
l'U.R.^S.S. serait l'objet d'une agression de la part d'un Etat 
européen dans les conditions prévus a l'article 1?, paragraphes
I et 3 I du Pacte de la Société des Nations.
Article 4
les engagements ci-dessus stipulés étant conformés aux obligations 
des Hautes Parties Contractantes en tant que Membres de la Société 
des Nations, rien dans le présent traité ne sera interprété comme 
restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres 
à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde ou comme restreignant 
les obligations découlant pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes du 
Pacte de la Société des Nations.
Article 5
Le présent traité, dont les textes français et russe feront 
également foi, sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification 
seront échanges a Moscou aussitôt.que faire se pourra. Il sera 
enregistre au Secretariat de la Société des Nations.
II prendra effet dès l'échange des ratifications et restera en 
vigeur pendant cinq ans. S'il n'est pas dénoncé par une des Hautes 
Parties Contractantes avec un préavis d'un an au moins avant
1'expiration de cette période, il restera en vigueur sans 
limitation de durée, chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes 
pouvant alors y mettre fin par une déclaration a cet effet avec 
préavis d'un an.
En foi de quoi, les Plénipoteniaires ont signé le présent Traité 
et y ont appose leurs sceaux.
Fait a Paris, en double expedition le 2 mai 1935*
(L.S.) (Signe) Pierre LAVAL.
(L.S.) (Signé) V . 'POTEMKINE.
2. PROTOCOLE DE SIGNATURE
Au moment de procéder à la signature du Traité d'assistance
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mutuelle franco-soviétique en date de ce jour, les 
Plénipotentiaires ont signé le Protocole suivant qui sera compris 
dans l'échange des ratifications du Traité.
Il est entendu que l'effet de l'article 3 est obliger chaque 
Partie Contractante a prêter immédiatement assistance à l'autre 
en se conformant immédiatement aux recommandations du Conseil de 
la Société des Nations, aussitôt qu'elles auront été énoncées en 
vertu de l'article l6 du Pacte. Il est également entendu que les 
deux Parties Contractantes agiront de concert pour obtenir que le 
Conseil énonce ses recommandations avec toute la rapidité 
qu'exigeront les circonstances et que, si néanmoins le Conseil, 
pour une raison quelconque, n'énonce aucune recommandation ou s'il 
n'arrive pas à un vote unanime, l'obligation d'assistance n'en 
recevra pas moins l'application. Il est également entendu que les 
engagements d'assistance prévus dans le présent Traité ne visent que 
le cas d'une agression effectuée contre le territoire propre de 
l'une ou de l'autre Partie Contractante.
II
l'intention commune des deux Gouvernements étant de ne contredire 
en rien, par le present Traité, les engagements précédement assumes 
envers des Etats tiers par la France et par l'U.R.S.S. en vertu de 
traités publies, il est entendu que les dispositions dudit Traité 
ne pourront pas recevoir une application qui, étant incompatible 
avec des obligations conventionelles assumé.es par une Partie 
Contractante, exposerait celle-ci a des sanctions de caractère 
international.
III
Les deux Gouvernements, estimant désirable la conclusion d'un 
accord regional qui tendrait à organiser la sécurité entre Etats 
contractants et qui pourrait comporter ou que pourraient 
accompagner d'autre part des engagements d'assistance mutuelle, 
se reconnaissent la faculté de participer, de leur consentement 
mutuel, le cas échéant, à de semblables accords dans telle forme, 
directe ou indirecte, qui paraîtrait appropriée, les engagements de 
ces divers accords devant se substituer à ceux resultant du 
présent Traite.
IV
Les deux Gouvernements constatent que les négociations qui 
viennent d"avoir pour résultat la signature du présent Traité 
ont été engagées, a l'origine, en vue de compléter un accord 
de securité englobant les pays du nord-est de l'Europe, a savoir 
l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes, l'Allemagne, 
la Tchécoslaviquie, la Pologne et les Etats baltes voisins de 
l'Union des republiques soviétiques socialistes; à coté de cet 
accord devait etre conclu un Traite d'assistance entre l'Union 
des republiques soviétiques socialistes, la France et l'Allemagne, 
chacun de ces trois Etats devant s'engager a prêter assistance 
a celui d'entre eux qui serait l'objet d'une -agression de la 
part de l'un de ces trois Etats. Bien que les circonstances 
n'aient pas jusqu'ici permis la conclusion de ces accords, que 
les deux parties continuent a considérer comme désirable, il 
n'en reste pas moins que les engagements énoncés dans le Traité
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d'assistance franco-sovietique doivent être entendus connue ne 
devant jouer que dans les limites envisagées dans l'accord 
tripartite antérieurement projeté. Indépendamment des 
obligations découlant du présent Traité, il est rappelé en 
même temps que, conformément au Pacte franco-soviétique de 
non-agression signé le 29 novembre 1932 et sans porter par 
ailleurs atteinte a l'universalité des engagements de ce Pacte, 
au cas où l'une des deux Parties deviendrait l'objet d'une 
agression de la part d'une ou de plusieurs tierces puissances 
européennes non visées dans l'accord tripartite ci-dessus 
mentionné, l'autre Partie contractante devra s'abstenir, pendant 
la durée du conflit, de toute aide ou assistance directe ou 
indirecte a l'agresseur.ou aux agresseurs, chaque Partie 
déclarant d'ailleurs n'être liée par aucun accord d'assistance 
qui se trouverait en contradiction avec cet engagement.
Fait à Paris, le 2 mai 1935
(Signé) Pierre LAVAL 
(Signé) V. POTEMKINE
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APPENDIX II
ratification of the Franco--Soviet Pact
Party
For
Votes
Against Total
Communist 12 0 12
Croupe d'unité ouvrière 5 0 5
S.F.I.O. 118 0 118
Union socialiste et 
républicaine 9 0 9
Parti socialist français 4 0 4
Républicain socialiste 20 0 20
Républicain radical et 
Radical socialiste 40 2 42
Radical socialiste 99 2 101
Radical indépendant 0 4 4
Indépendant de gauche 9 4 13
Gauche radicale 6 12 18
Gauche démocratique 2 2 4
Alliance démocratique 16 32 48
Démocrates populaires 3 7 10
Union républicaine et 
démocratique 3 27 30
Centre républicain 0 24 24
Fédération républicaine 1 20 21
Indépendant 3 15 18
Non-inscrit 3 13 16
Ail parties 353 164 517
*******************
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APPENDIX III
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APPENDIX IV
Possible action by Soviet airforce in the event of conflict 
with Germany Î-. ' From Russian Airbases
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Fig. 1
Aircraft with range of 800 kilometres operating from Russian 
airbases.
— ---- —  from Minsk.
■" —  from J itomir.
P Minsk
Fig. 2
Aircraft with range of 1,000 kilometres from Russian airbases 
^  —  ' from Minsk from J itomir
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2. From Polish airbases
Fig. 3
Aircraft with range of 800 and 1,000 kilometres operating 
from Polish airbases.
range of 1,000 kilometres 
range of 800 kilometres
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